Sam Harris and the Problem of Evil

Cleaning up and organizing my blog this evening, I noticed this brief excerpt from Sam Harris sitting as an unpublished 'Draft' in my index of blog posts. Evidently I had intended to compose a response but for some reason forgot all about it. It is a succinct Problem of Evil argument which I pulled from his "An Atheist Manifesto" [1]:

[God is responsible for human suffering. There is no other way to properly frame the issue.] This is the age-old problem of theodicy, of course, and we should consider it solved. If God exists, either He can do nothing to stop the most egregious calamities, or He does not care to. God, therefore, is either impotent or evil.

After listing some examples of human suffering—Hurricane Katrina, the Holocaust, genocide in Rwanda, etc.—with rhetoric guaranteed to stir up the emotions of his readers, he then asks them to think rationally. If it is the case that his readers are supposed to think rationally about the issue, why did Harris invest so much energy into fomenting their emotions in the ten preceding paragraphs? Because his readers must react emotionally in order for his argument to work. If his readers truly were to think critically armed with reason, the embarrassing holes in his argument would become immediately obvious.

What ought to be the philosophical rebuttal to his PoE argument? Harris believes that pious readers "will now execute the following pirouette: God cannot be judged by merely human standards of morality" (which he finds ludicrous because, according to him, "human standards of morality are precisely what the faithful use to establish God’s goodness in the first place"). Well no, that is not the response Harris can expect to his argument. Even though it is true that God cannot be judged by human standards of morality (for a complex of reasons that Harris' dogmatic bigotry would likely prevent him from anticipating), that would not be the right critical response.

If his readers were to think critically armed with reason, they should immediately note (or at the very least suspect) that Harris' argument committed the fallacy of bifurcation or false dilemma, which involves "a situation in which only two alternatives are considered, when in fact there are other options" [2].

Since God is said to be omniscient and omnipotent—i.e., he knows these calamities will happen and possesses the power to stop them—then indeed he obviously "does not care to" stop them; he is infinitely able to but for some reason doesn't stop these calamities. Now, this leads Harris to conclude that God is therefore "evil" but such a conclusion does not follow reasonably from the stated premises. Harris is operating from a premise that is suppressed. Like I said, God is infinitely able to but for some reason doesn't stop these calamities. That is the closet in which can be found the hidden premise that Harris drew his conclusion from.

Only if God's reason (for not stopping this or that calamity) is rooted in "malice" can he be considered evil, if he did it out of some sick enjoyment of inflicting gratuitous harm on others or watching people suffer. But what if his reason is rooted in justice, such that a calamity fell upon people who deserved it? Moreover, what if his just reason for allowing some calamity to befall one person led to not only strengthening their personal development but also to a net greater good in the future for hundreds or thousands of others? In such cases God is not evil at all for allowing the calamity, which firmly proves the fallacy of bifurcation Harris committed. God can know a calamity will happen and possess the power to stop it but nevertheless allow it to happen and not be evil for doing so.

So now the readers need to decide which is more plausible, and I will tell them how they can do that. I can cite multiple pieces of evidence showing where God allowed egregious calamities to occur for the purpose of justice or a greater good, whereas Harris cannot cite one single example of God doing so for the purpose of malice. Not even one. Harris can assume malice out of baseless assertion or personal incredulity but he cannot prove it from evidence. So if I have several pieces of evidence for my contention (e.g., Gen. 50:20; cf. Gen. 45:4-11) and Harris has zero for his, where should the reader think the plausibility lies? The answer is pretty obvious.

The Problem of Evil argument presented by Harris is fallacious and bankrupt. He needs to go back to the drawing board and firm up his suppressed premise, next time exposing it honestly.

A Horrific Anachronism

When someone wishes to criticize 'X' despite possessing a demonstrable ignorance thereof (e.g., a creationist attack against evolution by someone who does not even understand the basics of evolution), what would that be called? There simply must be something more excoriating than "ignorant." Is that really the most censorious term available? It hardly seems adequate.

I need something that will adequately characterize such moronic arguments as those presented by "Vjack" who, in his blog about an Atheist Revolution [1], presents some of the most torturous logic I have ever had the misfortune of encountering. I cannot remember the link trail I was following but I ended up discovering a blog post of his from nearly four years ago (March 2005) entitled "Bible Commands Christians to Kill Nonbelievers" [2]. Obviously that grabbed my attention, as it was probably intended to. But the sheer incoherence of his argument is truly a phenomenon.

Although I read the entire article (thankfully it is brief), I certainly didn't need to, having noted the biblical reference his argument was calling upon, pulled from the book of Deuteronomy. Really, Vjack? Deuteronomy? This material, written nearly a thousand years before there were any Christians, was composed with instructions for them? Does the word "anachronistic" [3] mean anything to you, sir? I should suppose that Vjack has good reason to think these mitzvot (commands) in fact do not form "extensive laws, admonitions, and injunctions to the Israelites regarding how they ought to conduct themselves in Canaan" [4; emphasis mine], that he surely has good reason to think these instructions were actually for Christians.

And if he does, he forgot to include it in his blog post.

David Silverman and "Top 10 Atheist Myths"

David Silverman is the Communications Director for the web site American Atheists [1], which describes itself as an organization laboring for the civil liberties of Atheists, a total wall of separation between church and state, and providing information about Atheism [2]. A philosopher could almost make a career out of critiquing the ideas and propaganda that are published at that site, but in this piece here I want to critique one specific article: the list that Silverman published about the "Top Ten Atheist Myths" [3]. (I am trying to ignore my pedantic itch to indicate that the title implies myths which atheists have; i.e., it ought to say "Top Ten Myths About Atheists.") And I want to be clear that I am writing from the perspective of a Christian philosopher, not from that of a generic theist (which would include any religion that advocates a deity or deities, e.g., Islam, Hinduism, etc.).

Out of the ten alleged myths that Silverman claims theists have about atheists, he successfully identifies only one: Myth #4, and only assuming that I have correctly understood the alleged myth. The other nine are either not myths (e.g., Myth #1) or they are not about atheists (e.g., Myth #10). The only myth he manages to successfully identify—assuming I have correctly understood it—is the myth that atheists must be able to prove that God doesn't exist in order to be atheists. That is indeed a myth. However, he is wrong that it's one which theists have. Hardly any theists think that. That is a popular myth only amongst brainless Protestant Christian fundamentalists (especially Myth #2), which is a very tiny fraction of those who are theists.

But that is the other problem with Silverman's article. Despite his constant allusion to theists, Silverman spends no time whatsoever on theists; the context of his responses are seemingly geared toward only one select demographic (brainless fundies) of one select branch (Protestant) of one select theism (Christianity), evidenced probably nowhere better than Myth #10. Furthermore, Silverman spends most of his time defending Secular Humanists, not atheists. He needs to change the title of his article to "The Top One Myth That Brainless Protestant Christian Fundies Have About Atheists."

1. "Atheists are all the same."

I am not even sure what this means, quite frankly. And despite the considerable extent of my experiences in philosophical education and discourse, both casual and academic, not once have I ever heard this supposed myth. Something this obscure certainly does not belong on a Top Ten list. Having said that, if I were to make an educated guess at Silverman's meaning, I would assume that he is calling it a myth the notion that all atheists can be lumped together.

Despite his contention, that is actually not a myth. It is a fact that atheists can all be lumped together—under 'atheism', which he nearly recognizes by his statement that atheists "are bound only by our atheism." It is true that atheists quickly diversify ideologically beyond their atheism; e.g., one atheist may be a Buddhist, another may be a Secular Humanist, etc. But what Silverman apparently fails to realize, having tripped over his own equivocating fallacy [4], is that this is also true for theists. It is likewise a fact that theists can be all lumped together—under 'theism' (being bound only by their theism). And it is likewise true that theists quickly diversify ideologically beyond their theism; e.g., one theist may be a Christian, another may be a Hindu, etc. It is unfortunate but Silverman did not address this so-called "myth" accurately or fairly.

Additionally, Silverman insists that "believers must be bound by much more than a simple belief in God." But this is erroneous, too: it is not true that a theist is bound by more than a simple belief in God. Although specific types of theists may be committed to a number of additional beliefs (e.g., Muslim), this is also true for specific types of atheists (e.g., Secular Humanist). A 'theist' is nothing more than a person who assents intellectually to the existence of a deity or deities, whether emphatically or agnostically, just as an 'atheist' is nothing more than a person who consciously rejects the existence of any deities, whether emphatically or agnostically. Moreover, a theist's beliefs are no less a choice than an atheist's beliefs; i.e., indeed atheists freely choose their beliefs, but so do theists. Understand that clearly. There is no "must" in a theist's beliefs substantively different from the compelling motivation that drives an atheist to his beliefs. Both camps are comprised of those who affirm their convictions zealously (fanatic) and those who may not have explored their beliefs very much at all (apathetic).

