Sam Harris and the Problem of Evil

Cleaning up and organizing my blog this evening, I noticed this brief excerpt from Sam Harris sitting as an unpublished 'Draft' in my index of blog posts. Evidently I had intended to compose a response but for some reason forgot all about it. It is a succinct Problem of Evil argument which I pulled from his "An Atheist Manifesto" [1]:

[God is responsible for human suffering. There is no other way to properly frame the issue.] This is the age-old problem of theodicy, of course, and we should consider it solved. If God exists, either He can do nothing to stop the most egregious calamities, or He does not care to. God, therefore, is either impotent or evil.

After listing some examples of human suffering—Hurricane Katrina, the Holocaust, genocide in Rwanda, etc.—with rhetoric guaranteed to stir up the emotions of his readers, he then asks them to think rationally. If it is the case that his readers are supposed to think rationally about the issue, why did Harris invest so much energy into fomenting their emotions in the ten preceding paragraphs? Because his readers must react emotionally in order for his argument to work. If his readers truly were to think critically armed with reason, the embarrassing holes in his argument would become immediately obvious.

What ought to be the philosophical rebuttal to his PoE argument? Harris believes that pious readers "will now execute the following pirouette: God cannot be judged by merely human standards of morality" (which he finds ludicrous because, according to him, "human standards of morality are precisely what the faithful use to establish God’s goodness in the first place"). Well no, that is not the response Harris can expect to his argument. Even though it is true that God cannot be judged by human standards of morality (for a complex of reasons that Harris' dogmatic bigotry would likely prevent him from anticipating), that would not be the right critical response.

If his readers were to think critically armed with reason, they should immediately note (or at the very least suspect) that Harris' argument committed the fallacy of bifurcation or false dilemma, which involves "a situation in which only two alternatives are considered, when in fact there are other options" [2].

Since God is said to be omniscient and omnipotent—i.e., he knows these calamities will happen and possesses the power to stop them—then indeed he obviously "does not care to" stop them; he is infinitely able to but for some reason doesn't stop these calamities. Now, this leads Harris to conclude that God is therefore "evil" but such a conclusion does not follow reasonably from the stated premises. Harris is operating from a premise that is suppressed. Like I said, God is infinitely able to but for some reason doesn't stop these calamities. That is the closet in which can be found the hidden premise that Harris drew his conclusion from.

Only if God's reason (for not stopping this or that calamity) is rooted in "malice" can he be considered evil, if he did it out of some sick enjoyment of inflicting gratuitous harm on others or watching people suffer. But what if his reason is rooted in justice, such that a calamity fell upon people who deserved it? Moreover, what if his just reason for allowing some calamity to befall one person led to not only strengthening their personal development but also to a net greater good in the future for hundreds or thousands of others? In such cases God is not evil at all for allowing the calamity, which firmly proves the fallacy of bifurcation Harris committed. God can know a calamity will happen and possess the power to stop it but nevertheless allow it to happen and not be evil for doing so.

So now the readers need to decide which is more plausible, and I will tell them how they can do that. I can cite multiple pieces of evidence showing where God allowed egregious calamities to occur for the purpose of justice or a greater good, whereas Harris cannot cite one single example of God doing so for the purpose of malice. Not even one. Harris can assume malice out of baseless assertion or personal incredulity but he cannot prove it from evidence. So if I have several pieces of evidence for my contention (e.g., Gen. 50:20; cf. Gen. 45:4-11) and Harris has zero for his, where should the reader think the plausibility lies? The answer is pretty obvious.

The Problem of Evil argument presented by Harris is fallacious and bankrupt. He needs to go back to the drawing board and firm up his suppressed premise, next time exposing it honestly.

Another Question on the Problem of Evil

I had a Christian lady send me a question by email about the Problem of Evil (PoE)—pertaining to her specific case, having been confronted by an atheist on the issue. Evidently this atheist told her that the PoE "proves that the God of the Bible doesn't exist." I told her I can guarantee that the argument he produces to support that claim will be invalid in at least one way, possibly more. She later shared with me what his argument was, which quite forcefully stated, "Since suffering exists and there is no reason for it, that defeats the belief that an omnibenevolent God exists"—and furthermore, that "no theologian has ever offered a successful solution to the PoE."

Does his argument shoot itself in the foot, as I had guaranteed it would? Absolutely.

