He rages comfortably against the truth

“If you had to choose between truth and comfort, which would you choose?”

So the question is posed by Matt Oxley rhetorically to the readers of his blog as a way of introducing his thoughts on the existential tension between truth on the one hand and comfort on the other, a tension he experienced as he progressively expunged his former charismatic Christian faith, a painful process of replacing what was comfortable with what is true. Oxley is a self-proclaimed atheist who is sharing with others the dimensions and contours of his journey away from the charismatic faith that he once held dear, an itinerarium mentis in a direction opposite of mine toward an ostensibly godless view of the world and life.

“When I began recognizing this truth,” he writes regarding the deception in charismatic churches, “it was anything but comfortable.” And this former comfort he describes as a sort of uneasy truce between how he wanted the world to be and how it actually is, a cognitive dissonance maintained by a promissory note of a celestial afterlife. Now if that accurately characterizes the intellectual life of the charismatic, well then, I could hardly fault his journey away from it. In addition to the moralist burden he describes having to shoulder (i.e., “denying your carnal desires and working to please [God] all of your life”), the intellectual anorexia would surely leave me desperate for something more authentic and honest. For some of us, a group I suspect Oxley would count himself among, such intellectual curiosity is inexorable and insatiable. But just here marks a notable difference between someone like Oxley and someone like myself; we both came to a point where we lost faith in a childish understanding of God, but I did not confuse that with losing faith in God whereas Oxley did. Having said that, there is a more important observation that I should like to make about his post.

He places such a high value on truth that often he capitalizes it, almost as though the word Truth were just as good as the word God (although on his view it is better). I should think that as a former Christian he could probably define to some extent what ‘God’ means, and he certainly defined what ‘comfort’ means, but notice the odd fact that he never bothers to define what ‘truth’ means. “The way I determine what is true,” he said, “has changed dramatically,” but then notice that he never bothers to give that account. How is it that someone who esteems truth above comfort can provide an account of the latter but offer nothing on the former? He described what his perspective on truth used to be: “I used to believe that if the Bible said it [then] it must be Truth. I didn’t even have to question that conclusion; my faith allowed for that to be so.” Yes but that was when he firmly staked his yellow Gadsden flag in the soil of comfort. “It was comfortable to me and I had no reason to question it.” Things are different now, he would have us believe. Comfort was swallowed up in truth, that principle he esteems enough to capitalize but not enough to provide an account of. He surrendered comfort to pursue truth, but was that before or after determining what is true? And this issue is made all the more salient by his comment about embracing the “standard of evidence” he knew existed but ignored most of his life, which represents a potential confusion of the metaphysical (what is true) with the epistemological (how we know it).

I can appreciate Oxley’s disdain for the way he viewed the world and life in his charismatic faith, but I find myself concerned by the echoes of Eden reverberating through his equally naive approach to this new journey. Has he exchanged comfort for truth, or just one type of comfort for another? While he says that he has a very different way of determining what is true, he does not give any sort of account of that except by means of what that way used to be and no longer is. Moreover, even his description of the way he used to determine what is true is not entirely meaningful. “If the Bible said it, then it must be truth.” For that to be meaningful there must be some way of determining what the Bible said (i.e., rules and principles of interpretation). I could go on but the point has been made. I should like to offer a challenge to Oxley for an upcoming blog post:

• “Please explain the way you now determine what is true.”

I am not sure I can entirely relate to Oxley’s experience of existential tension between truth and comfort. I am a critical skeptic by nature, an intellectual attitude that I had not only prior to my conversion to the Christian faith but one that has been deeply cultivated by that faith; that is to say, I have always pursued that which shakes me up from intellectual comfort, constantly seeking out things that challenge my beliefs. I am not sure why someone would prefer comfort over truth the way Oxley did; it is a foreign concept to me. But that just goes to underscore the point I had implicitly made earlier, that one does not need to lose faith in God in order to abandon a childish understanding of faith in God. Truth, logic, reason, knowledge, science, etc.; such things thrive under Christian theology, notwithstanding some weak charismatic faith that cowers with a contrary opinion. I applaud Oxley for turning his back on an intellectual wasteland, but I do not understand his choice of embracing another one.

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Matt Oxley, “Truth over comfort,” RagingRev (2011, August 25).
http://ragingrev.com/2011/08/truth-over-comfort/

Pointless Belief

From the EthicalAtheist.com web page "Questions for God" [1]:

Why don't you show yourself? You supposedly made us and want us to believe in you, right? Why the big mystery? You're also omnipresent, right? Why don't you show yourself to all of us at once and have a personal discussion with us? You can pick the date and time, we'll all stop what we are doing, I'm sure.

Why doesn't God dance when you want him to, and to the tune of your choosing? Why doesn't God put on some righteous cosmic magic show to convince you that he exists? Allow me to submit what I think is a far more pertinent question: "What would be the point?"

Imagine for a moment that God does your bidding. Whatever it would take to convince you that he exists, let's assume for the sake of argument that he produced it. Presto, you affirm that indeed God exists.

Now what?

So you now believe he exists. Well that's fantastic but, if I may be so bold, "So what?" What does this profit you? Are you so ignorant and out of touch that you think God will love you and accept you just because you assent intellectually to his existence? Are you so presumptuous as to dismiss with a wave of the hand your tremendous debt of moral culpability and (even worse) God's righteousness and sovereignty? Is God supposed to be so overwhelmed with gratitude for your cognitive approbation that he will just ignore the holy demands of justice? It's great that you now believe he exists. But so what? Will you now obey his commands? Do you throw away your ethics and other philosophical commitments and subject yourself fully to the will of God and what he demands?

No.

Why doesn't he show himself? Why doesn't he put on a cosmic magic show to convince atheists he exists? Because it would be pointless. It profits him nothing. It profits the atheist nothing. The atheist's intellectual assent is barren and impotent. For Satan himself believes that God exists, and he will believe that all the way to hell. The problem is not in the atheist's head but in his heart. When it comes to a relationship with God, the atheist's problem is not an intellectual one, but a moral one—on several different fronts.

As Rabbi Harold Kushner so eloquently put the matter:

Paul, whose conversation with me ultimately flowered into this book [2], assured me that while he did not believe in religion, he believed in God. I asked him what he meant by that, and he told me that when he contemplates the beauty and intricacy of the world, he has to believe that God exists. That’s very nice, I told him, and I’m sure God appreciates your vote of confidence. But for the religious mind and soul, the issue has never been the existence of God but the importance of God, the difference that God makes in the way we live. To believe that God exists the way that you believe the South Pole exists, though you have never seen either one, to believe in the reality of God the way you believe in the Pythagorean theorem as an accurate abstract statement that does not really affect your daily life, is not a religious stance. A God who exists but does not matter, who does not make a difference in the way you live, might as well not exist.

David Silverman and "Top 10 Atheist Myths"

David Silverman is the Communications Director for the web site American Atheists [1], which describes itself as an organization laboring for the civil liberties of Atheists, a total wall of separation between church and state, and providing information about Atheism [2]. A philosopher could almost make a career out of critiquing the ideas and propaganda that are published at that site, but in this piece here I want to critique one specific article: the list that Silverman published about the "Top Ten Atheist Myths" [3]. (I am trying to ignore my pedantic itch to indicate that the title implies myths which atheists have; i.e., it ought to say "Top Ten Myths About Atheists.") And I want to be clear that I am writing from the perspective of a Christian philosopher, not from that of a generic theist (which would include any religion that advocates a deity or deities, e.g., Islam, Hinduism, etc.).

Out of the ten alleged myths that Silverman claims theists have about atheists, he successfully identifies only one: Myth #4, and only assuming that I have correctly understood the alleged myth. The other nine are either not myths (e.g., Myth #1) or they are not about atheists (e.g., Myth #10). The only myth he manages to successfully identify—assuming I have correctly understood it—is the myth that atheists must be able to prove that God doesn't exist in order to be atheists. That is indeed a myth. However, he is wrong that it's one which theists have. Hardly any theists think that. That is a popular myth only amongst brainless Protestant Christian fundamentalists (especially Myth #2), which is a very tiny fraction of those who are theists.

But that is the other problem with Silverman's article. Despite his constant allusion to theists, Silverman spends no time whatsoever on theists; the context of his responses are seemingly geared toward only one select demographic (brainless fundies) of one select branch (Protestant) of one select theism (Christianity), evidenced probably nowhere better than Myth #10. Furthermore, Silverman spends most of his time defending Secular Humanists, not atheists. He needs to change the title of his article to "The Top One Myth That Brainless Protestant Christian Fundies Have About Atheists."

1. "Atheists are all the same."

I am not even sure what this means, quite frankly. And despite the considerable extent of my experiences in philosophical education and discourse, both casual and academic, not once have I ever heard this supposed myth. Something this obscure certainly does not belong on a Top Ten list. Having said that, if I were to make an educated guess at Silverman's meaning, I would assume that he is calling it a myth the notion that all atheists can be lumped together.