Furthermore, he states that atheists are Republicans and they are Democrats, they are both men and women, they are gays and straights, blacks and whites. The same is true for theists, Mr. Silverman. There are Republicans who are Jews, Democrats who are Muslim, men who are Sikh, women who are Baha'i, gays who are Christian, straights who are Zoroastrian, etc. There is diversity in both camps, atheism and theism alike.

Finally, he claims that atheists "accept every person, as they are, as equals." That, unfortunately, is a bold generalization that fails to square with reality, a delusion in virtue of being contradicted by evidence. It is true only for those atheists who affirm the system of values described by Silverman's statement. It is not true for atheists who are racist, for example, who do not accept every person as equals. Does the fact that they don't share his system of values mean they are not atheists? Of course not, which leads to another problem with his statement: it reaches beyond what atheism is, in itself. Atheism is a position on the question of deities, not on the question of ethics (i.e., morals and values). For the latter, one must reach beyond atheism to something like Secular Humanism, for example—which is atheistic, but it is not atheism. Yet atheism is precisely what the subject of this list is supposed to be. This is not a list of myths about Secular Humanism or any other atheistic belief system, but rather atheism itself.

2. "Atheists have no morals, since they don't believe in God."

I am willing to believe that there are people who "seriously say that humans need to fear eternal damnation in order to do good," but I have good reason to believe that they are very few in number. It almost seems as though Silverman is taking the extreme views of certain Protestant Christian fundamentalists and pretending that this characterizes theists nationwide (Muslims, Hindus, Zoroastrians, Tenrikyos, Christians, Baha'i, Sikhs, Rastafarians, Jews, etc.)—all of whom are theists and who are the ones that Silverman wishes to disabuse of these ten myths ("the myths about atheists that are popular among theists"). In actuality, Mr. Silverman, it is "a sad world" when so many like you think that 'theist' means brainless Protestant Christian fundamentalist, a very narrow definition in the extreme which excludes hundreds of millions of other Christians and, worse yet, billions of theists.

No intelligent theist believes that "atheists have no morals." No intelligent theist thinks that "just because [atheists] are different from them" it somehow makes atheists "inherently bad." If Silverman is writing for unintelligent theists, then I fear he is wasting his time and efforts. Unintelligent theists do not typically appreciate rational discourse (assuming they can even recognize it) nor is that what shapes their ideas and beliefs. Silverman ought to be writing for intelligent theists with whom his arguments would have a far better chance of finding traction. And, as I said, no intelligent theist believes that atheists have no morals.

At any rate, Silverman argues that "humans have the idea of 'right and wrong' imbedded in them by their own brains, as well as [by] their upbringing and society." This statement of faith is obviously something that Silverman himself believes, but the reader needs to realize that although it may be atheistic it certainly is not atheism. That is to say, it is myths about atheists that Silverman is supposed to be addressing so he needs to broaden his thinking to include all those atheists who don't necessarily agree with his statement. Although there are some atheists who do share this belief in common with him, there are certainly many who do not. There are, for example, atheists who believe there is no such thing as 'right and wrong' in any real or meaningful sense (e.g., Sartre, Nietzsche, etc.), that such ideas are nothing more than certain firing patterns of neural activity in the human brain in a causal relationship with the universe's physical laws (the only consistent atheists, I submit). If Silverman is going to cherry-pick the atheists his list is supposed to defend, he ought to be honest about it within the article itself. Otherwise he should stick to myths about atheists that can apply to all atheists, instead of espousing these ethical theories that atheism has nothing to do with.

As for Silverman's remarks about the number of self-identified atheists in the nation, as well as those in various stages of the correctional system, I have no idea how that relates to myths about atheists, refutes the Christian philosophical argument on metaethics, or is any sort of criticism of Christian theology in general. Although Silverman would like to think that he has thus far successfully proved that "religion and ethical behaviour are not even slightly related," it has been exposed here that (a) he has not even come close and that (b) it would nevertheless be utterly irrelevant to the task he set before himself: clearing up myths about atheists.

Do his statements thus far truly "piss off the theists"? Of course not. For one thing, his statements have been incredibly weak at best, being mostly irrelevant. For another, his statements have pretty much ignored theists, seeming to concentrate instead upon a select demographic of a select branch of a select type of theist. There are millions upon millions of theists throughout the United States who would be scratching their heads wondering why Silverman is not more honest, editing his article to address brainless "Christian fundies" (which it does) instead of intelligent "theists" (which it does not).

3. "Atheists believe in evolution, but that doesn't answer as many questions as creationism."

Once again, completely irrelevant to the task of clearing up myths about atheists. Period. This should not even be on a list like this. First, practically all atheists do believe in evolution. That is not a myth, sorry. It is an easily verifiable fact. And whether or not evolution answers "as many questions as creationism" has absolutely nothing to do with myths about atheists in the first place. There is literally nothing here for me to address. It is that irrelevant.

But I do have to address one particular point. Silverman claims that "believers are loath to discuss where God came from, or what he was doing before the creation." This could not possibly be any more false. It is in fact contradicted by volumes of evidence, rendering his claim delusional. (Yes, I know that Silverman is again speaking of a specific type of theist, i.e., those who believe in one eternal God who personally created the world.) They are not loath to discuss the question: they have answered it, directly and repeatedly, and there are countless articles online and in print where it can be found. The question is identified as being fallacious; it commits the plurium interrogationum logical fallacy [5] by assuming within the question a God that no monotheist believes in (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). In order to ask where God came from, one has to first assume that God came from somewhere. But such an assumption fails to correspond with the monotheistic belief in an eternal, self-existent God. In other words, he did not "come from" anywhere; he has always been. The question fails to address that God. As for what God was doing before creation, that too has been answered numerous times throughout the centuries: no one knows because (a) no one was there and (b) no one has been told. (I have chosen to refrain from nitpicking the fact that "before" is temporal language that is meaningless outside the existence of 'time', to which it stands in relation.)

4. "Atheists cannot know there is no God, since you cannot prove he doesn't exist."

This, too, does not belong on a list like this because it's not a myth about atheists. It is not a myth but a fact that atheists (a) cannot know there is no God and (b) cannot prove he doesn't exist. That is true. And I have read a number of atheistic scholars who have admitted as much (e.g., Michael Shermer). So what could Silverman have been trying to address here?

Judging by the context of his response, it seems that he is addressing a myth that atheists must be able to prove that God doesn't exist in order to be atheists. If that is the point he is addressing, and I certainly believe that it is, then he is right to address it. Atheism does not explicitly affirm the non-existence of God (although individual atheists can, and some do); atheism is simply the conscious rejection of theism, typically a refusal to believe that God exists. Etymologically, an atheist is someone who is "without God," someone who views the world and lives his life as though God does not exist, "godless," in the same way that something is asymmetrical when it is "without symmetry." Whether or not God actually exists is irrelevant; Silverman can be an atheist even if God does exist, because 'atheist' describes the nature of Silverman's belief system without saying anything about God.

5. "Atheists seek to remove religion from society, and to force all people to be atheists."

This is not a myth, although it certainly is a sweeping generalization that fails to square with reality. In other words, it is not true of all atheists—but it is not a myth either. There certainly are a number of atheists, both contemporary and historically, who this accurately characterizes (e.g., The End of Faith by Sam Harris). So although this is not false—not a myth—it is true of only some atheists and should, therefore, be properly qualified (e.g., "There are atheists who seek...").

6. "Atheists are so closed-minded, they can't see that miracles happen every day!"

This is not a myth, as demonstrated by Silverman himself within his own response! In the event that you are wondering what 'irony' is, please read his response. His stated intention is to identify and clear up at least ten myths about atheists, and yet on this point his response went toward establishing that it's not a myth. When it comes to whether or not miracles exist, Silverman proclaims that "they never do." The irony is thick, and certainly amuses this author.

7. "Atheists are pushing a negative sentiment, and have a dreary life."

Silverman's response to this one is simply erroneous, which will be addressed in a moment. First I want to point out the fact that (a) the first clause is true by definition and (b) the second clause is not a myth, although its truth does not bear out in every case; in other words, it is true of many atheists but not of all atheists.

It is not a myth that "atheists are pushing a negative sentiment." It is true, and that by definition; i.e., the very definition of atheism is a negative, insofar as it's the negation of 'theos'. That is the "negative sentiment" which all atheists push, by being atheists: the negation of God from every equation.

The second clause is not a myth, although it is not necessarily true in all cases or at all times. It is a sweeping generalization and those never succeed. There are some atheists who for the most part lead content and rewarding lives, and there are many whose lives are dreary at times and rewarding at times. But certainly there are some whose lives are mostly dreary. The sticky part (for whoever tries to make such a suggestion) is trying to prove that this dreariness is a result of their atheism. The best of luck with that. It can be done, of course, but neither easily nor categorically.