Where his PoE invalidates itself is at the premise "there is no reason for [suffering]." By having assumed in advance that gratuitous suffering exists, his argument excludes the God of Christianity from the criticism. The argument has nothing to say about our God. How so? Quite simply: the God of Christianity is defined as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent; consequently, given those attributes in concert, there can be no such thing as gratuitous suffering. They are mutually exclusive, in the same way that an Irresistible Force precludes an Immovable Object.

If he persists in presupposing the existence of gratuitous suffering in an argument that is supposed to address the God of Christianity, then he is guilty of committing the fallacy of Begging the Question. How so? Because, like I said, gratuitous suffering and those attributes of God are mutually exclusive; i.e., by assuming in advance that gratuitous suffering exists, his argument has assumed that God as defined by Christianity does not exist, and then it concludes that he does not exist. The only way he can escape this dilemma is by proving that gratuitous suffering exists, instead of simply assuming it does. His assuming its existence is what's invalidating his argument.

And the absence of a coherent theodicy does not salvage his argument. "You are not required to provide a solution for the PoE," I told her, so that aspect of his contention is irrelevant. And I went on to say:

It almost seems like he is saying, "My PoE argument is true if you can't prove it false," which is the fallacious irrelevancy known as 'argumentum ad ignorantiam'. His PoE argument stands or falls under its own merits, not on your ability to provide a theodicy (which is what solutions to the PoE are called). PoE arguments and theodicies are two different things.

And he is wrong, of course. Many Christian philosophers have produced successful theodicies (James Moreland, Greg Bahnsen, Alvin Plantinga, John Frame, etc.). Until he can cite every theodicy ever developed and unequivocally refute them all, his statement is nothing more than wishful thinking: (a) if there are any theodicies he has failed to unequivocally refute, his statement cannot be true; (b) if there are any theodicies he has no knowledge of, his statement cannot be true.

Håvard Skjæveland and the Problem of Evil – Part 1

It seems that my discussion with Skjæveland on the Problem of Evil (i.e., how it supposedly demonstrates the probability that God doesn’t exist) has drawn to a tentative close. And I want to highlight the term “tentative” because he has not exactly given up yet. Let me explain where we’re at thus far and how we got here.

First, a little background information on Skjæveland. He is a 23-year old student from Stavanger, Norway, who is studying web programming. He is an avowed atheist who describes himself as “running pretty high on Richard Dawkins’ atheism scale” which means, I have reason to think, he affirms the ‘strong’ version of atheism. He also admitted to me that his thinking has been influenced by the New Atheist propaganda of Dawkins, Hitchens, Dennet, and Harris. (These gentlemen are reliable on philosophy in the same way that Duane Gish is reliable on science.)

On December 10th he introduced himself to me in an email which described his appreciation of the fact that someone else actually recognizes the fundamental difference between agnosticism and atheism, that the former addresses an issue different from the latter. “I was beginning to think I was alone!” he exclaimed. And in a subsequent email he shared with me a brief synopsis of his atheistic convictions and how he arrived at them. A particularly compelling issue for him, he said, was how convincingly the Problem of Evil undermines Christian theism. (I chose to ignore his thoughts on other religions, e.g., Hinduism, because I have no interest in defending those.) Since I have never encountered a Problem of Evil argument that accomplishes its intended aim—and I have examined many, both historical and contemporary—I thought this could be an issue worth exploring. He agreed to engage me on it.

He began with the logical Problem of Evil argument as presented by Epicurus, whom he cited directly, an argument taken up by others like David Hume and John L. Mackie. However, this alleged problem suffers from a fatal flaw, I pointed out—the definition of ‘evil’. Epicurus and others who submit this problem use the term 'evil' but never bother to define it. Until that term is defined, the problem is a lifeless corpse with no merit whatsoever because 'evil' lies at the very heart of the issue. “If you find the logical Problem of Evil argument compelling,” I said, “it's because you have assumed a definition of 'evil' on behalf of the argument.” I told him that he needed to disclose this definition he was assuming in order to continue examining the problem.

At this point he backed away from the Problem of Evil argument. “I don’t really know how to define evil,” he confessed, and asked if we could approach it as a Problem of Suffering argument instead. “Surely you agree,” he said, “that there is gratuitous suffering in the world,” that God could do something “so that people don’t suffer needlessly.” And I had to stop him right there. First, the Problem of Suffering argument shoulders an enormous burden of proof that has to be met. As the critical mind will detect, asking me to agree from the outset that gratuitous suffering exists is to beg the very question, which is fallacious. Since the supposed existence of gratuitous suffering lies at the heart of the argument—the very issue upon which it is hinged—he cannot simply assume it, nor can he ask me to.