Despite his contention, that is actually not a myth. It is a fact that atheists can all be lumped together—under 'atheism', which he nearly recognizes by his statement that atheists "are bound only by our atheism." It is true that atheists quickly diversify ideologically beyond their atheism; e.g., one atheist may be a Buddhist, another may be a Secular Humanist, etc. But what Silverman apparently fails to realize, having tripped over his own equivocating fallacy [4], is that this is also true for theists. It is likewise a fact that theists can be all lumped together—under 'theism' (being bound only by their theism). And it is likewise true that theists quickly diversify ideologically beyond their theism; e.g., one theist may be a Christian, another may be a Hindu, etc. It is unfortunate but Silverman did not address this so-called "myth" accurately or fairly.

Additionally, Silverman insists that "believers must be bound by much more than a simple belief in God." But this is erroneous, too: it is not true that a theist is bound by more than a simple belief in God. Although specific types of theists may be committed to a number of additional beliefs (e.g., Muslim), this is also true for specific types of atheists (e.g., Secular Humanist). A 'theist' is nothing more than a person who assents intellectually to the existence of a deity or deities, whether emphatically or agnostically, just as an 'atheist' is nothing more than a person who consciously rejects the existence of any deities, whether emphatically or agnostically. Moreover, a theist's beliefs are no less a choice than an atheist's beliefs; i.e., indeed atheists freely choose their beliefs, but so do theists. Understand that clearly. There is no "must" in a theist's beliefs substantively different from the compelling motivation that drives an atheist to his beliefs. Both camps are comprised of those who affirm their convictions zealously (fanatic) and those who may not have explored their beliefs very much at all (apathetic).

Furthermore, he states that atheists are Republicans and they are Democrats, they are both men and women, they are gays and straights, blacks and whites. The same is true for theists, Mr. Silverman. There are Republicans who are Jews, Democrats who are Muslim, men who are Sikh, women who are Baha'i, gays who are Christian, straights who are Zoroastrian, etc. There is diversity in both camps, atheism and theism alike.

Finally, he claims that atheists "accept every person, as they are, as equals." That, unfortunately, is a bold generalization that fails to square with reality, a delusion in virtue of being contradicted by evidence. It is true only for those atheists who affirm the system of values described by Silverman's statement. It is not true for atheists who are racist, for example, who do not accept every person as equals. Does the fact that they don't share his system of values mean they are not atheists? Of course not, which leads to another problem with his statement: it reaches beyond what atheism is, in itself. Atheism is a position on the question of deities, not on the question of ethics (i.e., morals and values). For the latter, one must reach beyond atheism to something like Secular Humanism, for example—which is atheistic, but it is not atheism. Yet atheism is precisely what the subject of this list is supposed to be. This is not a list of myths about Secular Humanism or any other atheistic belief system, but rather atheism itself.

2. "Atheists have no morals, since they don't believe in God."

I am willing to believe that there are people who "seriously say that humans need to fear eternal damnation in order to do good," but I have good reason to believe that they are very few in number. It almost seems as though Silverman is taking the extreme views of certain Protestant Christian fundamentalists and pretending that this characterizes theists nationwide (Muslims, Hindus, Zoroastrians, Tenrikyos, Christians, Baha'i, Sikhs, Rastafarians, Jews, etc.)—all of whom are theists and who are the ones that Silverman wishes to disabuse of these ten myths ("the myths about atheists that are popular among theists"). In actuality, Mr. Silverman, it is "a sad world" when so many like you think that 'theist' means brainless Protestant Christian fundamentalist, a very narrow definition in the extreme which excludes hundreds of millions of other Christians and, worse yet, billions of theists.

No intelligent theist believes that "atheists have no morals." No intelligent theist thinks that "just because [atheists] are different from them" it somehow makes atheists "inherently bad." If Silverman is writing for unintelligent theists, then I fear he is wasting his time and efforts. Unintelligent theists do not typically appreciate rational discourse (assuming they can even recognize it) nor is that what shapes their ideas and beliefs. Silverman ought to be writing for intelligent theists with whom his arguments would have a far better chance of finding traction. And, as I said, no intelligent theist believes that atheists have no morals.

At any rate, Silverman argues that "humans have the idea of 'right and wrong' imbedded in them by their own brains, as well as [by] their upbringing and society." This statement of faith is obviously something that Silverman himself believes, but the reader needs to realize that although it may be atheistic it certainly is not atheism. That is to say, it is myths about atheists that Silverman is supposed to be addressing so he needs to broaden his thinking to include all those atheists who don't necessarily agree with his statement. Although there are some atheists who do share this belief in common with him, there are certainly many who do not. There are, for example, atheists who believe there is no such thing as 'right and wrong' in any real or meaningful sense (e.g., Sartre, Nietzsche, etc.), that such ideas are nothing more than certain firing patterns of neural activity in the human brain in a causal relationship with the universe's physical laws (the only consistent atheists, I submit). If Silverman is going to cherry-pick the atheists his list is supposed to defend, he ought to be honest about it within the article itself. Otherwise he should stick to myths about atheists that can apply to all atheists, instead of espousing these ethical theories that atheism has nothing to do with.

As for Silverman's remarks about the number of self-identified atheists in the nation, as well as those in various stages of the correctional system, I have no idea how that relates to myths about atheists, refutes the Christian philosophical argument on metaethics, or is any sort of criticism of Christian theology in general. Although Silverman would like to think that he has thus far successfully proved that "religion and ethical behaviour are not even slightly related," it has been exposed here that (a) he has not even come close and that (b) it would nevertheless be utterly irrelevant to the task he set before himself: clearing up myths about atheists.

Do his statements thus far truly "piss off the theists"? Of course not. For one thing, his statements have been incredibly weak at best, being mostly irrelevant. For another, his statements have pretty much ignored theists, seeming to concentrate instead upon a select demographic of a select branch of a select type of theist. There are millions upon millions of theists throughout the United States who would be scratching their heads wondering why Silverman is not more honest, editing his article to address brainless "Christian fundies" (which it does) instead of intelligent "theists" (which it does not).

3. "Atheists believe in evolution, but that doesn't answer as many questions as creationism."

Once again, completely irrelevant to the task of clearing up myths about atheists. Period. This should not even be on a list like this. First, practically all atheists do believe in evolution. That is not a myth, sorry. It is an easily verifiable fact. And whether or not evolution answers "as many questions as creationism" has absolutely nothing to do with myths about atheists in the first place. There is literally nothing here for me to address. It is that irrelevant.

But I do have to address one particular point. Silverman claims that "believers are loath to discuss where God came from, or what he was doing before the creation." This could not possibly be any more false. It is in fact contradicted by volumes of evidence, rendering his claim delusional. (Yes, I know that Silverman is again speaking of a specific type of theist, i.e., those who believe in one eternal God who personally created the world.) They are not loath to discuss the question: they have answered it, directly and repeatedly, and there are countless articles online and in print where it can be found. The question is identified as being fallacious; it commits the plurium interrogationum logical fallacy [5] by assuming within the question a God that no monotheist believes in (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). In order to ask where God came from, one has to first assume that God came from somewhere. But such an assumption fails to correspond with the monotheistic belief in an eternal, self-existent God. In other words, he did not "come from" anywhere; he has always been. The question fails to address that God. As for what God was doing before creation, that too has been answered numerous times throughout the centuries: no one knows because (a) no one was there and (b) no one has been told. (I have chosen to refrain from nitpicking the fact that "before" is temporal language that is meaningless outside the existence of 'time', to which it stands in relation.)

4. "Atheists cannot know there is no God, since you cannot prove he doesn't exist."

This, too, does not belong on a list like this because it's not a myth about atheists. It is not a myth but a fact that atheists (a) cannot know there is no God and (b) cannot prove he doesn't exist. That is true. And I have read a number of atheistic scholars who have admitted as much (e.g., Michael Shermer). So what could Silverman have been trying to address here?

Judging by the context of his response, it seems that he is addressing a myth that atheists must be able to prove that God doesn't exist in order to be atheists. If that is the point he is addressing, and I certainly believe that it is, then he is right to address it. Atheism does not explicitly affirm the non-existence of God (although individual atheists can, and some do); atheism is simply the conscious rejection of theism, typically a refusal to believe that God exists. Etymologically, an atheist is someone who is "without God," someone who views the world and lives his life as though God does not exist, "godless," in the same way that something is asymmetrical when it is "without symmetry." Whether or not God actually exists is irrelevant; Silverman can be an atheist even if God does exist, because 'atheist' describes the nature of Silverman's belief system without saying anything about God.

5. "Atheists seek to remove religion from society, and to force all people to be atheists."

This is not a myth, although it certainly is a sweeping generalization that fails to square with reality. In other words, it is not true of all atheists—but it is not a myth either. There certainly are a number of atheists, both contemporary and historically, who this accurately characterizes (e.g., The End of Faith by Sam Harris). So although this is not false—not a myth—it is true of only some atheists and should, therefore, be properly qualified (e.g., "There are atheists who seek...").