So what was erroneous about Silverman's response? Quite succinctly, his response defended something other than atheism. It promoted a number of sentiments that had Secular Humanist characteristics, but here is the problem: not all atheists are Secular Humanists. And yet it is myths about atheists that Silverman is supposed to be identifying and clearing up. Throughout his article Silverman almost routinely conflated Secular Humanism with atheism, the same way he almost routinely conflated Christianity with theism. These are the equivocations he commits repeatedly.

It is very interesting to note that he refrains from identifying who this "false deity" is, but it's good that he refrained because the moment he identifies it he's committed to a logical fallacy that is impossible to escape (argumentum ad ignorantiam, "Since X has not been proven true, it is therefore false").

8. "If atheists are right, then religious people are wasting their time, but at least they're happy. No harm in that! If religious people are right, then atheists are going to hell. It seems logical that atheists should become religious just to be safe."

This is not a myth about atheists. This is Pascal's Wager [6]. There is literally nothing to respond to here. (And did Silverman really state that "drug addicts go through life happy"? Really?)

9. "There are no such things as atheists." a.k.a. "There are no atheists in foxholes."

This is not a myth about atheists. It's a denial that atheists exist. There is nothing to respond to here.

10. "This country was founded by Christians, on Christian values, and should therefore be a Christian country."

This is not a myth about atheists. There is nothing to respond to here. (It does, however, support my contention that Silverman routinely conflated Christianity with theism. Christianity is theistic, but it is not theism.)

Another Question on the Problem of Evil

I had a Christian lady send me a question by email about the Problem of Evil (PoE)—pertaining to her specific case, having been confronted by an atheist on the issue. Evidently this atheist told her that the PoE "proves that the God of the Bible doesn't exist." I told her I can guarantee that the argument he produces to support that claim will be invalid in at least one way, possibly more. She later shared with me what his argument was, which quite forcefully stated, "Since suffering exists and there is no reason for it, that defeats the belief that an omnibenevolent God exists"—and furthermore, that "no theologian has ever offered a successful solution to the PoE."

Does his argument shoot itself in the foot, as I had guaranteed it would? Absolutely.

Where his PoE invalidates itself is at the premise "there is no reason for [suffering]." By having assumed in advance that gratuitous suffering exists, his argument excludes the God of Christianity from the criticism. The argument has nothing to say about our God. How so? Quite simply: the God of Christianity is defined as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent; consequently, given those attributes in concert, there can be no such thing as gratuitous suffering. They are mutually exclusive, in the same way that an Irresistible Force precludes an Immovable Object.

If he persists in presupposing the existence of gratuitous suffering in an argument that is supposed to address the God of Christianity, then he is guilty of committing the fallacy of Begging the Question. How so? Because, like I said, gratuitous suffering and those attributes of God are mutually exclusive; i.e., by assuming in advance that gratuitous suffering exists, his argument has assumed that God as defined by Christianity does not exist, and then it concludes that he does not exist. The only way he can escape this dilemma is by proving that gratuitous suffering exists, instead of simply assuming it does. His assuming its existence is what's invalidating his argument.

And the absence of a coherent theodicy does not salvage his argument. "You are not required to provide a solution for the PoE," I told her, so that aspect of his contention is irrelevant. And I went on to say:

It almost seems like he is saying, "My PoE argument is true if you can't prove it false," which is the fallacious irrelevancy known as 'argumentum ad ignorantiam'. His PoE argument stands or falls under its own merits, not on your ability to provide a theodicy (which is what solutions to the PoE are called). PoE arguments and theodicies are two different things.

And he is wrong, of course. Many Christian philosophers have produced successful theodicies (James Moreland, Greg Bahnsen, Alvin Plantinga, John Frame, etc.). Until he can cite every theodicy ever developed and unequivocally refute them all, his statement is nothing more than wishful thinking: (a) if there are any theodicies he has failed to unequivocally refute, his statement cannot be true; (b) if there are any theodicies he has no knowledge of, his statement cannot be true.

Another Rational Atheist

Evidently there are some atheists who do not know how to read—which is quite an extraordinary paradox, given their apparent ability to write. You see, despite the fact that my former blog Apologia has been declared 'Closed' for more than a year, it continues to receive drive-by comments from these visitors. (Some might argue that perhaps these visitors are linked to the specific article in question by Google, but that is no excuse because I reiterate within the Comments field itself that the blog is closed.)

A gentleman by the name of Nigel Davies recently left a terrific scholarly response:

Your religion does not declare that there is one God atall. It declares faith in the Holy Trinity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost betraying its origins in pre-Christian faiths of multiple gods. You have rationalised that down to one god but you have one more reduction to go before you reach the fact that there is actually no god atall.

Christianity does not declare that there is one God, Davies states. Were you aware of this? I wasn't. That was definitely news to me. When I examine every reasonable standard of historic Christian belief, from apostolic teaching and throughout the history of orthodox doctrine, I find again and again the declaration that there is one God—and at times rather explicitly, in direct repudiation of relevant heresies (e.g., The Nicene Creed, which begins with the affirmation, "I believe in one God").

Do you know what we call a proposition that's contradicted by evidence? A delusion, sir. This is especially the case when the amount of invalidating evidence is so extensive. Now, I think it's quite probable that Davies meant to say that the expression 'trinitarian monotheism' is an oxymoron but, if that is so, he really ought to have said that because that's quite a different statement—but it's also an extremely difficult one to support, given a responsible definition of both terms (viz. both terms presuppose a singular deity).

Of particular interest to me, of course, is his bold assertion that it's a "fact" that God does not exist. Oh how I would love to examine the evidence which establishes that as a fact. I shall not hold my breath, though.

Håvard Skjæveland and the Problem of Evil – Part 1

It seems that my discussion with Skjæveland on the Problem of Evil (i.e., how it supposedly demonstrates the probability that God doesn’t exist) has drawn to a tentative close. And I want to highlight the term “tentative” because he has not exactly given up yet. Let me explain where we’re at thus far and how we got here.

First, a little background information on Skjæveland. He is a 23-year old student from Stavanger, Norway, who is studying web programming. He is an avowed atheist who describes himself as “running pretty high on Richard Dawkins’ atheism scale” which means, I have reason to think, he affirms the ‘strong’ version of atheism. He also admitted to me that his thinking has been influenced by the New Atheist propaganda of Dawkins, Hitchens, Dennet, and Harris. (These gentlemen are reliable on philosophy in the same way that Duane Gish is reliable on science.)

On December 10th he introduced himself to me in an email which described his appreciation of the fact that someone else actually recognizes the fundamental difference between agnosticism and atheism, that the former addresses an issue different from the latter. “I was beginning to think I was alone!” he exclaimed. And in a subsequent email he shared with me a brief synopsis of his atheistic convictions and how he arrived at them. A particularly compelling issue for him, he said, was how convincingly the Problem of Evil undermines Christian theism. (I chose to ignore his thoughts on other religions, e.g., Hinduism, because I have no interest in defending those.) Since I have never encountered a Problem of Evil argument that accomplishes its intended aim—and I have examined many, both historical and contemporary—I thought this could be an issue worth exploring. He agreed to engage me on it.

He began with the logical Problem of Evil argument as presented by Epicurus, whom he cited directly, an argument taken up by others like David Hume and John L. Mackie. However, this alleged problem suffers from a fatal flaw, I pointed out—the definition of ‘evil’. Epicurus and others who submit this problem use the term 'evil' but never bother to define it. Until that term is defined, the problem is a lifeless corpse with no merit whatsoever because 'evil' lies at the very heart of the issue. “If you find the logical Problem of Evil argument compelling,” I said, “it's because you have assumed a definition of 'evil' on behalf of the argument.” I told him that he needed to disclose this definition he was assuming in order to continue examining the problem.

At this point he backed away from the Problem of Evil argument. “I don’t really know how to define evil,” he confessed, and asked if we could approach it as a Problem of Suffering argument instead. “Surely you agree,” he said, “that there is gratuitous suffering in the world,” that God could do something “so that people don’t suffer needlessly.” And I had to stop him right there. First, the Problem of Suffering argument shoulders an enormous burden of proof that has to be met. As the critical mind will detect, asking me to agree from the outset that gratuitous suffering exists is to beg the very question, which is fallacious. Since the supposed existence of gratuitous suffering lies at the heart of the argument—the very issue upon which it is hinged—he cannot simply assume it, nor can he ask me to.

Second, how I understand the term “suffering” differs explicitly from how he understands it (because our metaethics are antithetical, mine being God-based and him being an atheist), so my agreement would only encourage the fallacy of equivocation at any rate. Then I reset the conversation, underscoring the two things that must be established. “If you cannot prove the gratuity of human suffering, the argument fails. If you cannot prove that human suffering is inconsistent with the attributes of God, the argument fails” (viz. omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent).

Skjæveland said he didn’t know how to go about proving the gratuity of suffering “except to come up with hypothetical scenarios” by which to illustrate it. So he called upon the example of rape: “Surely the woman being raped didn’t ask for it and certainly doesn’t deserve it.” Again I had to note the logical fallacy being committed, or possibly two different fallacies. On the one hand, he is possibly committing the fallacy of arguing from incredulity; i.e., “This suffering must be gratuitous because I can’t believe it’s not.”