Second, how I understand the term “suffering” differs explicitly from how he understands it (because our metaethics are antithetical, mine being God-based and him being an atheist), so my agreement would only encourage the fallacy of equivocation at any rate. Then I reset the conversation, underscoring the two things that must be established. “If you cannot prove the gratuity of human suffering, the argument fails. If you cannot prove that human suffering is inconsistent with the attributes of God, the argument fails” (viz. omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent).

Skjæveland said he didn’t know how to go about proving the gratuity of suffering “except to come up with hypothetical scenarios” by which to illustrate it. So he called upon the example of rape: “Surely the woman being raped didn’t ask for it and certainly doesn’t deserve it.” Again I had to note the logical fallacy being committed, or possibly two different fallacies. On the one hand, he is possibly committing the fallacy of arguing from incredulity; i.e., “This suffering must be gratuitous because I can’t believe it’s not.”

On the other hand, he is definitely committing the fallacy of begging the question; i.e., “This is gratuitous suffering because it is gratuitous.” How did he commit this fallacy? By stating that the rape victim did not deserve it. Unfortunately, that assumes the truth of the very conclusion to be proved. “I am not trying to suggest she did deserve it,” I said. “It's just that I won't be bullied into a conclusion, if you know what I mean.” Nothing defeats an argument quite like fallacies, by which it defeats itself. They are to be avoided. Does there exist gratuitous suffering? That’s the burden shouldered by this argument, which must be met because if gratuitous suffering does not exist then the argument is a dog with no bite.

On the issue of whether or not human suffering is inconsistent with the attributes of God, Skjæveland had no directly relevant response. The only response he had was, “If God made us this way, doesn’t that suggest that God is at least imperfect?” First of all, God is not imperfect if the history of creation is unfolding precisely as he had planned it, meeting every purpose for which it was designed. Second, I was unable to determine how the angle his response took here adequately meets the burden of proof. The perfection of God was not the issue. The issue is the alleged conflict between human suffering and a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. So I had asked him to clarify, if he could, how his response relevantly answers that issue.

And at this point he backed away from the Problem of Suffering argument too. “I’ll concede the two informal fallacies you bring up,” he said, and further conceded that suffering could be consistent with the attributes of God (although it makes him wonder if God is “toying with us,” which I subsequently answered). “Can we leave the Argument of Suffering behind for the moment, and maybe drive back to pick it up later on?” he asked. “I admit tentative defeat; I need to think about it more and familiarize myself with the issues better.”

The following was my reply, in part:

According to my understanding, you were trying to describe an argument against the existence of God that you thought was compelling. What I was trying to do—the only thing I was trying to do—was critically examine the argument with you to see if it had any rational force. I accept that you found the argument compelling, but I disagree it was for rational reasons. In order to make my case, I had to score the argument rationally (step-by-step with you, in a somewhat Socratic fashion). By proving its logical weakness, I thereby establish that its compelling force could not have been reason.

I don't want to appear as though I am disparaging your intellect. I am personally convinced that you are quite a highly intelligent man. Please understand that. But I do think people should be honest with themselves—in my own opinion, speaking from my commitment to critical thinking. If an argument is proven to be logically untenable, then a person should be honest with himself and admit that its compelling force must have been something other than reason, i.e., that he came to the argument already convinced to some degree.

So here is my suspicion. I think you already sensed on some intuitive level that there was a conflict between what you see as gratuitous suffering on the one hand and the supposed attributes of God on the other, and you gravitated toward arguments that seemed to provide rational ammunition for what you already believed. In other words, the arguments did not convince you, but they were needed as rational support for what you already believed. Maybe by recognizing and honestly admitting that these arguments are logically untenable, a way can be opened for discovering why you think there's a conflict between the world and God.

I know you're not prepared to concede that yet. Given our brief exchange thus far, you are perhaps beginning to see that it's possible these arguments are untenable, but I don't think we've had enough mileage on this yet to convince you. I know only because I've done the homework already; now I'm showing you that homework. We'll get there, but on your terms.

This is where the critical analysis of the Problem of Evil or Suffering rests at this point. I’m pretty sure that we will return to it later, but for now I suspect that Skjæveland wants to (a) intellectually digest the criticisms I had raised, (b) review the arguments put forth by atheist philosophers on this issue, to find out if his presentation was missing something, and if so, what, and (c) to see if any of them adequately address the criticisms I had raised. He never said any of this, mind you; it’s just my suspicion, based on nothing other than the fact that it’s something I would do, having been in a similar position myself at times.