6. "Atheists are so closed-minded, they can't see that miracles happen every day!"

This is not a myth, as demonstrated by Silverman himself within his own response! In the event that you are wondering what 'irony' is, please read his response. His stated intention is to identify and clear up at least ten myths about atheists, and yet on this point his response went toward establishing that it's not a myth. When it comes to whether or not miracles exist, Silverman proclaims that "they never do." The irony is thick, and certainly amuses this author.

7. "Atheists are pushing a negative sentiment, and have a dreary life."

Silverman's response to this one is simply erroneous, which will be addressed in a moment. First I want to point out the fact that (a) the first clause is true by definition and (b) the second clause is not a myth, although its truth does not bear out in every case; in other words, it is true of many atheists but not of all atheists.

It is not a myth that "atheists are pushing a negative sentiment." It is true, and that by definition; i.e., the very definition of atheism is a negative, insofar as it's the negation of 'theos'. That is the "negative sentiment" which all atheists push, by being atheists: the negation of God from every equation.

The second clause is not a myth, although it is not necessarily true in all cases or at all times. It is a sweeping generalization and those never succeed. There are some atheists who for the most part lead content and rewarding lives, and there are many whose lives are dreary at times and rewarding at times. But certainly there are some whose lives are mostly dreary. The sticky part (for whoever tries to make such a suggestion) is trying to prove that this dreariness is a result of their atheism. The best of luck with that. It can be done, of course, but neither easily nor categorically.

So what was erroneous about Silverman's response? Quite succinctly, his response defended something other than atheism. It promoted a number of sentiments that had Secular Humanist characteristics, but here is the problem: not all atheists are Secular Humanists. And yet it is myths about atheists that Silverman is supposed to be identifying and clearing up. Throughout his article Silverman almost routinely conflated Secular Humanism with atheism, the same way he almost routinely conflated Christianity with theism. These are the equivocations he commits repeatedly.

It is very interesting to note that he refrains from identifying who this "false deity" is, but it's good that he refrained because the moment he identifies it he's committed to a logical fallacy that is impossible to escape (argumentum ad ignorantiam, "Since X has not been proven true, it is therefore false").

8. "If atheists are right, then religious people are wasting their time, but at least they're happy. No harm in that! If religious people are right, then atheists are going to hell. It seems logical that atheists should become religious just to be safe."

This is not a myth about atheists. This is Pascal's Wager [6]. There is literally nothing to respond to here. (And did Silverman really state that "drug addicts go through life happy"? Really?)

9. "There are no such things as atheists." a.k.a. "There are no atheists in foxholes."

This is not a myth about atheists. It's a denial that atheists exist. There is nothing to respond to here.

10. "This country was founded by Christians, on Christian values, and should therefore be a Christian country."

This is not a myth about atheists. There is nothing to respond to here. (It does, however, support my contention that Silverman routinely conflated Christianity with theism. Christianity is theistic, but it is not theism.)

Another Rational Atheist

Evidently there are some atheists who do not know how to read—which is quite an extraordinary paradox, given their apparent ability to write. You see, despite the fact that my former blog Apologia has been declared 'Closed' for more than a year, it continues to receive drive-by comments from these visitors. (Some might argue that perhaps these visitors are linked to the specific article in question by Google, but that is no excuse because I reiterate within the Comments field itself that the blog is closed.)

A gentleman by the name of Nigel Davies recently left a terrific scholarly response:

Your religion does not declare that there is one God atall. It declares faith in the Holy Trinity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost betraying its origins in pre-Christian faiths of multiple gods. You have rationalised that down to one god but you have one more reduction to go before you reach the fact that there is actually no god atall.

Christianity does not declare that there is one God, Davies states. Were you aware of this? I wasn't. That was definitely news to me. When I examine every reasonable standard of historic Christian belief, from apostolic teaching and throughout the history of orthodox doctrine, I find again and again the declaration that there is one God—and at times rather explicitly, in direct repudiation of relevant heresies (e.g., The Nicene Creed, which begins with the affirmation, "I believe in one God").

Do you know what we call a proposition that's contradicted by evidence? A delusion, sir. This is especially the case when the amount of invalidating evidence is so extensive. Now, I think it's quite probable that Davies meant to say that the expression 'trinitarian monotheism' is an oxymoron but, if that is so, he really ought to have said that because that's quite a different statement—but it's also an extremely difficult one to support, given a responsible definition of both terms (viz. both terms presuppose a singular deity).

Of particular interest to me, of course, is his bold assertion that it's a "fact" that God does not exist. Oh how I would love to examine the evidence which establishes that as a fact. I shall not hold my breath, though.

Håvard Skjæveland and the Problem of Evil – Part 1

It seems that my discussion with Skjæveland on the Problem of Evil (i.e., how it supposedly demonstrates the probability that God doesn’t exist) has drawn to a tentative close. And I want to highlight the term “tentative” because he has not exactly given up yet. Let me explain where we’re at thus far and how we got here.

First, a little background information on Skjæveland. He is a 23-year old student from Stavanger, Norway, who is studying web programming. He is an avowed atheist who describes himself as “running pretty high on Richard Dawkins’ atheism scale” which means, I have reason to think, he affirms the ‘strong’ version of atheism. He also admitted to me that his thinking has been influenced by the New Atheist propaganda of Dawkins, Hitchens, Dennet, and Harris. (These gentlemen are reliable on philosophy in the same way that Duane Gish is reliable on science.)

On December 10th he introduced himself to me in an email which described his appreciation of the fact that someone else actually recognizes the fundamental difference between agnosticism and atheism, that the former addresses an issue different from the latter. “I was beginning to think I was alone!” he exclaimed. And in a subsequent email he shared with me a brief synopsis of his atheistic convictions and how he arrived at them. A particularly compelling issue for him, he said, was how convincingly the Problem of Evil undermines Christian theism. (I chose to ignore his thoughts on other religions, e.g., Hinduism, because I have no interest in defending those.) Since I have never encountered a Problem of Evil argument that accomplishes its intended aim—and I have examined many, both historical and contemporary—I thought this could be an issue worth exploring. He agreed to engage me on it.

He began with the logical Problem of Evil argument as presented by Epicurus, whom he cited directly, an argument taken up by others like David Hume and John L. Mackie. However, this alleged problem suffers from a fatal flaw, I pointed out—the definition of ‘evil’. Epicurus and others who submit this problem use the term 'evil' but never bother to define it. Until that term is defined, the problem is a lifeless corpse with no merit whatsoever because 'evil' lies at the very heart of the issue. “If you find the logical Problem of Evil argument compelling,” I said, “it's because you have assumed a definition of 'evil' on behalf of the argument.” I told him that he needed to disclose this definition he was assuming in order to continue examining the problem.

At this point he backed away from the Problem of Evil argument. “I don’t really know how to define evil,” he confessed, and asked if we could approach it as a Problem of Suffering argument instead. “Surely you agree,” he said, “that there is gratuitous suffering in the world,” that God could do something “so that people don’t suffer needlessly.” And I had to stop him right there. First, the Problem of Suffering argument shoulders an enormous burden of proof that has to be met. As the critical mind will detect, asking me to agree from the outset that gratuitous suffering exists is to beg the very question, which is fallacious. Since the supposed existence of gratuitous suffering lies at the heart of the argument—the very issue upon which it is hinged—he cannot simply assume it, nor can he ask me to.

Second, how I understand the term “suffering” differs explicitly from how he understands it (because our metaethics are antithetical, mine being God-based and him being an atheist), so my agreement would only encourage the fallacy of equivocation at any rate. Then I reset the conversation, underscoring the two things that must be established. “If you cannot prove the gratuity of human suffering, the argument fails. If you cannot prove that human suffering is inconsistent with the attributes of God, the argument fails” (viz. omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent).

Skjæveland said he didn’t know how to go about proving the gratuity of suffering “except to come up with hypothetical scenarios” by which to illustrate it. So he called upon the example of rape: “Surely the woman being raped didn’t ask for it and certainly doesn’t deserve it.” Again I had to note the logical fallacy being committed, or possibly two different fallacies. On the one hand, he is possibly committing the fallacy of arguing from incredulity; i.e., “This suffering must be gratuitous because I can’t believe it’s not.”

On the other hand, he is definitely committing the fallacy of begging the question; i.e., “This is gratuitous suffering because it is gratuitous.” How did he commit this fallacy? By stating that the rape victim did not deserve it. Unfortunately, that assumes the truth of the very conclusion to be proved. “I am not trying to suggest she did deserve it,” I said. “It's just that I won't be bullied into a conclusion, if you know what I mean.” Nothing defeats an argument quite like fallacies, by which it defeats itself. They are to be avoided. Does there exist gratuitous suffering? That’s the burden shouldered by this argument, which must be met because if gratuitous suffering does not exist then the argument is a dog with no bite.

