If one is willing to believe the rhetoric, it is Problem of Evil arguments that make the most convincing case for Atheism. Obviously I have witnessed this rhetoric coming from the ranks of atheists but, curiously enough, I also witness some Christian ministers and apologists saying the same thing. Personally, I am nowhere near convinced; I have yet to discover a Problem of Evil argument that sustains the conclusion it sets out to establish (whether the impossibility or improbability of God's existence).
CURTIS ANDERSON'S ARGUMENT
The following argument comes from Curtis Anthony Anderson, a very intelligent and knowledgeable Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Santa Barbara. He identifies it as The Argument from Evil: Inductive Version [1]:
- If God exists, then He is omnipotent, omniscient, and all good.
- There is a tremendous amount of evil in the world, some of it not caused by human beings and apparently gratuitous. (Here might follow a long description of natural disasters, diseases afflicting the apparently innocent, and so on.)
- It is unlikely that such an amount and kind of evil would exist if there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and all good being.
- Probably, God does not exist.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Although I do not think Anderson himself is an atheist, since he is a member of the Society for Christian Philosophers—which helps to identify the 'God' this argument addresses (e.g., I am not interested in the problems Islam faces)—his argument nevertheless is hinged upon what is potentially the fallacious equivocation that most atheists engage in when formulating this Problem: the meaning of the term 'evil'.
The entire argument is predicated upon the notion of 'evil' so leaving it unspecified is intellectually irresponsible. The second premise asserts that there is a "tremendous amount of evil" in the world but nowhere are we told what 'evil' means in this argument. Therefore it is nearly impossible to evaluate this argument beyond noting this potential equivocation, because it is unknown whether Anderson is criticizing the issue over an internal or external inconsistency.
At this point the critique could end. But I will assume in the first case that Anderson is arguing over an internal inconsistency, and in the second case over an external inconsistency.
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Criticism Over Internal Inconsistency
If his criticism is over an internal inconsistency in Christian theism, then I shall examine the premises and conclusion under the terms of Christian theism.
- Premise 1: "If God exists, then He is omnipotent, omniscient, and all good."
(I am ignoring the more glaring problem of the term describing a moral quality about God, which implies a moral order that transcends God and to which he is subject, which invokes the Euthyphro dilemma.)
If the expression "all good" does not mean anything more substantive than that God possesses no malevolence against which his benevolence might compete, but leaves room for God to possess more attributes than just benevolence, then I will concede that point also and tentatively agree that this premise reflects God as revealed in Christian sacred scriptures.
- Premise 2: "There is a tremendous amount of evil in the world, some of it not caused by human beings and apparently gratuitous. (Here might follow a long description of natural disasters, diseases afflicting the apparently innocent, and so on.)"
There are numerous problems here that would require a wholesale revision of the argument. First, under Christian theism, moral order is grounded in the very nature of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands. Ergo, 'evil' is that which runs contrary to the will of this eternal and immutable God. For Anderson to assert that 'natural evil' exists, he shoulders the burden of proving that events in nature run contrary to God's will. He cannot ask us to assume it for the sake of argument, because that would fallaciously beg the question (since 'evil' is the very crux of the entire argument).
Moreover, if these events in nature are "not caused by human beings" then what does Christian theism posit as the causal agent? Ultimately it is God, who is "omnipotent" and "omniscient" and sovereign over his creation. Therefore, to call these events in nature 'evil' Anderson would have to show that Christian theism posits that God acts contrary to his own will at the same time and in the same respect. Utterly incoherent; Anderson would not succeed here. The only way for Anderson to succeed here is for his argument to deny the theory of moral order posited by Christian theism; but in that case his argument would no longer be demonstrating an internal inconsistency but an external one.
Second, there is an important difference between something being "apparently gratuitous" and actually gratuitous. It is possible for something to appear gratuitous at the time but, given all of the relevant facts of the case later, finally understood as not being gratuitous after all (no matter how improbable such a conclusion seemed while we were still caught in the thick of it). So for Anderson's purposes, he needs cases of genuinely gratuitous natural evils—e.g., earthquakes for which God had no purpose consonant with his benevolence—which shoulders a monstrous burden of proof, given Anderson's severe spatio-temporal limitations. Maybe we are not aware of, or maybe cannot conceive of, any purpose God might have consonant with his benevolence, but that fails to prove that no purpose exists.
Third, there is a similar important difference between someone being "apparently innocent" and actually innocent, and to ask that we assume the point for the sake of argument would likewise fallaciously beg the question (e.g., if a person receives what they deserve, it is 'just'; if they receive what they do not deserve, it is 'unjust' and a case for evil can be made). So in this case too, Anderson needs a case of actual innocence that accords with Christian theism; (i) being unable to conceive of how some specific individual could be anything but innocent does not establish their innocence; such would be an argument from incredulity, which is not valid; (ii) the case has to accord with Christian theism, otherwise it will no longer be demonstrating an internal inconsistency but an external one.
- Premise 3: "It is unlikely that such an amount and kind of evil would exist if there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and all good being."
- Conclusion: "Probably, God does not exist."
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Criticism Over External Inconsistency
If his criticism is over an external inconsistency, then I am not sure there is anything Christian theism would need to address. There are countless worldviews which Christian theism is not consistent with. But that is not in itself a criticism of Christian theism; it is merely a comparative evaluation.
Unless, of course, the worldview against which Christian theism is being evaluated is making truth claims that are said to be objective. In that case, the premises of this argument need a good deal of revision.
In the first place, as with the 'internal' criticism I can tentatively concede the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience, but the "all good" attribute causes me some concern because I do not know what is being asserted. It assumes a particular moral theory but, since that moral theory has not been described, 'good' is an empty term. I cannot give a pass to any moral terms since they are the very crux of the Problem from Evil argument.
Second, until the working moral theory is described, the second premise likewise cannot make sense. If I am not provided the moral theory upon which the argument is based, my immediate reaction is to interpret it according to a Christian theistic metaethic. But if this is a criticism over an external inconsistency, that would be an inappropriate interpretation.
And the third premise suffers from the same problem as the first and second premises. And as a consequence of all this, the Conclusion is eminently premature and nowhere near valid yet.
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[1] Anderson, C. Anthony. "Argument from Evil: Inductive Version" (5 Dec. 2003). University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Philosophy. Retrieved 7 Nov. 2008. <http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/faculty/anderson/12ArgfromEvilInductive.htm>
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