On the other hand, he is definitely committing the fallacy of begging the question; i.e., “This is gratuitous suffering because it is gratuitous.” How did he commit this fallacy? By stating that the rape victim did not deserve it. Unfortunately, that assumes the truth of the very conclusion to be proved. “I am not trying to suggest she did deserve it,” I said. “It's just that I won't be bullied into a conclusion, if you know what I mean.” Nothing defeats an argument quite like fallacies, by which it defeats itself. They are to be avoided. Does there exist gratuitous suffering? That’s the burden shouldered by this argument, which must be met because if gratuitous suffering does not exist then the argument is a dog with no bite.

On the issue of whether or not human suffering is inconsistent with the attributes of God, Skjæveland had no directly relevant response. The only response he had was, “If God made us this way, doesn’t that suggest that God is at least imperfect?” First of all, God is not imperfect if the history of creation is unfolding precisely as he had planned it, meeting every purpose for which it was designed. Second, I was unable to determine how the angle his response took here adequately meets the burden of proof. The perfection of God was not the issue. The issue is the alleged conflict between human suffering and a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. So I had asked him to clarify, if he could, how his response relevantly answers that issue.

And at this point he backed away from the Problem of Suffering argument too. “I’ll concede the two informal fallacies you bring up,” he said, and further conceded that suffering could be consistent with the attributes of God (although it makes him wonder if God is “toying with us,” which I subsequently answered). “Can we leave the Argument of Suffering behind for the moment, and maybe drive back to pick it up later on?” he asked. “I admit tentative defeat; I need to think about it more and familiarize myself with the issues better.”

The following was my reply, in part:

According to my understanding, you were trying to describe an argument against the existence of God that you thought was compelling. What I was trying to do—the only thing I was trying to do—was critically examine the argument with you to see if it had any rational force. I accept that you found the argument compelling, but I disagree it was for rational reasons. In order to make my case, I had to score the argument rationally (step-by-step with you, in a somewhat Socratic fashion). By proving its logical weakness, I thereby establish that its compelling force could not have been reason.

I don't want to appear as though I am disparaging your intellect. I am personally convinced that you are quite a highly intelligent man. Please understand that. But I do think people should be honest with themselves—in my own opinion, speaking from my commitment to critical thinking. If an argument is proven to be logically untenable, then a person should be honest with himself and admit that its compelling force must have been something other than reason, i.e., that he came to the argument already convinced to some degree.

So here is my suspicion. I think you already sensed on some intuitive level that there was a conflict between what you see as gratuitous suffering on the one hand and the supposed attributes of God on the other, and you gravitated toward arguments that seemed to provide rational ammunition for what you already believed. In other words, the arguments did not convince you, but they were needed as rational support for what you already believed. Maybe by recognizing and honestly admitting that these arguments are logically untenable, a way can be opened for discovering why you think there's a conflict between the world and God.

I know you're not prepared to concede that yet. Given our brief exchange thus far, you are perhaps beginning to see that it's possible these arguments are untenable, but I don't think we've had enough mileage on this yet to convince you. I know only because I've done the homework already; now I'm showing you that homework. We'll get there, but on your terms.

This is where the critical analysis of the Problem of Evil or Suffering rests at this point. I’m pretty sure that we will return to it later, but for now I suspect that Skjæveland wants to (a) intellectually digest the criticisms I had raised, (b) review the arguments put forth by atheist philosophers on this issue, to find out if his presentation was missing something, and if so, what, and (c) to see if any of them adequately address the criticisms I had raised. He never said any of this, mind you; it’s just my suspicion, based on nothing other than the fact that it’s something I would do, having been in a similar position myself at times.

- - -

NB: I just want to underscore one remarkable feature of my present debate with Skjæveland, because its significance simply must not go unnoticed. In all the years I have engaged countless atheists in debate, not a single one has ever conceded (a) the logical fallacies I have pointed out in their arguments or (b) any sort of defeat of their argument. Without any exceptions, every single one of those atheists have insisted that either no fallacies were committed or that I don’t understand what fallacies are—even when the fallacy they commit is almost verbatim identical to the examples given in Logic textbooks I cite from.

I want to formally recognize and acknowledge that Skjæveland is the very first atheist I’ve ever debated who had the personal and intellectual integrity to concede a logical fallacy when indicated and the defeat it incurred. My respect for him can scarcely be measured it is so high. Out of hundreds of atheists, he’s the first. This man has a place of high honor in my estimation.

Håvard Skjæveland and the Problem of Evil

I am currently engaged in an email discussion with a young Norwegian by the name of Håvard Skjæveland on the Problem of Evil argument against the existence of God. (His internet footprint is outdated, he tells me, so take whatever you find about him with a grain of salt.) Our discussion began about four days ago and is still ongoing. Once it is completed, I intend to publish the results here in my blog, having received his permission to do so. Keep an eye out for this. He is a very intelligent, articulate, and respectful young man and our discussion is proving to be quite fruitful, certainly on my end.

(NOTE: As it stands right now, the discussion is shifting away from the problem of ‘evil’ in favour of the problem of ‘suffering’, but I am leaving the title as it is because whether the issue is ‘evil’ or ‘suffering’ the fundamental context is synonymous.)

'Illogical' Doctrine? Prove It.

In a message board conversation I observed someone saying:

The idea of God, having a Son, who is born by a virgin, never sins, never makes a mistake while walking the earth, is crucified, resurrected in three days, and the result of this transpiration of events was the forgiveness of everyone's sins, with the possibility of eternal life with God, is fantastically illogical . . . and this is what makes it great! There is nothing logical in those remarks above. If you contend they are logical, then by all means, make the argument those events are "logical"

"Illogical," he said. An interesting charge, and one that we should not give a pass to. So here is the question that I want to deal with: "What should be the Christian's response to this?" It is a common enough attack, given the typical rhetoric dispensed by atheists, particularly those advocating the 'new atheism' advanced by the likes of Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens, et al.

I think the Christian's response should pay careful consideration to that word being used: "illogical." The response ought not ignore that word. If an atheist wants to claim that these beliefs are illogical, then he should be held accountable for that claim; he needs to present an argument that makes his case. One of two things would happen. The easiest option would be for him to notice how indefensible such an argument is and choose to employ a different, more defensible attack. Obviously that will invoke a different argument, which means this one was wisely abandoned and we can ignore it, focusing our analysis on whatever new attack he proposes.

The other option, of course, is that he will stick to his claim. And it is preferable that he does, I think, because it is the weakest argument he could raise, the easiest one to take apart. I enjoy disemboweling bad arguments, mostly because I enjoy making a spectacle of what 'bad arguments' are. So if he sticks to this attack then the first thing the Christian should do is point out that what we have here is a claim, not an argument. The atheist here has stated his case. Now he must make his case, such as reason obliges him to do. (We are assuming the atheist esteems reason, which they typically profess to do.)

You can see in this anecdotal example that he has tried to shift the burden of proof onto the Christian: "If you contend they are logical," he said, "[then] make the argument [that] those events are logical." He cannot be permitted to get away with this shifting of the burden. Such a tactic is an affront to reason, for by implication it commits the argumentum ad ignorantiam fallacy. What he is essentially saying is, "My case is true unless you can prove it false." And there is nothing intellectually appealing or compelling about fallacious arguments. This is key: If he thinks there is any truth to his claim, then he needs to establish its truth. He must present his ratio veritatis. He cannot simply assume its truth, thinking that it carries weight by the mere force of his assertion (and it is therefore up to the Christian to prove it false). In the arena of critical thinking, that is called an ipse dixit, a Latin term to describe the fallacious sophistry of an unsupported assertion being presented as true by fiat.

Moreover I contend that Christians do not shoulder the burden because there is nothing obviously illogical about those beliefs. For example, there is nothing obviously illogical (i.e., contrary to logic) about a son being born of a virgin. In fact, parthenogenesis has been observed to occur naturally in a variety of species of certain plants, invertebrates, and vertebrates. And given our current understanding about mammalian reproduction, it may seem contrary to science that a virgin could give birth to a child but there is nothing contrary to logic about it. There is a very important difference between science (a posteriori knowledge) and logic (a priori knowledge); they are categorically different, such that when something is contrary to science it does not necessarily follow that it is contrary to logic.

(I would also note that prior to the dawn of the 21st century it was thought that parthenogenesis in mammals was impossible, on account of their imprinted genetic regions. But due to the work of South Korean scientist Hwang Woo-Suk in early 2004 and the Tokyo University of Agriculture shortly thereafter, plus the efforts of the International Stem Cell Corporation from 2007, etc., the creation of human parthenogenetic stem cell lines from unfertilized eggs has been achieved with tremendous success. Just imagine what we will 'know' ten years from now.)