On the issue of whether or not human suffering is inconsistent with the attributes of God, Skjæveland had no directly relevant response. The only response he had was, “If God made us this way, doesn’t that suggest that God is at least imperfect?” First of all, God is not imperfect if the history of creation is unfolding precisely as he had planned it, meeting every purpose for which it was designed. Second, I was unable to determine how the angle his response took here adequately meets the burden of proof. The perfection of God was not the issue. The issue is the alleged conflict between human suffering and a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. So I had asked him to clarify, if he could, how his response relevantly answers that issue.

And at this point he backed away from the Problem of Suffering argument too. “I’ll concede the two informal fallacies you bring up,” he said, and further conceded that suffering could be consistent with the attributes of God (although it makes him wonder if God is “toying with us,” which I subsequently answered). “Can we leave the Argument of Suffering behind for the moment, and maybe drive back to pick it up later on?” he asked. “I admit tentative defeat; I need to think about it more and familiarize myself with the issues better.”

The following was my reply, in part:

According to my understanding, you were trying to describe an argument against the existence of God that you thought was compelling. What I was trying to do—the only thing I was trying to do—was critically examine the argument with you to see if it had any rational force. I accept that you found the argument compelling, but I disagree it was for rational reasons. In order to make my case, I had to score the argument rationally (step-by-step with you, in a somewhat Socratic fashion). By proving its logical weakness, I thereby establish that its compelling force could not have been reason.

I don't want to appear as though I am disparaging your intellect. I am personally convinced that you are quite a highly intelligent man. Please understand that. But I do think people should be honest with themselves—in my own opinion, speaking from my commitment to critical thinking. If an argument is proven to be logically untenable, then a person should be honest with himself and admit that its compelling force must have been something other than reason, i.e., that he came to the argument already convinced to some degree.

So here is my suspicion. I think you already sensed on some intuitive level that there was a conflict between what you see as gratuitous suffering on the one hand and the supposed attributes of God on the other, and you gravitated toward arguments that seemed to provide rational ammunition for what you already believed. In other words, the arguments did not convince you, but they were needed as rational support for what you already believed. Maybe by recognizing and honestly admitting that these arguments are logically untenable, a way can be opened for discovering why you think there's a conflict between the world and God.

I know you're not prepared to concede that yet. Given our brief exchange thus far, you are perhaps beginning to see that it's possible these arguments are untenable, but I don't think we've had enough mileage on this yet to convince you. I know only because I've done the homework already; now I'm showing you that homework. We'll get there, but on your terms.

This is where the critical analysis of the Problem of Evil or Suffering rests at this point. I’m pretty sure that we will return to it later, but for now I suspect that Skjæveland wants to (a) intellectually digest the criticisms I had raised, (b) review the arguments put forth by atheist philosophers on this issue, to find out if his presentation was missing something, and if so, what, and (c) to see if any of them adequately address the criticisms I had raised. He never said any of this, mind you; it’s just my suspicion, based on nothing other than the fact that it’s something I would do, having been in a similar position myself at times.

- - -

NB: I just want to underscore one remarkable feature of my present debate with Skjæveland, because its significance simply must not go unnoticed. In all the years I have engaged countless atheists in debate, not a single one has ever conceded (a) the logical fallacies I have pointed out in their arguments or (b) any sort of defeat of their argument. Without any exceptions, every single one of those atheists have insisted that either no fallacies were committed or that I don’t understand what fallacies are—even when the fallacy they commit is almost verbatim identical to the examples given in Logic textbooks I cite from.

I want to formally recognize and acknowledge that Skjæveland is the very first atheist I’ve ever debated who had the personal and intellectual integrity to concede a logical fallacy when indicated and the defeat it incurred. My respect for him can scarcely be measured it is so high. Out of hundreds of atheists, he’s the first. This man has a place of high honor in my estimation.

Håvard Skjæveland and the Problem of Evil

I am currently engaged in an email discussion with a young Norwegian by the name of Håvard Skjæveland on the Problem of Evil argument against the existence of God. (His internet footprint is outdated, he tells me, so take whatever you find about him with a grain of salt.) Our discussion began about four days ago and is still ongoing. Once it is completed, I intend to publish the results here in my blog, having received his permission to do so. Keep an eye out for this. He is a very intelligent, articulate, and respectful young man and our discussion is proving to be quite fruitful, certainly on my end.

(NOTE: As it stands right now, the discussion is shifting away from the problem of ‘evil’ in favour of the problem of ‘suffering’, but I am leaving the title as it is because whether the issue is ‘evil’ or ‘suffering’ the fundamental context is synonymous.)

Layman & Euthyphro

Pulled from Atheism.org in their "Quotation of the Minute" box:

"[Given the legitimacy of purely hypothetical questions] . . . even if God would not approve of torture, it is still true, according to the divine command theory, that if He were to approve of torture, then torture would be right." (Layman, p. 38)

Layman has latched onto the Euthyphro dilemma, which has no compelling force against Christian theism. His statement is non-sequitur when contemplating a God who is (i) immutable and (ii) omnibenevolent, and a moral order that is (iii) grounded in the very nature of God. All three are hallmarks of Christian theology.

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Layman, C. Stephen. The Shape of the Good: Christian Reflections on the Foundation of Ethics. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame. (1991)

Anderson's 'Problem from Evil' Argument

INTRODUCTION

If one is willing to believe the rhetoric, it is Problem of Evil arguments that make the most convincing case for Atheism. Obviously I have witnessed this rhetoric coming from the ranks of atheists but, curiously enough, I also witness some Christian ministers and apologists saying the same thing. Personally, I am nowhere near convinced; I have yet to discover a Problem of Evil argument that sustains the conclusion it sets out to establish (whether the impossibility or improbability of God's existence).

CURTIS ANDERSON'S ARGUMENT

The following argument comes from Curtis Anthony Anderson, a very intelligent and knowledgeable Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Santa Barbara. He identifies it as The Argument from Evil: Inductive Version [1]:

1. If God exists, then He is omnipotent, omniscient, and all good.
   
   
2. There is a tremendous amount of evil in the world, some of it not caused by human beings and apparently gratuitous. (Here might follow a long description of natural disasters, diseases afflicting the apparently innocent, and so on.)
   
   
3. It is unlikely that such an amount and kind of evil would exist if there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and all good being.
   
   
4. Probably, God does not exist.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Although I do not think Anderson himself is an atheist, since he is a member of the Society for Christian Philosophers—which helps to identify the 'God' this argument addresses (e.g., I am not interested in the problems Islam faces)—his argument nevertheless is hinged upon what is potentially the fallacious equivocation that most atheists engage in when formulating this Problem: the meaning of the term 'evil'.

The entire argument is predicated upon the notion of 'evil' so leaving it unspecified is intellectually irresponsible. The second premise asserts that there is a "tremendous amount of evil" in the world but nowhere are we told what 'evil' means in this argument. Therefore it is nearly impossible to evaluate this argument beyond noting this potential equivocation, because it is unknown whether Anderson is criticizing the issue over an internal or external inconsistency.

At this point the critique could end. But I will assume in the first case that Anderson is arguing over an internal inconsistency, and in the second case over an external inconsistency.

- - -

Criticism Over Internal Inconsistency

If his criticism is over an internal inconsistency in Christian theism, then I shall examine the premises and conclusion under the terms of Christian theism.

• Premise 1: "If God exists, then He is omnipotent, omniscient, and all good."

Although I will tentatively concede the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience, the attribute of "all good" causes me some concern because asserting that God is "all good" prima facie excludes other facets of God's being, such as his 'wrath' against sin.

(I am ignoring the more glaring problem of the term describing a moral quality about God, which implies a moral order that transcends God and to which he is subject, which invokes the Euthyphro dilemma.)

If the expression "all good" does not mean anything more substantive than that God possesses no malevolence against which his benevolence might compete, but leaves room for God to possess more attributes than just benevolence, then I will concede that point also and tentatively agree that this premise reflects God as revealed in Christian sacred scriptures.

• Premise 2: "There is a tremendous amount of evil in the world, some of it not caused by human beings and apparently gratuitous. (Here might follow a long description of natural disasters, diseases afflicting the apparently innocent, and so on.)"

Here at the second premise is where the argument collapses into unintelligibility, if 'evil' is understood under the terms of Christian theism. Anderson here asserts that some of this world's evil is "not caused by human beings," which I believe refers to events in the natural world because he hints at "natural disasters" and "diseases." Furthermore, he asserts that this natural evil is "apparently gratuitous."

There are numerous problems here that would require a wholesale revision of the argument. First, under Christian theism, moral order is grounded in the very nature of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands. Ergo, 'evil' is that which runs contrary to the will of this eternal and immutable God. For Anderson to assert that 'natural evil' exists, he shoulders the burden of proving that events in nature run contrary to God's will. He cannot ask us to assume it for the sake of argument, because that would fallaciously beg the question (since 'evil' is the very crux of the entire argument).

