The Only Response Possible

Altruist80 wrote: What if it all came to pass? Picture this. You are sitting at the television, watching the news one day. You see headlines erupting about a Russian (or other northern force) launching a surprise attack on Israel, with no real opposition. But somehow they are forced to turn back with major losses due to command confusion, friendly fire, and natural events. The world enters a time of war. Some months later, a second assault is launched from the north. A large naval fleet decimates this force with fierce bombardments from the Mediterranean (ships of Kittim). Again they are forced to turn back. Still, some time later, the southern forces muster a counter-attack. But the northern force smashes this army and overthrows all of Europe and Asia Minor, including Israel. The leader of the prevailing force declares world rule and outlaws Judaism and Christianity, citing them as the cause for the war, and sets up his command headquarters in Israel. People start disappearing. Unnatural events occur, which defy all reason. You are now a subject of a world police power. Would you believe the book of Daniel, or would you cite these events as inevitable and resulting from the demand of a new solution in a volatile world? Don't answer with, "It's not going to happen." Treat it as hypothetical. What if?

themadfiddler wrote: I would realize I was in a horrible alternate reality that was a result of Hal Lindsey's engrams being imprinted on the world, where real biblical scholarship was replaced by gullible idiocy, where the trailer park had become the cultural center of the world, and reality was now, Matrix-like, being run by a horrible super-computer with Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins at the helm, spewing out a cliched mess of hackneyed plagiarized plot.

"I Contend We Are Both Atheists" - Response to Comments 2

Finally, after a few more subsequent comments posted to my original article (despite that blog being 'Closed'), I received a comment that actually has something intelligible to say—ironically, from Stephen Roberts himself! It has been quite a few years so it was a pleasant surprise to hear from him again. It's nice running into you again, Stephen!

Although he posted his comment to a different blog post ("No Theist Is An Atheist"), it nevertheless regarded my critique squarely and, quite refreshingly, had something intelligent to say. Stephen's comment (3/Jan/08) stated:

Hey David, Stephen here! After the quote came up in another forum I read, I ego-surfed across this post and figured I'd drop by and say hi!

Yes, I know the usage of "atheist" in the quote is incorrect since if a person believes in any kind of god they are a theist, not an atheist. But I think it still work because it helps them to think about the fact that they are also non-believers for other gods.

But the real "meat" of the quote is the second part about how if the theist really understood why they don't believe in the other gods they might understand why their god is hard to believe in too.

If I would have been writing a philosophy book, I probably would have come up with better wording or at least better phrasing. But even with its flaws, its kind of nice to see the quote still wander around and mean something to some people :-)

I appreciate his candor, and his concession that the "we are both atheists" clause is untenable. At least someone, finally, possessed enough sense to concede that this feature of the Quote is inherently faulty. Unfortunately, it was the author only. Everyone else that comments still tries to retain it, tenaciously blind to the contradiction. My hat's off to Stephen.

Nevertheless, the real 'meat' of the Quote is still faulty (but not as obviously). I can appreciate the point Stephen is trying to make, but I have to wonder if he is cognizant of the fact that the only people who will agree with him are those who already adhere to an epistemology similar to his. Unless I am mistaken, Stephen subscribes to a form of empiricism, i.e. the degree to which some proposition outside science can be given scientific support or can be reduced to science, to that degree the proposition becomes rationally acceptable. It is for this reason that theistic claims are said to shoulder an empirical burden of proof. (I invite Stephen to correct me if I am wrong.) From my understanding, that is why he rejects all possible gods, including the God of Christianity: because claims of their existence are bereft of empirical evidence to substantiate those claims.

If that is the case, then the question immediately presents itself: Is that the reason why Christians "dismiss all the other possible gods"? Is it because those other god-claims are without empirical evidence substantiating them? No, that is not their reason, because (a) they do not subscribe to any formulation of empiricism, for it is antithetical to orthodox Christian theology, and (b) they know that reasoning this way, for them, commits the Special Pleading fallacy. (This fallacy is committed when you reject all other gods because they lack substantiating empirical evidence, while making an exception, without good reason, for your own God who likewise lacks said evidence.)

Therefore, the only people who will agree with the second clause are necessarily those who already adhere to an epistemology similar to Stephen's. How so? Because he asserts that once "you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours." It naturally follows that this clause requires its subject to hold a similar epistemology. Consider: we first discover the reason he dismisses all possible gods, and we then look to see whether or not that is the same reason Christians dismiss all other gods. So then what happens when Stephen encounters Christians, who do not subscribe to an epistemology similar to his? Suddenly this Quote is unsound, collapsing under the fact that it is untrue with respect to the subject it is addressing (Christians). It is true for only a specific segment of the human population: those who already share his epistemic views. With regard to everyone else, it is false.

To summarize in brief: (1) I look at Stephen's reason for dismissing all possible gods and I admit, "That's not my reason for dismissing them"; (2) and if Stephen considered my reason for rejecting all other gods, he would admit, "That's not my reason for dismissing them." In other words, this second clause—

When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours.

—is false, when regarding all those who adhere to an epistemology different from Stephen's empiricism. The reason he rejects all possible gods and the reason I reject all other gods are, in fact, two very different reasons. Being informed of Stephen's reasoning does not inform anyone of my reasoning, nor vice versa.