How about the idea that Jesus never sinned? Again, there is nothing obviously illogical about it. (It is debatable whether or not Jesus "never [made] a mistake while walking the earth" because there was a definite religious status quo that he contravened almost routinely; but such does not determine 'sin'.) Something is 'illogical' when it runs contrary to logic qua logic. How exactly does a 'sinless life' run contrary to logic? What principle of logic does it violate? It is certainly not obvious; ergo, it must be shown to be illogical, and this test applies to the entirety of his above claim. Although I think he could make an argument for how certain doctrines run contrary to our common human experience, an entirely different argument is called for when claiming that they violate the laws of logic. Furthermore, to cite a doctrine (e.g., Christ's resurrection) as contradicting our human experience forcefully demonstrates its status as 'miraculous' but it pointedly fails to demonstrate it as 'illogical' because logic is a priori knowledge; it is neither defined by human experience nor a product of scientific inquiry (a posteriori knowledge). On the question of whether something is 'illogical' or not, human experience and science are irrelevant.

So the atheist here, having stated his case, must now make his case. This, reason obliges him to do. And if he wants to stick with his claim about these beliefs being "illogical," his burden is heavy indeed. I would look enthusiastically forward to such attempts because I cannot imagine how one would go about meeting that burden. It would be exciting to observe—or, more probably, anti-climatic.

Layman & Euthyphro

Pulled from Atheism.org in their "Quotation of the Minute" box:

"[Given the legitimacy of purely hypothetical questions] . . . even if God would not approve of torture, it is still true, according to the divine command theory, that if He were to approve of torture, then torture would be right." (Layman, p. 38)

Layman has latched onto the Euthyphro dilemma, which has no compelling force against Christian theism. His statement is non-sequitur when contemplating a God who is (i) immutable and (ii) omnibenevolent, and a moral order that is (iii) grounded in the very nature of God. All three are hallmarks of Christian theology.

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Layman, C. Stephen. The Shape of the Good: Christian Reflections on the Foundation of Ethics. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame. (1991)

Anderson's 'Problem from Evil' Argument

INTRODUCTION

If one is willing to believe the rhetoric, it is Problem of Evil arguments that make the most convincing case for Atheism. Obviously I have witnessed this rhetoric coming from the ranks of atheists but, curiously enough, I also witness some Christian ministers and apologists saying the same thing. Personally, I am nowhere near convinced; I have yet to discover a Problem of Evil argument that sustains the conclusion it sets out to establish (whether the impossibility or improbability of God's existence).

CURTIS ANDERSON'S ARGUMENT

The following argument comes from Curtis Anthony Anderson, a very intelligent and knowledgeable Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Santa Barbara. He identifies it as The Argument from Evil: Inductive Version [1]:

1. If God exists, then He is omnipotent, omniscient, and all good.
   
   
2. There is a tremendous amount of evil in the world, some of it not caused by human beings and apparently gratuitous. (Here might follow a long description of natural disasters, diseases afflicting the apparently innocent, and so on.)
   
   
3. It is unlikely that such an amount and kind of evil would exist if there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and all good being.
   
   
4. Probably, God does not exist.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Although I do not think Anderson himself is an atheist, since he is a member of the Society for Christian Philosophers—which helps to identify the 'God' this argument addresses (e.g., I am not interested in the problems Islam faces)—his argument nevertheless is hinged upon what is potentially the fallacious equivocation that most atheists engage in when formulating this Problem: the meaning of the term 'evil'.

The entire argument is predicated upon the notion of 'evil' so leaving it unspecified is intellectually irresponsible. The second premise asserts that there is a "tremendous amount of evil" in the world but nowhere are we told what 'evil' means in this argument. Therefore it is nearly impossible to evaluate this argument beyond noting this potential equivocation, because it is unknown whether Anderson is criticizing the issue over an internal or external inconsistency.

At this point the critique could end. But I will assume in the first case that Anderson is arguing over an internal inconsistency, and in the second case over an external inconsistency.

- - -

Criticism Over Internal Inconsistency

If his criticism is over an internal inconsistency in Christian theism, then I shall examine the premises and conclusion under the terms of Christian theism.

• Premise 1: "If God exists, then He is omnipotent, omniscient, and all good."

Although I will tentatively concede the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience, the attribute of "all good" causes me some concern because asserting that God is "all good" prima facie excludes other facets of God's being, such as his 'wrath' against sin.

(I am ignoring the more glaring problem of the term describing a moral quality about God, which implies a moral order that transcends God and to which he is subject, which invokes the Euthyphro dilemma.)

If the expression "all good" does not mean anything more substantive than that God possesses no malevolence against which his benevolence might compete, but leaves room for God to possess more attributes than just benevolence, then I will concede that point also and tentatively agree that this premise reflects God as revealed in Christian sacred scriptures.

• Premise 2: "There is a tremendous amount of evil in the world, some of it not caused by human beings and apparently gratuitous. (Here might follow a long description of natural disasters, diseases afflicting the apparently innocent, and so on.)"

Here at the second premise is where the argument collapses into unintelligibility, if 'evil' is understood under the terms of Christian theism. Anderson here asserts that some of this world's evil is "not caused by human beings," which I believe refers to events in the natural world because he hints at "natural disasters" and "diseases." Furthermore, he asserts that this natural evil is "apparently gratuitous."

There are numerous problems here that would require a wholesale revision of the argument. First, under Christian theism, moral order is grounded in the very nature of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands. Ergo, 'evil' is that which runs contrary to the will of this eternal and immutable God. For Anderson to assert that 'natural evil' exists, he shoulders the burden of proving that events in nature run contrary to God's will. He cannot ask us to assume it for the sake of argument, because that would fallaciously beg the question (since 'evil' is the very crux of the entire argument).

Moreover, if these events in nature are "not caused by human beings" then what does Christian theism posit as the causal agent? Ultimately it is God, who is "omnipotent" and "omniscient" and sovereign over his creation. Therefore, to call these events in nature 'evil' Anderson would have to show that Christian theism posits that God acts contrary to his own will at the same time and in the same respect. Utterly incoherent; Anderson would not succeed here. The only way for Anderson to succeed here is for his argument to deny the theory of moral order posited by Christian theism; but in that case his argument would no longer be demonstrating an internal inconsistency but an external one.

Second, there is an important difference between something being "apparently gratuitous" and actually gratuitous. It is possible for something to appear gratuitous at the time but, given all of the relevant facts of the case later, finally understood as not being gratuitous after all (no matter how improbable such a conclusion seemed while we were still caught in the thick of it). So for Anderson's purposes, he needs cases of genuinely gratuitous natural evils—e.g., earthquakes for which God had no purpose consonant with his benevolence—which shoulders a monstrous burden of proof, given Anderson's severe spatio-temporal limitations. Maybe we are not aware of, or maybe cannot conceive of, any purpose God might have consonant with his benevolence, but that fails to prove that no purpose exists.

Third, there is a similar important difference between someone being "apparently innocent" and actually innocent, and to ask that we assume the point for the sake of argument would likewise fallaciously beg the question (e.g., if a person receives what they deserve, it is 'just'; if they receive what they do not deserve, it is 'unjust' and a case for evil can be made). So in this case too, Anderson needs a case of actual innocence that accords with Christian theism; (i) being unable to conceive of how some specific individual could be anything but innocent does not establish their innocence; such would be an argument from incredulity, which is not valid; (ii) the case has to accord with Christian theism, otherwise it will no longer be demonstrating an internal inconsistency but an external one.

• Premise 3: "It is unlikely that such an amount and kind of evil would exist if there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and all good being."

The failure of the third premise results from the failure of the second and, therefore, does not need to be addressed at this time. The second premise requires an extensive revision, which may have a deleterious effect on the third premise anyway, making it premature to address it at this time.

• Conclusion: "Probably, God does not exist."

Consequently, the conclusion no longer follows and may be dismissed as invalid.

- - -

Criticism Over External Inconsistency

If his criticism is over an external inconsistency, then I am not sure there is anything Christian theism would need to address. There are countless worldviews which Christian theism is not consistent with. But that is not in itself a criticism of Christian theism; it is merely a comparative evaluation.

Unless, of course, the worldview against which Christian theism is being evaluated is making truth claims that are said to be objective. In that case, the premises of this argument need a good deal of revision.

In the first place, as with the 'internal' criticism I can tentatively concede the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience, but the "all good" attribute causes me some concern because I do not know what is being asserted. It assumes a particular moral theory but, since that moral theory has not been described, 'good' is an empty term. I cannot give a pass to any moral terms since they are the very crux of the Problem from Evil argument.

Second, until the working moral theory is described, the second premise likewise cannot make sense. If I am not provided the moral theory upon which the argument is based, my immediate reaction is to interpret it according to a Christian theistic metaethic. But if this is a criticism over an external inconsistency, that would be an inappropriate interpretation.

And the third premise suffers from the same problem as the first and second premises. And as a consequence of all this, the Conclusion is eminently premature and nowhere near valid yet.