Moreover, if these events in nature are "not caused by human beings" then what does Christian theism posit as the causal agent? Ultimately it is God, who is "omnipotent" and "omniscient" and sovereign over his creation. Therefore, to call these events in nature 'evil' Anderson would have to show that Christian theism posits that God acts contrary to his own will at the same time and in the same respect. Utterly incoherent; Anderson would not succeed here. The only way for Anderson to succeed here is for his argument to deny the theory of moral order posited by Christian theism; but in that case his argument would no longer be demonstrating an internal inconsistency but an external one.

Second, there is an important difference between something being "apparently gratuitous" and actually gratuitous. It is possible for something to appear gratuitous at the time but, given all of the relevant facts of the case later, finally understood as not being gratuitous after all (no matter how improbable such a conclusion seemed while we were still caught in the thick of it). So for Anderson's purposes, he needs cases of genuinely gratuitous natural evils—e.g., earthquakes for which God had no purpose consonant with his benevolence—which shoulders a monstrous burden of proof, given Anderson's severe spatio-temporal limitations. Maybe we are not aware of, or maybe cannot conceive of, any purpose God might have consonant with his benevolence, but that fails to prove that no purpose exists.

Third, there is a similar important difference between someone being "apparently innocent" and actually innocent, and to ask that we assume the point for the sake of argument would likewise fallaciously beg the question (e.g., if a person receives what they deserve, it is 'just'; if they receive what they do not deserve, it is 'unjust' and a case for evil can be made). So in this case too, Anderson needs a case of actual innocence that accords with Christian theism; (i) being unable to conceive of how some specific individual could be anything but innocent does not establish their innocence; such would be an argument from incredulity, which is not valid; (ii) the case has to accord with Christian theism, otherwise it will no longer be demonstrating an internal inconsistency but an external one.

• Premise 3: "It is unlikely that such an amount and kind of evil would exist if there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and all good being."

The failure of the third premise results from the failure of the second and, therefore, does not need to be addressed at this time. The second premise requires an extensive revision, which may have a deleterious effect on the third premise anyway, making it premature to address it at this time.

• Conclusion: "Probably, God does not exist."

Consequently, the conclusion no longer follows and may be dismissed as invalid.

- - -

Criticism Over External Inconsistency

If his criticism is over an external inconsistency, then I am not sure there is anything Christian theism would need to address. There are countless worldviews which Christian theism is not consistent with. But that is not in itself a criticism of Christian theism; it is merely a comparative evaluation.

Unless, of course, the worldview against which Christian theism is being evaluated is making truth claims that are said to be objective. In that case, the premises of this argument need a good deal of revision.

In the first place, as with the 'internal' criticism I can tentatively concede the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience, but the "all good" attribute causes me some concern because I do not know what is being asserted. It assumes a particular moral theory but, since that moral theory has not been described, 'good' is an empty term. I cannot give a pass to any moral terms since they are the very crux of the Problem from Evil argument.

Second, until the working moral theory is described, the second premise likewise cannot make sense. If I am not provided the moral theory upon which the argument is based, my immediate reaction is to interpret it according to a Christian theistic metaethic. But if this is a criticism over an external inconsistency, that would be an inappropriate interpretation.

And the third premise suffers from the same problem as the first and second premises. And as a consequence of all this, the Conclusion is eminently premature and nowhere near valid yet.

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[1] Anderson, C. Anthony. "Argument from Evil: Inductive Version" (5 Dec. 2003). University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Philosophy. Retrieved 7 Nov. 2008. <http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/faculty/anderson/12ArgfromEvilInductive.htm>

Tracking the Debunkers (06/Nov/08)

During the last four days there has still been nothing posted at Debunking Christianity that actually attempts to debunk Christianity. There have been three posts: one regards a debate between John Lennox and Michael Shermer; another is Loftus requesting help with some research project, asking Christians to answer what best explains animal suffering; and the third is Garman wrestling with the concept of one being 'evangelical' with one's atheism.

Well done, Loftus. Way to prove Christianity false.

Tracking the Debunkers (02/Nov/08)

This evening I discovered a new blog. It is not the blog itself that is new; it is simply new to me, as I had not previously encountered it nor had it brought to my attention. (I have not yet figured out a way to determine the date a blog was created when it does not display any navigation by 'date'. Someone should create a service that simplifies this area of research.)

At any rate, it should be a blog of considerable interest to me, considering what its title is: Debunking Christianity. That is surely a grand task, particularly when its founder concedes that to 'debunk' means to "show something to be false" (which he cites from the Encarta® World English Dictionary from Microsoft). Since the stated task of this blog is to show that Christianity is false, I will be tracking its entries to see if any measure up to the task the authors set before themselves.

As far as I understand, the blog was founded by a gentleman named John W. Loftus, who describes himself as a minister-turned-atheist residing in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and author of Why I Became an Atheist (a book I will now have to review, if I can find someone who wishes to rid themselves of their copy) whose participation at TheologyWeb (under the name 'Doubter John') has garnered him a questionable reputation. However, Debunking Christianity is home to a number of additional contributors of varying backgrounds; even though Loftus is of particular interest to me, I will critique any post regardless of its author.

From this point onward (November 2, 2008) I will examine entries made at Debunking Christianity to see if they accomplish what they set out to do.

The Spectator Speculates on Whether Richard Dawkins Has Changed His Mind (by John Loftus).

In this post Loftus reports on a comment that Richard Dawkins reportedly made during a second debate with John Lennox at Oxford's Natural History Museum (21/Oct/08, as reported by Melanie Phillips at The Spectator). However fascinating it might be to observe Dawkins burying himself in deeper layers of irrationality, none of this has anything to do with Christianity.

Has Loftus met the task of proving Christianity false? No.

Vote Your Conscience... Please! (by John Loftus)

In this post Loftus comments on the current U.S. Presidential election, lamenting on the inadequacies of the nominated candidates from the three leading parties (Republican, Democrat, Libertarian) and his angst over who to cast his vote for, since he has little confidence in their platforms or policies.

Has Loftus met the task of proving Christianity false? No.

Pat Condell: "Provide Evidence or Expect Mockery and Ridicule" (by John Loftus)

Admittedly I have not watched the embedded video to this post, but given Loftus' commentary it does not seem to meet the task of debunking Christianity anyhow. From what I can gather, it is rather Condell's advice for polemic approach. I will have to watch the video to confirm, but at this point it seems unlikely it even approaches their task.

[Edit 02/Nov/08: I have now watched the video and, indeed, it has nothing to do with proving Christianity is false. It is simply Condell describing his forceful bigotry and atheistic fanaticism. Yes, well, that is all quite underwhelming and remarkably irrelevant to anything beyond Condell's biography.]

Has Loftus met the task of proving Christianity false? No.

Inconsistent Skeptics

Some skeptics do not adhere to critical thinking as consistently as they should. In my experience, atheistic skeptics exhibit this lack of consistency the most. Critical thinking is not a commendable heuristic if it gets abandoned whenever it inconveniences a pre-existing bias. Rather, critical thinking ought reshape one's bias, not be tossed out when it threatens one's bias.

For example, a skeptic who adheres to critical thinking consistently (Smith) would refuse to accept some proposition P if there is inadequate epistemic warrant for it. Now, one who does not adhere to critical thinking consistently (Jones) would likewise refuse to accept P at first. Where the inconsistency in critical thinking arises is when Jones takes it a step further and asserts that because P has not been proven true it is consequently false.

This is made more obvious where P stands for "gods exist." It is consistent with critical thinking for Jones to reject P if for him there has been inadequate epistemic warrant for it. However, Jones promptly abandons critical thinking if he asserts that P ("gods exist") is false because it has not been proven true; that is a logical fallacy, argumentum ad ignorantiam. And he further contradicts critical thinking if he also affirms that a lack of evidence for P is somehow itself evidence for ¬P ("gods do not exist"). An absence of evidence is an empty set; 'nothing' in support of P is still 'nothing' when used as an attempt to support ¬P.

Smith is the consistent skeptic when he refuses to affirm that P is true but also refuses to affirm that P is false. It may be false. Or it may be true. The lack of adequate warrant either way means he cannot affirm either; Smith remains agnostic on the question. Jones, in order to be consistent with critical thinking, must do the same. If what Jones wants to affirm is that P is false, critical thinking dictates that he must provide evidence that either (a) supports ¬P or (b) invalidates P.

"I Contend We Are Both Atheists" - Response to Comments 3

The following blog post is a direct response to some of the intriguing comments I have received regarding my criticism of Stephen Roberts' infamous Quote. I think the points being raised are too good to be buried in a Comments field which is inevitably lagging further and further behind in the flow of the blog, comments which certainly deserve their own light of day.

Anonymous said (his comment here):

"The Quote" does not imply that your reasons for dismissing other gods are the same as Stephen's reasons for dismissing yours. It merely states that when you UNDERSTAND your own reasons for dismissing those other gods, you will UNDERSTAND his reasons. I suspect that since you do not even UNDERSTAND the quote, you will not make the mental effort to UNDERSTAND either his reasons or your own.

First of all, I would encourage you to assume a name. Make one up if you have to, but please assume a name by which I can identify your arguments. Anyone can contribute as "Anonymous" and I would have no way of knowing if it was you or not.