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NB: I just want to underscore one remarkable feature of my present debate with Skjæveland, because its significance simply must not go unnoticed. In all the years I have engaged countless atheists in debate, not a single one has ever conceded (a) the logical fallacies I have pointed out in their arguments or (b) any sort of defeat of their argument. Without any exceptions, every single one of those atheists have insisted that either no fallacies were committed or that I don’t understand what fallacies are—even when the fallacy they commit is almost verbatim identical to the examples given in Logic textbooks I cite from.

I want to formally recognize and acknowledge that Skjæveland is the very first atheist I’ve ever debated who had the personal and intellectual integrity to concede a logical fallacy when indicated and the defeat it incurred. My respect for him can scarcely be measured it is so high. Out of hundreds of atheists, he’s the first. This man has a place of high honor in my estimation.

Håvard Skjæveland and the Problem of Evil

I am currently engaged in an email discussion with a young Norwegian by the name of Håvard Skjæveland on the Problem of Evil argument against the existence of God. (His internet footprint is outdated, he tells me, so take whatever you find about him with a grain of salt.) Our discussion began about four days ago and is still ongoing. Once it is completed, I intend to publish the results here in my blog, having received his permission to do so. Keep an eye out for this. He is a very intelligent, articulate, and respectful young man and our discussion is proving to be quite fruitful, certainly on my end.

(NOTE: As it stands right now, the discussion is shifting away from the problem of ‘evil’ in favour of the problem of ‘suffering’, but I am leaving the title as it is because whether the issue is ‘evil’ or ‘suffering’ the fundamental context is synonymous.)

Anderson's 'Problem from Evil' Argument

INTRODUCTION

If one is willing to believe the rhetoric, it is Problem of Evil arguments that make the most convincing case for Atheism. Obviously I have witnessed this rhetoric coming from the ranks of atheists but, curiously enough, I also witness some Christian ministers and apologists saying the same thing. Personally, I am nowhere near convinced; I have yet to discover a Problem of Evil argument that sustains the conclusion it sets out to establish (whether the impossibility or improbability of God's existence).

CURTIS ANDERSON'S ARGUMENT

The following argument comes from Curtis Anthony Anderson, a very intelligent and knowledgeable Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Santa Barbara. He identifies it as The Argument from Evil: Inductive Version [1]:

1. If God exists, then He is omnipotent, omniscient, and all good.
   
   
2. There is a tremendous amount of evil in the world, some of it not caused by human beings and apparently gratuitous. (Here might follow a long description of natural disasters, diseases afflicting the apparently innocent, and so on.)
   
   
3. It is unlikely that such an amount and kind of evil would exist if there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and all good being.
   
   
4. Probably, God does not exist.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Although I do not think Anderson himself is an atheist, since he is a member of the Society for Christian Philosophers—which helps to identify the 'God' this argument addresses (e.g., I am not interested in the problems Islam faces)—his argument nevertheless is hinged upon what is potentially the fallacious equivocation that most atheists engage in when formulating this Problem: the meaning of the term 'evil'.

The entire argument is predicated upon the notion of 'evil' so leaving it unspecified is intellectually irresponsible. The second premise asserts that there is a "tremendous amount of evil" in the world but nowhere are we told what 'evil' means in this argument. Therefore it is nearly impossible to evaluate this argument beyond noting this potential equivocation, because it is unknown whether Anderson is criticizing the issue over an internal or external inconsistency.

At this point the critique could end. But I will assume in the first case that Anderson is arguing over an internal inconsistency, and in the second case over an external inconsistency.

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Criticism Over Internal Inconsistency

If his criticism is over an internal inconsistency in Christian theism, then I shall examine the premises and conclusion under the terms of Christian theism.

• Premise 1: "If God exists, then He is omnipotent, omniscient, and all good."

Although I will tentatively concede the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience, the attribute of "all good" causes me some concern because asserting that God is "all good" prima facie excludes other facets of God's being, such as his 'wrath' against sin.

(I am ignoring the more glaring problem of the term describing a moral quality about God, which implies a moral order that transcends God and to which he is subject, which invokes the Euthyphro dilemma.)

If the expression "all good" does not mean anything more substantive than that God possesses no malevolence against which his benevolence might compete, but leaves room for God to possess more attributes than just benevolence, then I will concede that point also and tentatively agree that this premise reflects God as revealed in Christian sacred scriptures.