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[1] Anderson, C. Anthony. "Argument from Evil: Inductive Version" (5 Dec. 2003). University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Philosophy. Retrieved 7 Nov. 2008. <http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/faculty/anderson/12ArgfromEvilInductive.htm>

Tracking the Debunkers (06/Nov/08)

During the last four days there has still been nothing posted at Debunking Christianity that actually attempts to debunk Christianity. There have been three posts: one regards a debate between John Lennox and Michael Shermer; another is Loftus requesting help with some research project, asking Christians to answer what best explains animal suffering; and the third is Garman wrestling with the concept of one being 'evangelical' with one's atheism.

Well done, Loftus. Way to prove Christianity false.

Obama, Abortion, Gay Marriage, and Being Christian

Under my last blog post "President Barack Obama" a gentlemen by the name of Matthew left some thoughts and questions for me (here):

David - yours is the first Christian blog that I've read that is supportive of Obama. All others have focussed on his extreme pro-abortion and pro-homosexual stances - were these not issues for you from a Christian standpoint?

Oh, and just to play Devil's Advocate, God most certainly did will that Obama be elected; but then, He also gave Israel the king that they wanted in King Saul.

Keep up your awesome writings ... you don't blog as often as I think you should!

First I wish to extend a personal greeting to you, Matthew, and to thank you for stopping by this blog and leaving your thoughts and questions. Second, the reason my response to you is getting its own blog post, instead of being in the comments field, is because I have far too much to say.

With regard to other Christian blogs being critical of President Obama rather than supportive? All I can really say about that—and I think your comment itself reflected this—is that it seems to stem more from a political commitment than a biblical one with a measure of willful ignorance. You say they express criticisms of his stance on abortion and homosexuality, which in North American society are obviously two polarizing political issues, especially as key positions characterizing the conservative agenda (whether the Republican party in the U.S. or Conservative party in Canada).

But as is far too often the case, these bloggers misunderstand—or shamefully misrepresent—what Obama's position is on such issues. Take abortion, for example. If you spend enough time listening to right-wing conservative radio (e.g., Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, Andy Wilkow, etc.), which many of these bloggers probably do, you would think Obama is in favour of killing babies because he voted 'present' on certain bills instead of voting 'no'. He is described, even by McCain himself during the final Presidential debate, as aligning with "the pro-abortion movement" (which in itself is a retarded label because no one is 'pro-abortion'). These despicable right-wing hosts are attempting a blatant character assassination of Obama by misrepresenting his position, and even misrepresenting how the system works. You see, the actual facts of the case paint a very different picture. But they do not wish to present all the relevant facts because Obama would not look as nefarious as they want him to appear. And I think a lot of these bloggers listen to these radio hosts, and it gets reflected in their posts.

But look at what the facts are. As a skeptic, that is my consistent position: listen to the arguments from both sides, investigate what the facts are, then draw a more informed conclusion. For instance, under the rules of the Illinois state legislature, only 'yes' votes count toward the passage of a bill; i.e. to vote 'present' has the same effect as voting 'no' since it has the same result on the bill. Ergo, it is misleading to say that Obama "voted against" the bills. He simply voted 'present'. Moreover, when you vote 'present' it generally means that you have a problem with the bill—like its wording, for example, or its failure to include something you feel should be there. But neither these right-wing radio hosts nor these bloggers inform people of these relevant facts.

That is how the state legislature works. As for Obama's voting record, let's look at a specific example. The reason why Obama at the Senate Judiciary Committee in the state of Illinois was opposed to the bill purported to ban partial-birth abortions was because it did not include anything about those abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother; it would have rendered doctors vulnerable to felony indictments for adhering to their Hippocratic Oath by performing an abortion when the mother's health was in jeopardy. In my opinion, anyone with a brain would have had a problem with that bill. "If it sounds incredible that I would vote to withhold life-saving treatment from an infant," Obama said during the debate, "it's because it's not true . . . I am completely supportive of a ban on late-term abortions—partial-birth or otherwise—as long as there is an exception for the mother's health and life. And this [bill] did not contain that exception" (Obama-McCain Presidential Debate III, 15/Oct/08). Imagine that. He would support a ban on late-term abortions. But, again, neither these right-wing radio hosts nor these bloggers inform people of these relevant facts.

To be fair, usually these bloggers are not themselves aware of the actual facts of the case because (i) right-wing radio often avoids the facts whenever the facts weaken their agenda, and (ii) they do not personally verify the information they hear, they do not check to see if what they are hearing is true. They hear it from a source they trust (but should not) and readily believe it, and subsequently propagate it in their blogs.

Are not the 'abortion' and 'homosexuality' topics an issue for me, from a Christian standpoint? Well, yes and no. See, your question is hinged upon what I feel is a crucial equivocation. Speaking for myself, there is a fundamental distinction on these issues as they relate to (i) the 'church' on the one hand and (ii) the 'state' on the other—predicated upon my personal conviction (corresponding to the federal Constitution of the United States) that there should be a "wall of separation" between church and state.

For example, how I think the church should handle the issue of 'gay marriage' is distinct and unique from my view on how the state should handle it, such that I am quite opposed to legislating my 'church' convictions (regardless of how many people share them in common with me) over the entire constituency of the 'state' because I know there are many others who do not share them in common with me. Look at it this way: I would not want to live in a society where Islamic doctrines were legislated into state law; ergo, I am likewise opposed to legislating Christian doctrines into state law. The church can handle the issue of 'gay marriage' in accordance with its Scriptural mandate but it cannot impose those doctrines on the rest of the country's population. And the state can handle the issue in accordance with state laws, which are under the ultimate jurisdiction of the federal Constitution.

If I had lived in the state of California, I would have voted 'no' on Proposition 8; in other words, I would have been opposed to the state banning gay marriage. Why? Because there is no political or legal argument for banning it. Only a religious argument—e.g., Scriptural support for (i) the sanctity of marriage as ordained by and centered upon God, (ii) marriage being a union between one man and one woman, and Scriptural proscription against (iii) the practice of homosexuality. But religious arguments, no matter how solid or compelling they might be, are entirely moot because of the First Amendment.

Having said that, there are very strong Constitutional arguments against banning gay marriage; the arguments are complex and cite various Articles and Amendments of the Constitution but they basically boil down to this inescapable fact: if one group of people are allowed to marry, all groups are allowed to marry. If same-sex couples are barred from marriage, it is an abridgment of the privileges they are entitled to as citizens of the United States, stripping them of equal protection of the laws.

But I also insist that the state is Constitutionally prohibited from interfering with church practices. In other words, wherever gay marriages are to be recognized by the state, there must be protection for church clergy who, according to their religious convictions, refuse to officiate gay marriages. It is disgusting to me when I hear about clergy being prosecuted under a civil lawsuit because they refused to marry a same-sex couple. The "wall of separation" goes both ways.

"Oh, and just to play Devil's Advocate," you said, "God most certainly did will that Obama be elected; but then, He also gave Israel the king that they wanted in King Saul." Touché, my friend... touché.

And thank you very much, for your warm compliment about my writing.

Tracking the Debunkers (02/Nov/08)

This evening I discovered a new blog. It is not the blog itself that is new; it is simply new to me, as I had not previously encountered it nor had it brought to my attention. (I have not yet figured out a way to determine the date a blog was created when it does not display any navigation by 'date'. Someone should create a service that simplifies this area of research.)

At any rate, it should be a blog of considerable interest to me, considering what its title is: Debunking Christianity. That is surely a grand task, particularly when its founder concedes that to 'debunk' means to "show something to be false" (which he cites from the Encarta® World English Dictionary from Microsoft). Since the stated task of this blog is to show that Christianity is false, I will be tracking its entries to see if any measure up to the task the authors set before themselves.

As far as I understand, the blog was founded by a gentleman named John W. Loftus, who describes himself as a minister-turned-atheist residing in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and author of Why I Became an Atheist (a book I will now have to review, if I can find someone who wishes to rid themselves of their copy) whose participation at TheologyWeb (under the name 'Doubter John') has garnered him a questionable reputation. However, Debunking Christianity is home to a number of additional contributors of varying backgrounds; even though Loftus is of particular interest to me, I will critique any post regardless of its author.

From this point onward (November 2, 2008) I will examine entries made at Debunking Christianity to see if they accomplish what they set out to do.

The Spectator Speculates on Whether Richard Dawkins Has Changed His Mind (by John Loftus).

In this post Loftus reports on a comment that Richard Dawkins reportedly made during a second debate with John Lennox at Oxford's Natural History Museum (21/Oct/08, as reported by Melanie Phillips at The Spectator). However fascinating it might be to observe Dawkins burying himself in deeper layers of irrationality, none of this has anything to do with Christianity.

Has Loftus met the task of proving Christianity false? No.

Vote Your Conscience... Please! (by John Loftus)

In this post Loftus comments on the current U.S. Presidential election, lamenting on the inadequacies of the nominated candidates from the three leading parties (Republican, Democrat, Libertarian) and his angst over who to cast his vote for, since he has little confidence in their platforms or policies.