Now, regarding your comment. I already know the Quote does not imply that our reasons are the same. The content and context of the Quote and Roberts' elaboration thereof both make that pretty obvious. My criticism argues from the understanding that the Quote implies our reasons are similar. That is the implication the Quote makes, and it is rather candid about it. So I will let the readers determine for themselves whether or not I understand the Quote, particularly by my responses here.

(Keep in mind that my criticism regarded the Quote and, by extension, Roberts' elaboration of it. My criticism did not, and cannot, regard your own views nor your perspective of the Quote. Any objection that indicates how my criticism fails to account for some perspective of yours only demonstrates a misunderstanding of my criticism itself. I am certainly able to offer a critique of your perspective on a given subject but that is not what I had done; yet it is my criticism of the Quote that you had responded to.)

What does the Quote itself say? I am going to direct our attention to the verifiable facts here, in an effort to keep this discussion relevant and intellectually honest. What does it actually say? It says that when you "understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods," then you will "understand why I dismiss yours" (emphasis supplied). And then Stephen Roberts himself stopped by this blog—which really made my day, quite frankly, since I had not heard from him in so long—to elaborate not only on the meaning of the Quote but also on what for him, as the originator of the Quote, is the real "meat" of it; specifically, that "if [theists] really understood why they don't believe in the other gods they might understand why their god is hard to believe in too" (emphasis supplied).

These facts are not really disputable. Anyone can independently verify them. Right? Especially when I openly provide the relevant links. The Quote was already fairly clear, and Roberts himself made it clearer still: the fundamental point is that if the Christian theist openly and honestly understands "why" he dismisses all the other possible gods then he will understand "why" the atheist dismisses God (or finds him hard to believe in, at best). In both the Quote and in Roberts' elaboration, the "why" test (reasoning) is the real meat or force of the Quote.

This fact becomes even clearer when one sees there are two questions which the Quote logically and naturally raises in our minds. The first question is, "Why does the atheist dismiss God?" And the second question is, "Why do I (the Christian theist) dismiss all other possible gods?" As I understand it, and Roberts likewise pointed out, the second question essentially acts as the springboard to the answer for the first question; i.e., answering the second question ought to enlighten and enable the Christian theist to discover the answer for the first question.

And my contention has been just this: "Is that actually the case?" Is there any real correlation between the answers to each question? Put it another way: Is it true that by honestly examining and understanding my own reasons for why I dismiss all other possible gods I will be enabled to understand why the atheist dismisses God? The force of my contention, of course, is borne upon the rather unequivocal answer, "No, there is no correlation." Because—

[and here is the essential thrust]

—if I honestly examine and understand my own reasons for why I dismiss all the other possible gods, I actually discover that they have no possible relationship with the atheist's reasons for dismissing God. None, zero. For example, my reasons (for dismissing all other gods) operate from the presupposition of God's existence. The epistemologies and heuristics on either side of the debate differ quite drastically, and at their most foundational levels. Not even the ground or nature of logic itself bears any similarity between us; for the Christian theist, logic is grounded in the very nature of God, and this cannot be said for the atheist—any atheist whatsoever. This is precisely why the theist's reasons (for dismissing all other possible gods) do not, in fact, offer any insight of understanding into the atheist's reasons (for dismissing God).

But notice something compelling here, equally relevant and interesting. The force of this argument can also be shown from the opposite side; i.e., flip the scenario around and it still bears this truth out. If I genuinely and honestly understand the atheist's reasons for why he dismisses God, based as they usually are upon an epistemology grounded in some form of empiricism, I discover that his reasons for dismissing God do not have any kind of relationship to my reasons for dismissing all other possible gods. Our epistemologies are grounded and structured quite differently. And that is the very point of my contention, originally and now expanded upon in this post: the theist's reasons and the atheist's reasons are not even similar, much less the same. This is why the second clause of the Quote is unintelligible. It is simply false (i.e., it bears no correspondence with reality). As I had said previously, the reasons why Roberts rejects God and the reasons why I reject "all other possible gods" are very different: "Being informed of Stephen's reasoning does not inform anyone of my reasoning, nor vice versa."

The first clause of the Quote is incoherent. And its second clause is false. I cannot understand why anyone would want to champion the Quote. (Well, actually I can, but that is the threshold beyond which my skepticism gives way to my cynicism. My skepticism I can defend; my cynicism is more rant-ish.)

jaydecay57 said (his comment here):

I believe the point of the quote is to illustrate the fact that any believer in a monotheistic religion can so readily dismiss all other gods as easily as any atheist, yet can cling so tightly to one slight variation from the others without providing an acceptable reasoning behind their choice.

I do not believe the Quote has anything to say about whether or not a theist has the intellectual honesty and integrity to provide "acceptable" reasoning behind his choice. (And I can level a significant and substantive criticism against atheists pontificating to others what "acceptable reasoning" is.) Let me explain what I mean. Whether the Christian provides his reasoning or not, the Quote is asking him to authentically examine and understand his reasons for dismissing all other gods, and that by doing so he will better understand the atheist's reasons for dismissing God. And my criticism shows how this fails the test, i.e., that it is simply not true, that it does not correspond to anything in reality.

Truthfully though the REAL point of the quote (I feel) is to make atheists smile and say "That's what I've been trying to say all along!"

Perhaps. But what those atheists "have been trying to say all along" is still incoherent and false, respectively, if it mirrors the first and second clause of the Quote. Like I said, if the Quote is really just humorous nonsense that atheists find entertaining, if it has nothing substantive or real to say about Christian theology, then I should not find any atheists arguing against me if I post about how nonsensical the Quote is. They felt the same way before I even posted, right? As I said before, "It is amusing but incoherent. Great. A smile, a nod, and now let's move along to authentic, intelligible dialogue." Why waste time over something everyone agrees is neither intelligible nor substantive?

I will give you that believing in a god is logical. However all the logical reasons to believe in a god are inherently demeaning to the believer (Fear of the unknown, gullible, ignorant, and other admittedly mean sounding words) which may be why it is difficult for some to see that it is in fact rather silly to say no other god exists except the one you have arbitrarily chosen from the myriad of other choices.

Evidently you have not listed "all the logical reasons to believe" because I did not find in your list any of the reasons argued for in systematic theologies or philosophical texts, nor any of the reasons I happen to hold. That is a lot to have left out. I think maybe there are logical reasons you do not even know about (I do not want to assume there are some you know about and willfully omitted); critical reasoning would dictate that as an opportunity to exercise a tone of intellectual charity, admitting there could be logical reasons you have not informed yourself about, instead of rashly declaring that you have listed all the logical reasons to believe. I am assuming, of course, that you hold critical thinking skills in high regard when dealing with competing views. I hope it is a correct assumption.

How do you expect not to be ridiculed?

Because I champion reason, critical thinking, and skepticism. Perhaps fundies might ridicule me for that, but not fellow thinkers and skeptics. In my limited experience, they usually demonstrate appreciation for such things being championed, not ridicule. And no, "skeptic" is not a synonym for "atheist."

...you actively chose one God that fits you and ignoring all other possibilities, called it truth.

You assume I ignored all other possibilities. I am not sure you have a defensible basis for such an assumption.

But you are correct, I do not determine truth. I discover it—which can happen when one pursues it.

If one [god] is absurd, it inevitably means they all are.

It is not obvious how that follows logically. I would love to see the premises that render such a scandalous conclusion.

This is all rather mean sounding, I know, and I do apologies a little, but under the guise of the internet I am safe from your e-god's scorn...regardless, I can take it as easily as I can dish it out, so feel free to bash my grammar and liberal use of ellipsis. I also fully realize that I'm just as ignorant as you and we're all in this thing together...I'm just able to admit and embrace it.

I fully and genuinely appreciate your contributions. When people leave their bigotry outside and enter into an authentic conversation on ultimate issues, it can plant seeds that end up shaping the ideas and beliefs of the participants. That is what this blog is all about: the conversations and experiences that shape my itinerarium mentis.

Emotional Rhetoric, 1; Critical Thinking, 0

"The next time someone tries to tell me that being Christian is the embodiment of logic and reasoning, I don't know what I will do," a young woman on IRC commented. Well here is a really crazy notion for her to consider: engage the person in a critical analysis on that issue.

Her comment was in response to something I had said earlier in a conversation with someone else; namely, that an in-depth study of logic and critical thinking ironically led me from atheism to Christian theism: "The unexpected thing was the fact that a commitment to reason and critical thinking eventually landed me in the Christian camp," I had said.

But for all practical purposes it is impossible to engage her on that issue because she has a vitriolic aversion to anything that even resembles "religion talk." What I find very disappointing is the sheer ubiquity of this attitude among those who identify themselves as atheists. It is alarming, the number of atheists I encounter that exhibit it. They will take time out of their day to hurl such gratuitous invective, but to engage the issues critically is somehow not worth their time. It is very disheartening to observe such priority in their values, where they have time to invest in supercilious rhetoric but not critical analysis. Such intellectual irresponsibility was part of the reason I ended up rejecting atheism, and the atheists I interact with today continually demonstrate that my conclusive observation is still relevant and accurate.