• Premise 2: "There is a tremendous amount of evil in the world, some of it not caused by human beings and apparently gratuitous. (Here might follow a long description of natural disasters, diseases afflicting the apparently innocent, and so on.)"

Here at the second premise is where the argument collapses into unintelligibility, if 'evil' is understood under the terms of Christian theism. Anderson here asserts that some of this world's evil is "not caused by human beings," which I believe refers to events in the natural world because he hints at "natural disasters" and "diseases." Furthermore, he asserts that this natural evil is "apparently gratuitous."

There are numerous problems here that would require a wholesale revision of the argument. First, under Christian theism, moral order is grounded in the very nature of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands. Ergo, 'evil' is that which runs contrary to the will of this eternal and immutable God. For Anderson to assert that 'natural evil' exists, he shoulders the burden of proving that events in nature run contrary to God's will. He cannot ask us to assume it for the sake of argument, because that would fallaciously beg the question (since 'evil' is the very crux of the entire argument).

Moreover, if these events in nature are "not caused by human beings" then what does Christian theism posit as the causal agent? Ultimately it is God, who is "omnipotent" and "omniscient" and sovereign over his creation. Therefore, to call these events in nature 'evil' Anderson would have to show that Christian theism posits that God acts contrary to his own will at the same time and in the same respect. Utterly incoherent; Anderson would not succeed here. The only way for Anderson to succeed here is for his argument to deny the theory of moral order posited by Christian theism; but in that case his argument would no longer be demonstrating an internal inconsistency but an external one.

Second, there is an important difference between something being "apparently gratuitous" and actually gratuitous. It is possible for something to appear gratuitous at the time but, given all of the relevant facts of the case later, finally understood as not being gratuitous after all (no matter how improbable such a conclusion seemed while we were still caught in the thick of it). So for Anderson's purposes, he needs cases of genuinely gratuitous natural evils—e.g., earthquakes for which God had no purpose consonant with his benevolence—which shoulders a monstrous burden of proof, given Anderson's severe spatio-temporal limitations. Maybe we are not aware of, or maybe cannot conceive of, any purpose God might have consonant with his benevolence, but that fails to prove that no purpose exists.

Third, there is a similar important difference between someone being "apparently innocent" and actually innocent, and to ask that we assume the point for the sake of argument would likewise fallaciously beg the question (e.g., if a person receives what they deserve, it is 'just'; if they receive what they do not deserve, it is 'unjust' and a case for evil can be made). So in this case too, Anderson needs a case of actual innocence that accords with Christian theism; (i) being unable to conceive of how some specific individual could be anything but innocent does not establish their innocence; such would be an argument from incredulity, which is not valid; (ii) the case has to accord with Christian theism, otherwise it will no longer be demonstrating an internal inconsistency but an external one.

• Premise 3: "It is unlikely that such an amount and kind of evil would exist if there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and all good being."

The failure of the third premise results from the failure of the second and, therefore, does not need to be addressed at this time. The second premise requires an extensive revision, which may have a deleterious effect on the third premise anyway, making it premature to address it at this time.

• Conclusion: "Probably, God does not exist."

Consequently, the conclusion no longer follows and may be dismissed as invalid.

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Criticism Over External Inconsistency

If his criticism is over an external inconsistency, then I am not sure there is anything Christian theism would need to address. There are countless worldviews which Christian theism is not consistent with. But that is not in itself a criticism of Christian theism; it is merely a comparative evaluation.

Unless, of course, the worldview against which Christian theism is being evaluated is making truth claims that are said to be objective. In that case, the premises of this argument need a good deal of revision.

In the first place, as with the 'internal' criticism I can tentatively concede the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience, but the "all good" attribute causes me some concern because I do not know what is being asserted. It assumes a particular moral theory but, since that moral theory has not been described, 'good' is an empty term. I cannot give a pass to any moral terms since they are the very crux of the Problem from Evil argument.

Second, until the working moral theory is described, the second premise likewise cannot make sense. If I am not provided the moral theory upon which the argument is based, my immediate reaction is to interpret it according to a Christian theistic metaethic. But if this is a criticism over an external inconsistency, that would be an inappropriate interpretation.

And the third premise suffers from the same problem as the first and second premises. And as a consequence of all this, the Conclusion is eminently premature and nowhere near valid yet.

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[1] Anderson, C. Anthony. "Argument from Evil: Inductive Version" (5 Dec. 2003). University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Philosophy. Retrieved 7 Nov. 2008. <http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/faculty/anderson/12ArgfromEvilInductive.htm>