Has Loftus met the task of proving Christianity false? No.

Pat Condell: "Provide Evidence or Expect Mockery and Ridicule" (by John Loftus)

Admittedly I have not watched the embedded video to this post, but given Loftus' commentary it does not seem to meet the task of debunking Christianity anyhow. From what I can gather, it is rather Condell's advice for polemic approach. I will have to watch the video to confirm, but at this point it seems unlikely it even approaches their task.

[Edit 02/Nov/08: I have now watched the video and, indeed, it has nothing to do with proving Christianity is false. It is simply Condell describing his forceful bigotry and atheistic fanaticism. Yes, well, that is all quite underwhelming and remarkably irrelevant to anything beyond Condell's biography.]

Has Loftus met the task of proving Christianity false? No.

Inconsistent Skeptics

Some skeptics do not adhere to critical thinking as consistently as they should. In my experience, atheistic skeptics exhibit this lack of consistency the most. Critical thinking is not a commendable heuristic if it gets abandoned whenever it inconveniences a pre-existing bias. Rather, critical thinking ought reshape one's bias, not be tossed out when it threatens one's bias.

For example, a skeptic who adheres to critical thinking consistently (Smith) would refuse to accept some proposition P if there is inadequate epistemic warrant for it. Now, one who does not adhere to critical thinking consistently (Jones) would likewise refuse to accept P at first. Where the inconsistency in critical thinking arises is when Jones takes it a step further and asserts that because P has not been proven true it is consequently false.

This is made more obvious where P stands for "gods exist." It is consistent with critical thinking for Jones to reject P if for him there has been inadequate epistemic warrant for it. However, Jones promptly abandons critical thinking if he asserts that P ("gods exist") is false because it has not been proven true; that is a logical fallacy, argumentum ad ignorantiam. And he further contradicts critical thinking if he also affirms that a lack of evidence for P is somehow itself evidence for ¬P ("gods do not exist"). An absence of evidence is an empty set; 'nothing' in support of P is still 'nothing' when used as an attempt to support ¬P.

Smith is the consistent skeptic when he refuses to affirm that P is true but also refuses to affirm that P is false. It may be false. Or it may be true. The lack of adequate warrant either way means he cannot affirm either; Smith remains agnostic on the question. Jones, in order to be consistent with critical thinking, must do the same. If what Jones wants to affirm is that P is false, critical thinking dictates that he must provide evidence that either (a) supports ¬P or (b) invalidates P.

"I Contend We Are Both Atheists" - Response to Comments 3

The following blog post is a direct response to some of the intriguing comments I have received regarding my criticism of Stephen Roberts' infamous Quote. I think the points being raised are too good to be buried in a Comments field which is inevitably lagging further and further behind in the flow of the blog, comments which certainly deserve their own light of day.

Anonymous said (his comment here):

"The Quote" does not imply that your reasons for dismissing other gods are the same as Stephen's reasons for dismissing yours. It merely states that when you UNDERSTAND your own reasons for dismissing those other gods, you will UNDERSTAND his reasons. I suspect that since you do not even UNDERSTAND the quote, you will not make the mental effort to UNDERSTAND either his reasons or your own.

First of all, I would encourage you to assume a name. Make one up if you have to, but please assume a name by which I can identify your arguments. Anyone can contribute as "Anonymous" and I would have no way of knowing if it was you or not.

Now, regarding your comment. I already know the Quote does not imply that our reasons are the same. The content and context of the Quote and Roberts' elaboration thereof both make that pretty obvious. My criticism argues from the understanding that the Quote implies our reasons are similar. That is the implication the Quote makes, and it is rather candid about it. So I will let the readers determine for themselves whether or not I understand the Quote, particularly by my responses here.

(Keep in mind that my criticism regarded the Quote and, by extension, Roberts' elaboration of it. My criticism did not, and cannot, regard your own views nor your perspective of the Quote. Any objection that indicates how my criticism fails to account for some perspective of yours only demonstrates a misunderstanding of my criticism itself. I am certainly able to offer a critique of your perspective on a given subject but that is not what I had done; yet it is my criticism of the Quote that you had responded to.)

What does the Quote itself say? I am going to direct our attention to the verifiable facts here, in an effort to keep this discussion relevant and intellectually honest. What does it actually say? It says that when you "understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods," then you will "understand why I dismiss yours" (emphasis supplied). And then Stephen Roberts himself stopped by this blog—which really made my day, quite frankly, since I had not heard from him in so long—to elaborate not only on the meaning of the Quote but also on what for him, as the originator of the Quote, is the real "meat" of it; specifically, that "if [theists] really understood why they don't believe in the other gods they might understand why their god is hard to believe in too" (emphasis supplied).

These facts are not really disputable. Anyone can independently verify them. Right? Especially when I openly provide the relevant links. The Quote was already fairly clear, and Roberts himself made it clearer still: the fundamental point is that if the Christian theist openly and honestly understands "why" he dismisses all the other possible gods then he will understand "why" the atheist dismisses God (or finds him hard to believe in, at best). In both the Quote and in Roberts' elaboration, the "why" test (reasoning) is the real meat or force of the Quote.

This fact becomes even clearer when one sees there are two questions which the Quote logically and naturally raises in our minds. The first question is, "Why does the atheist dismiss God?" And the second question is, "Why do I (the Christian theist) dismiss all other possible gods?" As I understand it, and Roberts likewise pointed out, the second question essentially acts as the springboard to the answer for the first question; i.e., answering the second question ought to enlighten and enable the Christian theist to discover the answer for the first question.

And my contention has been just this: "Is that actually the case?" Is there any real correlation between the answers to each question? Put it another way: Is it true that by honestly examining and understanding my own reasons for why I dismiss all other possible gods I will be enabled to understand why the atheist dismisses God? The force of my contention, of course, is borne upon the rather unequivocal answer, "No, there is no correlation." Because—

[and here is the essential thrust]

—if I honestly examine and understand my own reasons for why I dismiss all the other possible gods, I actually discover that they have no possible relationship with the atheist's reasons for dismissing God. None, zero. For example, my reasons (for dismissing all other gods) operate from the presupposition of God's existence. The epistemologies and heuristics on either side of the debate differ quite drastically, and at their most foundational levels. Not even the ground or nature of logic itself bears any similarity between us; for the Christian theist, logic is grounded in the very nature of God, and this cannot be said for the atheist—any atheist whatsoever. This is precisely why the theist's reasons (for dismissing all other possible gods) do not, in fact, offer any insight of understanding into the atheist's reasons (for dismissing God).

But notice something compelling here, equally relevant and interesting. The force of this argument can also be shown from the opposite side; i.e., flip the scenario around and it still bears this truth out. If I genuinely and honestly understand the atheist's reasons for why he dismisses God, based as they usually are upon an epistemology grounded in some form of empiricism, I discover that his reasons for dismissing God do not have any kind of relationship to my reasons for dismissing all other possible gods. Our epistemologies are grounded and structured quite differently. And that is the very point of my contention, originally and now expanded upon in this post: the theist's reasons and the atheist's reasons are not even similar, much less the same. This is why the second clause of the Quote is unintelligible. It is simply false (i.e., it bears no correspondence with reality). As I had said previously, the reasons why Roberts rejects God and the reasons why I reject "all other possible gods" are very different: "Being informed of Stephen's reasoning does not inform anyone of my reasoning, nor vice versa."

The first clause of the Quote is incoherent. And its second clause is false. I cannot understand why anyone would want to champion the Quote. (Well, actually I can, but that is the threshold beyond which my skepticism gives way to my cynicism. My skepticism I can defend; my cynicism is more rant-ish.)

jaydecay57 said (his comment here):

I believe the point of the quote is to illustrate the fact that any believer in a monotheistic religion can so readily dismiss all other gods as easily as any atheist, yet can cling so tightly to one slight variation from the others without providing an acceptable reasoning behind their choice.

I do not believe the Quote has anything to say about whether or not a theist has the intellectual honesty and integrity to provide "acceptable" reasoning behind his choice. (And I can level a significant and substantive criticism against atheists pontificating to others what "acceptable reasoning" is.) Let me explain what I mean. Whether the Christian provides his reasoning or not, the Quote is asking him to authentically examine and understand his reasons for dismissing all other gods, and that by doing so he will better understand the atheist's reasons for dismissing God. And my criticism shows how this fails the test, i.e., that it is simply not true, that it does not correspond to anything in reality.

Truthfully though the REAL point of the quote (I feel) is to make atheists smile and say "That's what I've been trying to say all along!"

Perhaps. But what those atheists "have been trying to say all along" is still incoherent and false, respectively, if it mirrors the first and second clause of the Quote. Like I said, if the Quote is really just humorous nonsense that atheists find entertaining, if it has nothing substantive or real to say about Christian theology, then I should not find any atheists arguing against me if I post about how nonsensical the Quote is. They felt the same way before I even posted, right? As I said before, "It is amusing but incoherent. Great. A smile, a nod, and now let's move along to authentic, intelligible dialogue." Why waste time over something everyone agrees is neither intelligible nor substantive?