In the words of English philosopher Herbert Spencer:

"There is a principle which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance. That principle is contempt prior to investigation."

"I Contend We Are Both Atheists" - Response to Comments 2

Finally, after a few more subsequent comments posted to my original article (despite that blog being 'Closed'), I received a comment that actually has something intelligible to say—ironically, from Stephen Roberts himself! It has been quite a few years so it was a pleasant surprise to hear from him again. It's nice running into you again, Stephen!

Although he posted his comment to a different blog post ("No Theist Is An Atheist"), it nevertheless regarded my critique squarely and, quite refreshingly, had something intelligent to say. Stephen's comment (3/Jan/08) stated:

Hey David, Stephen here! After the quote came up in another forum I read, I ego-surfed across this post and figured I'd drop by and say hi!

Yes, I know the usage of "atheist" in the quote is incorrect since if a person believes in any kind of god they are a theist, not an atheist. But I think it still work because it helps them to think about the fact that they are also non-believers for other gods.

But the real "meat" of the quote is the second part about how if the theist really understood why they don't believe in the other gods they might understand why their god is hard to believe in too.

If I would have been writing a philosophy book, I probably would have come up with better wording or at least better phrasing. But even with its flaws, its kind of nice to see the quote still wander around and mean something to some people :-)

I appreciate his candor, and his concession that the "we are both atheists" clause is untenable. At least someone, finally, possessed enough sense to concede that this feature of the Quote is inherently faulty. Unfortunately, it was the author only. Everyone else that comments still tries to retain it, tenaciously blind to the contradiction. My hat's off to Stephen.

Nevertheless, the real 'meat' of the Quote is still faulty (but not as obviously). I can appreciate the point Stephen is trying to make, but I have to wonder if he is cognizant of the fact that the only people who will agree with him are those who already adhere to an epistemology similar to his. Unless I am mistaken, Stephen subscribes to a form of empiricism, i.e. the degree to which some proposition outside science can be given scientific support or can be reduced to science, to that degree the proposition becomes rationally acceptable. It is for this reason that theistic claims are said to shoulder an empirical burden of proof. (I invite Stephen to correct me if I am wrong.) From my understanding, that is why he rejects all possible gods, including the God of Christianity: because claims of their existence are bereft of empirical evidence to substantiate those claims.

If that is the case, then the question immediately presents itself: Is that the reason why Christians "dismiss all the other possible gods"? Is it because those other god-claims are without empirical evidence substantiating them? No, that is not their reason, because (a) they do not subscribe to any formulation of empiricism, for it is antithetical to orthodox Christian theology, and (b) they know that reasoning this way, for them, commits the Special Pleading fallacy. (This fallacy is committed when you reject all other gods because they lack substantiating empirical evidence, while making an exception, without good reason, for your own God who likewise lacks said evidence.)

Therefore, the only people who will agree with the second clause are necessarily those who already adhere to an epistemology similar to Stephen's. How so? Because he asserts that once "you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours." It naturally follows that this clause requires its subject to hold a similar epistemology. Consider: we first discover the reason he dismisses all possible gods, and we then look to see whether or not that is the same reason Christians dismiss all other gods. So then what happens when Stephen encounters Christians, who do not subscribe to an epistemology similar to his? Suddenly this Quote is unsound, collapsing under the fact that it is untrue with respect to the subject it is addressing (Christians). It is true for only a specific segment of the human population: those who already share his epistemic views. With regard to everyone else, it is false.

To summarize in brief: (1) I look at Stephen's reason for dismissing all possible gods and I admit, "That's not my reason for dismissing them"; (2) and if Stephen considered my reason for rejecting all other gods, he would admit, "That's not my reason for dismissing them." In other words, this second clause—

When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours.

—is false, when regarding all those who adhere to an epistemology different from Stephen's empiricism. The reason he rejects all possible gods and the reason I reject all other gods are, in fact, two very different reasons. Being informed of Stephen's reasoning does not inform anyone of my reasoning, nor vice versa.

Carl Sagan & Scientistic Nonsense

If we long to believe that the stars rise and set for us, that we are the reason there is a Universe, does science do us a disservice in deflating our conceits?

Thus wrote Carl Sagan, in the first chapter of The Demon-Haunted World: Science As a Candle in the Dark (Random House, 1996), one of his more popular books which sets out to "explain the scientific method to laymen, and to encourage people to learn critical or skeptical thinking." It is ironic, therefore, to find him here thrusting science into areas unrelated to it and making a fine display of very poor reasoning. Sagan, although he loved science, was certainly not a philosopher, yet both skepticism and critical thinking are philosophical subjects, not scientific ones. As much as I loved Sagan, he really ought to have avoided the folly Dawkins persists in, by keeping aware of his limitations: stick to what he knows, and avoid speaking on things which he clearly was not adequately versed.

It is categorically impossible for science to deflate our conceits (as he put it) when it comes to the issue of whether or not we are the reason there is a Universe. The scientific method empowers us to discover the structure and evolution of the Universe, on the whole as well as its parts, but it has nothing to say about teleology or the reason why the Universe exists. Science simply has nothing to say about the purpose or meaning of any thing; such comes from a different discipline: philosophy, that discipline which is the very foundation upon which science itself is based and from which it is enabled to operate in the first place. Affirming science consistently as the ultimate paradigm of rationality leads inexorably to rank self-stultification whose end is nihilism and the abdication of knowledge and reason altogether.

Science cannot "do us a disservice in deflating our conceits," sir, when it comes to the purpose of the Universe's existence, because science does not do business with purpose or meaning; it can examine certain properties of the Universe but it cannot tell you why the Universe exists, much less rule mankind out as the reason. One can discuss the purpose or meaning of the Universe but to do so is to engage metaphysics, not science.

"I Contend We Are Both Atheists" - Response to Comments

For a brief time I had a blog called Apologia over at WordPress.com, but since I was unhappy with the limited customization available to free accounts (and do not have the time to play with CSS), I eventually opened my blog here. Having said that, I had written a post there (23/Oct/06) on the now-famous quote originally authored by Stephen Roberts, a former acquaintance of mine from my days in #Atheism on the Dalnet IRC network. The quote is: "I contend we are both atheists; I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours" (The History of 'The Quote'). That article has generated a few comments from readers that happened upon it, but I am trying to divert traffic away from that inactive blog so I am going to start responding to comments here. The most recent comments are from two visitors, named "Kerin" and "DM."

Kerin writes:

How can you talk about rationality when… argh forget it, I’m over the whole debating about the existence of god, you don’t know, I don’t know there that settles it! happy?

It is a good thing she did not finish that first sentence, because in all likelihood she was about to make a complete fool of herself. And an unfinished sentence leaves nothing to respond to, so I am going to look at her agnostic assertion at the end. The fact of the matter is, the assertion that "you don't know, I don't know" is settled ONLY under an agnostic view. I am certainly not an agnostic, so she has no basis other than her own agnosticism to assert that I don't know—and I could really do without her shoving her beliefs down my throat. She is entitled to her agnosticism; she is not entitled to impose her views upon me. She can tell me about the things she doesn't know, but she cannot assert anything about what I know.

DM writes:

You describe Mr Roberts as "a good-natured fellow with a fantastic sense of humour who seemed to enjoy debate," then disregard that his comment is valid because it is clearly of a mocking nature. That you’ve read so deeply into it makes me believe that you’re terrified it is true. Then you (ironically) set yourself up against a religion (pantheism) that admits no god and accuse Mr Roberts of using a “straw man” tactic. Also, quoting Scripture as proof of your God is circular logic and you should be burned at the stake for such heresy (note: that’s humor…)

There are quite a few problems with DM's comments.

First, validity is not determined by the tone of a comment ("a mocking nature"); validity falls under the jurisdiction of logic. And as anyone can see (assuming they have a basic grasp of reading comprehension), my post critiqued the comment using logic, showing how it invalidated itself, under its own terms (with zero regard to tone). The comment utterly contradicts itself, intrinsically; it is a contradiction to "contend we are both atheists" in the context of a participant believing in "one fewer god" than another: (a) If Steve believes in one god while Mike believes in two or more, it is valid to say that Steve believes in "one fewer god" than Mike but contradictory to assert that either of them are atheists; (b) If Steve believes in no gods while Mike believes in at least one, it is valid to say that Steve believes in "one fewer god" than Mike but contradictory to assert that Mike is an atheist. The comment graphically impales itself on logic, regardless of its tone.

Second, I am not terrified of any truth. I love truth, passionately assert truth, constantly seek out truth. If you have something you contend as true, bring it forward; I would absolutely love to examine it. When one has a firm commitment to logic as I do, truth claims have no terrifying capacity (especially self-contradictory ones) because one is not operating emotionally but, rather, logically. Now, having invoked logic, I should like to identify your remark as an ad hominem fallacy, i.e. your comment regards the arguer (me), not the argument, and therefore fails the test of relevancy. Congratulations.

