October 20, 2008

Inconsistent Skeptics

Some skeptics do not adhere to critical thinking as consistently as they should. In my experience, atheistic skeptics exhibit this lack of consistency the most. Critical thinking is not a commendable heuristic if it gets abandoned whenever it inconveniences a pre-existing bias. Rather, critical thinking ought reshape one's bias, not be tossed out when it threatens one's bias.

For example, a skeptic who adheres to critical thinking consistently (Smith) would refuse to accept some proposition P if there is inadequate epistemic warrant for it. Now, one who does not adhere to critical thinking consistently (Jones) would likewise refuse to accept P at first. Where the inconsistency in critical thinking arises is when Jones takes it a step further and asserts that because P has not been proven true it is consequently false.

This is made more obvious where P stands for "gods exist." It is consistent with critical thinking for Jones to reject P if for him there has been inadequate epistemic warrant for it. However, Jones promptly abandons critical thinking if he asserts that P ("gods exist") is false because it has not been proven true; that is a logical fallacy, argumentum ad ignorantiam. And he further contradicts critical thinking if he also affirms that a lack of evidence for P is somehow itself evidence for ¬P ("gods do not exist"). An absence of evidence is an empty set; 'nothing' in support of P is still 'nothing' when used as an attempt to support ¬P.

Smith is the consistent skeptic when he refuses to affirm that P is true but also refuses to affirm that P is false. It may be false. Or it may be true. The lack of adequate warrant either way means he cannot affirm either; Smith remains agnostic on the question. Jones, in order to be consistent with critical thinking, must do the same. If what Jones wants to affirm is that P is false, critical thinking dictates that he must provide evidence that either (a) supports ¬P or (b) invalidates P.

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