I will give you that believing in a god is logical. However all the logical reasons to believe in a god are inherently demeaning to the believer (Fear of the unknown, gullible, ignorant, and other admittedly mean sounding words) which may be why it is difficult for some to see that it is in fact rather silly to say no other god exists except the one you have arbitrarily chosen from the myriad of other choices.

Evidently you have not listed "all the logical reasons to believe" because I did not find in your list any of the reasons argued for in systematic theologies or philosophical texts, nor any of the reasons I happen to hold. That is a lot to have left out. I think maybe there are logical reasons you do not even know about (I do not want to assume there are some you know about and willfully omitted); critical reasoning would dictate that as an opportunity to exercise a tone of intellectual charity, admitting there could be logical reasons you have not informed yourself about, instead of rashly declaring that you have listed all the logical reasons to believe. I am assuming, of course, that you hold critical thinking skills in high regard when dealing with competing views. I hope it is a correct assumption.

How do you expect not to be ridiculed?

Because I champion reason, critical thinking, and skepticism. Perhaps fundies might ridicule me for that, but not fellow thinkers and skeptics. In my limited experience, they usually demonstrate appreciation for such things being championed, not ridicule. And no, "skeptic" is not a synonym for "atheist."

...you actively chose one God that fits you and ignoring all other possibilities, called it truth.

You assume I ignored all other possibilities. I am not sure you have a defensible basis for such an assumption.

But you are correct, I do not determine truth. I discover it—which can happen when one pursues it.

If one [god] is absurd, it inevitably means they all are.

It is not obvious how that follows logically. I would love to see the premises that render such a scandalous conclusion.

This is all rather mean sounding, I know, and I do apologies a little, but under the guise of the internet I am safe from your e-god's scorn...regardless, I can take it as easily as I can dish it out, so feel free to bash my grammar and liberal use of ellipsis. I also fully realize that I'm just as ignorant as you and we're all in this thing together...I'm just able to admit and embrace it.

I fully and genuinely appreciate your contributions. When people leave their bigotry outside and enter into an authentic conversation on ultimate issues, it can plant seeds that end up shaping the ideas and beliefs of the participants. That is what this blog is all about: the conversations and experiences that shape my itinerarium mentis.

Emotional Rhetoric, 1; Critical Thinking, 0

"The next time someone tries to tell me that being Christian is the embodiment of logic and reasoning, I don't know what I will do," a young woman on IRC commented. Well here is a really crazy notion for her to consider: engage the person in a critical analysis on that issue.

Her comment was in response to something I had said earlier in a conversation with someone else; namely, that an in-depth study of logic and critical thinking ironically led me from atheism to Christian theism: "The unexpected thing was the fact that a commitment to reason and critical thinking eventually landed me in the Christian camp," I had said.

But for all practical purposes it is impossible to engage her on that issue because she has a vitriolic aversion to anything that even resembles "religion talk." What I find very disappointing is the sheer ubiquity of this attitude among those who identify themselves as atheists. It is alarming, the number of atheists I encounter that exhibit it. They will take time out of their day to hurl such gratuitous invective, but to engage the issues critically is somehow not worth their time. It is very disheartening to observe such priority in their values, where they have time to invest in supercilious rhetoric but not critical analysis. Such intellectual irresponsibility was part of the reason I ended up rejecting atheism, and the atheists I interact with today continually demonstrate that my conclusive observation is still relevant and accurate.

In the words of English philosopher Herbert Spencer:

"There is a principle which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance. That principle is contempt prior to investigation."

The Only Response Possible

Altruist80 wrote: What if it all came to pass? Picture this. You are sitting at the television, watching the news one day. You see headlines erupting about a Russian (or other northern force) launching a surprise attack on Israel, with no real opposition. But somehow they are forced to turn back with major losses due to command confusion, friendly fire, and natural events. The world enters a time of war. Some months later, a second assault is launched from the north. A large naval fleet decimates this force with fierce bombardments from the Mediterranean (ships of Kittim). Again they are forced to turn back. Still, some time later, the southern forces muster a counter-attack. But the northern force smashes this army and overthrows all of Europe and Asia Minor, including Israel. The leader of the prevailing force declares world rule and outlaws Judaism and Christianity, citing them as the cause for the war, and sets up his command headquarters in Israel. People start disappearing. Unnatural events occur, which defy all reason. You are now a subject of a world police power. Would you believe the book of Daniel, or would you cite these events as inevitable and resulting from the demand of a new solution in a volatile world? Don't answer with, "It's not going to happen." Treat it as hypothetical. What if?

themadfiddler wrote: I would realize I was in a horrible alternate reality that was a result of Hal Lindsey's engrams being imprinted on the world, where real biblical scholarship was replaced by gullible idiocy, where the trailer park had become the cultural center of the world, and reality was now, Matrix-like, being run by a horrible super-computer with Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins at the helm, spewing out a cliched mess of hackneyed plagiarized plot.

"I Contend We Are Both Atheists" - Response to Comments 2

Finally, after a few more subsequent comments posted to my original article (despite that blog being 'Closed'), I received a comment that actually has something intelligible to say—ironically, from Stephen Roberts himself! It has been quite a few years so it was a pleasant surprise to hear from him again. It's nice running into you again, Stephen!

Although he posted his comment to a different blog post ("No Theist Is An Atheist"), it nevertheless regarded my critique squarely and, quite refreshingly, had something intelligent to say. Stephen's comment (3/Jan/08) stated:

Hey David, Stephen here! After the quote came up in another forum I read, I ego-surfed across this post and figured I'd drop by and say hi!

Yes, I know the usage of "atheist" in the quote is incorrect since if a person believes in any kind of god they are a theist, not an atheist. But I think it still work because it helps them to think about the fact that they are also non-believers for other gods.

But the real "meat" of the quote is the second part about how if the theist really understood why they don't believe in the other gods they might understand why their god is hard to believe in too.

If I would have been writing a philosophy book, I probably would have come up with better wording or at least better phrasing. But even with its flaws, its kind of nice to see the quote still wander around and mean something to some people :-)

I appreciate his candor, and his concession that the "we are both atheists" clause is untenable. At least someone, finally, possessed enough sense to concede that this feature of the Quote is inherently faulty. Unfortunately, it was the author only. Everyone else that comments still tries to retain it, tenaciously blind to the contradiction. My hat's off to Stephen.

Nevertheless, the real 'meat' of the Quote is still faulty (but not as obviously). I can appreciate the point Stephen is trying to make, but I have to wonder if he is cognizant of the fact that the only people who will agree with him are those who already adhere to an epistemology similar to his. Unless I am mistaken, Stephen subscribes to a form of empiricism, i.e. the degree to which some proposition outside science can be given scientific support or can be reduced to science, to that degree the proposition becomes rationally acceptable. It is for this reason that theistic claims are said to shoulder an empirical burden of proof. (I invite Stephen to correct me if I am wrong.) From my understanding, that is why he rejects all possible gods, including the God of Christianity: because claims of their existence are bereft of empirical evidence to substantiate those claims.

If that is the case, then the question immediately presents itself: Is that the reason why Christians "dismiss all the other possible gods"? Is it because those other god-claims are without empirical evidence substantiating them? No, that is not their reason, because (a) they do not subscribe to any formulation of empiricism, for it is antithetical to orthodox Christian theology, and (b) they know that reasoning this way, for them, commits the Special Pleading fallacy. (This fallacy is committed when you reject all other gods because they lack substantiating empirical evidence, while making an exception, without good reason, for your own God who likewise lacks said evidence.)

Therefore, the only people who will agree with the second clause are necessarily those who already adhere to an epistemology similar to Stephen's. How so? Because he asserts that once "you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours." It naturally follows that this clause requires its subject to hold a similar epistemology. Consider: we first discover the reason he dismisses all possible gods, and we then look to see whether or not that is the same reason Christians dismiss all other gods. So then what happens when Stephen encounters Christians, who do not subscribe to an epistemology similar to his? Suddenly this Quote is unsound, collapsing under the fact that it is untrue with respect to the subject it is addressing (Christians). It is true for only a specific segment of the human population: those who already share his epistemic views. With regard to everyone else, it is false.

To summarize in brief: (1) I look at Stephen's reason for dismissing all possible gods and I admit, "That's not my reason for dismissing them"; (2) and if Stephen considered my reason for rejecting all other gods, he would admit, "That's not my reason for dismissing them." In other words, this second clause—

When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours.

—is false, when regarding all those who adhere to an epistemology different from Stephen's empiricism. The reason he rejects all possible gods and the reason I reject all other gods are, in fact, two very different reasons. Being informed of Stephen's reasoning does not inform anyone of my reasoning, nor vice versa.