Third, to say that pantheism admits no god is false, displaying a lack of familiarity with pantheism. It does admit a god: the universe. Pantheists deify the cosmos (which atheists and myself deem a peculiar and impractical sentimentality).

Fourth, I argued that Roberts' comment is in danger of committing the Straw Man fallacy. How? Roberts said that "when you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours." One reason I dismiss the god of pantheism is because replacing "the term 'nature' with the term 'god' is superfluous and obfuscating outside the scope of sentimentality." If Roberts is consistent, he has to admit that he rejects the God of Christianity for the same reason. But it would be fallacious for Roberts to do so because Christianity is not a pantheistic religion.

And finally, I never use Scripture to prove the existence of God, so your criticism is irrelevant and vacuous.

Shove This Down Your Throat

"What I can't stand is Christians who shove their beliefs down my throat."

Of all the ill-thought rhetoric coming from atheists, this oddly phrased tripe is one of those heard most often. (The verificationist mantra tops that list.) I am going to ignore how improbable that notion is, beyond anything other than hyperbolic rhetoric, and instead focus on another, far more revealing aspect of this issue: the fact that we Christians are routinely subjected to a militant campaign of atheistic beliefs.

After presenting a theistic argument for metaethics (values and morals), someone responded to me with, "Well, that's your opinion. And you're entitled to it." And that remark gave me pause. For maybe the first time ever, I actually stopped and gave that remark some thought. Well now, what does he mean by this statement? Quite simply, he means that what I presented is 'not fact'. More elaborately, he means that one cannot 'know' these things are so, these things I presented about God and metaethics; it is merely my personal perspective on something which is ultimately unprovable (i.e. there is nothing within reality to which the terms of my propositions correspond).

But do you realize what he has done? He doesn't realize it. By telling me that the sum of my argument is only so much 'opinion', he has shoved HIS beliefs down MY throat, because his statement is true only under his particular belief system! (In this case, some version of Scientistic Agnosticism. Some fundy atheists out there might object to the idea that they have a 'belief system', but it matters not because they do have one. No, it's not atheism; but it is atheistic.) The epistemic virtues that produce a statement like that certainly do not stem from my belief system. Such virtues are found somewhere else: in practically every case, the atheist's belief system. By insisting, in a matter-of-fact way, that my metaethics argument is only so much 'opinion', the atheist has shoved his beliefs down my throat—

—and is truly a hypocrite.

The Unintelligibility of Godless Ethics

In a strong reaction against the Christian view of values and morals, Tina asserted, "Personally, I view religion as a security blanket with as much correspondence to reality as Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy." I commended her having the good sense to admit that it was a product of personal taste rather than scholarly evaluation; however, when it comes to the larger picture of reality as a whole, her personal tastes have little relevance. Christian theology is something far more substantial; it is "the only view which provides the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility of human experience." It is a very large and brazen argument that myself and others make, demonstrating clearly that Christian theology is far more than just some "security blanket."

"God has nothing to do with ethics or morals," Tina replied. I countered that this factually-phrased statement holds only if you assume that ethics can be adequately and intelligibly accounted for without reference to God. However, under a godless view, ethical norms are non-existent; all that remains are biographical or sociological descriptives. Some people are okay with that. Fine. Speaking for myself, however, I expect an ethical theory to adequately and intelligibly account for evident human experiences like normative values and morals (ethics).

- - -

"It certainly is quite a brazen claim," Peter chimed in. "What's you're evidence for it? Can you prove all other viewpoints to be unintelligible? How would one even know if a viewpoint is intelligible or not?"

First of all, I replied, it should be noted that "the argument" is not really one neat, singular argument but in fact a network of arguments which address various concerns (e.g. ontology, ethics, epistemology, etc) that as a unified whole argues for the same thing.

Second, the argument itself confronts head-on the epistemic assumptions which operate behind the common demand for 'proof' of one thing or another, putting the demand in its proper place. For example, the demand that all items of knowledge must satisfy empirical virtues, understood pejoratively as Scientism (q.v. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy), is an epistemology that, when consistently held, abrogates all abstract realities and therefore destroys itself; ultimately it is "a kind of logical fallacy involving improper usage of science or scientific claims," explains Gregory Peterson ("Demarcation and the Scientistic Fallacy." Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 38 [4], 751-761).

Third, one can know whether or not a viewpoint is intelligible by the very definition of the term itself; i.e. if a viewpoint is not capable of coherently and adequately articulating itself, it is unintelligible. For example, if I ask someone to account for why the law of non-contradiction is universal and they reply, "It just is," then that is an unintelligible answer.

"There have been many societies which had strong ethics and morals that weren't Christian," Peter replied, "societies which never heard of the Christian God."

Practically all human beings recognize a moral order and try to live morally. I do not think that's an issue anyone contests. As I pointed out to earlier, the positive (descriptive) analysis is categorically different from the normative (prescriptive) analysis; in other words, the fundamental issue here is properly and adequately accounting for this curious phenomenon of the human being. Most people will agree that mankind generally recognizes a moral order and tries to live morally; an intelligible theory of ethics needs to adequately account for this phenomenon. A godless theory of ethics is incapable of doing so, because it refuses to permit the tools required to traverse from the 'is' to the 'ought'.

- - -

"Is it necessary to make the traverse from the 'is' to the 'ought' in order for an ethical system to function?" Eric asked. "In other words, do beings need the mythology of a Higher Power over their heads, waving the stick or carrot to enforce moral absolutes, in order to function? Or is there not a moral imperative inherent in their nature that, with their upbringing, will direct them to act in a certain way over an average?"

First, I would say that the traverse is only necessary for those with a concern for adequately and intelligibly accounting for normative statements. If one does not really care about accounting for the phenomenon, if one is content to believe that there is nothing within reality to which normative statements correspond, then no it's not necessary. But since there does exist a common human experience of objective morality (e.g. it is right for one society to charge members of another society with crimes against humanity), then certainly some people do have a concern for an adequate account of it; for such people, "there just is" is neither adequate nor intelligible.

Second, any theory of ethics which grounds moral order in some kind of carrot on a string falls prey to Euthyphro's dilemma and must answer to it.

Third, I agree that there is "a moral imperative inherent in [human] nature," so any adequate theory of ethics will need to account for this phenomenon. However, as many scholars far more able than myself have shown, trying to account for it by way of biological or sociological observations commits the naturalistic fallacy (e.g. George Moore, Principia Ethica). And theories which ignore fallacies fail the test of intelligibility. Furthermore, such naturalistic accounts fail to provide us with moral statements applicable to societies in themselves; i.e. circumstance 'X' might be considered 'good' under this theory because it promotes the health and survival of 'Society A' but it does not allow us to state whether 'Society A' is itself good or not (e.g. the Nazi regime). It also fails to provide a moral justification for 'Society B' involving itself in the affairs of 'Society A'. There are many undercutters such a theory must confront.

"With consideration given to religious behaviors across culture and distance," Eric added, "it seems that no one religion is likely to be more necessary or true than any other."

Behavior is descriptive, I answered, which is categorically different from normative or prescriptive. What a culture is or does is fundamentally different from what it ought to be or do.

Unbelievers and God's Mercy

In a forum discussion elsewhere, a fellow we shall call 'Brad' made the remark that "so many of the comedians these days do not find a God of mercy in the Old or New Testaments," that through irreverent satire they deride the God of Scripture as "vengeful and mean" and that it seemed to reflect a rather common attitude. "It saddens me that this trendy new religion of God-bashing has become a form of revenue and entertainment," he said. "The jokes are not challenged, which I fear might leave a perceptible force."

Despite his reference to "comedians" (George Carlin being a rather clear example), the various participants in that thread aptly demonstrated that it is a prevailing attitude of ALL unbelievers, an attitude which articulates a segment of their justification for unbelief. But my question is this: "Why should one be at all surprised?" Scripture predicts this condition.

Those participants who proceeded to exhibit a similar attitude as the one Brad was lamenting, a careful review of all their posts clearly demonstrates one consistent element: they have all presupposed a subjective system of morality that is in defiance of God, which they then hold God subject to. Why do they not find a God of mercy within the pages of Scripture? Because God's mercy is at odds with their system of morality! The mercy of God is defined by the gifts he bestows upon those who do not deserve it; but those comedians and these participants reject this idea of "do not deserve," insofar as they reject the biblical concept of sin and its inherent nature. They feel that there ARE things which all people deserve irrespective of their beliefs, race, commitments, geological location, etc. Since they view "sin" in strictly humanistic terms, there are numerous examples of God acting contrary to what they believe man deserves (and is therefore not merciful but, rather, inhumane and tyrannical). I do not think we would accomplish much by complaining about the derisions that unbelievers hurl at God (although it rightly upsets us). What we ought to do is call these people to the carpet for their completely unintelligible use of the term 'moral' and its relevant dimensions.

Why do I defend God? Because I love him. Why do they castigate God? Because they hate him (notwithstanding their varied qualifications about his existence).