In a strong reaction against the Christian view of values and morals, Tina asserted, "Personally, I view religion as a security blanket with as much correspondence to reality as Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy." I commended her having the good sense to admit that it was a product of personal taste rather than scholarly evaluation; however, when it comes to the larger picture of reality as a whole, her personal tastes have little relevance. Christian theology is something far more substantial; it is "the only view which provides the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility of human experience." It is a very large and brazen argument that myself and others make, demonstrating clearly that Christian theology is far more than just some "security blanket."
"God has nothing to do with ethics or morals," Tina replied. I countered that this factually-phrased statement holds only if you assume that ethics can be adequately and intelligibly accounted for without reference to God. However, under a godless view, ethical norms are non-existent; all that remains are biographical or sociological descriptives. Some people are okay with that. Fine. Speaking for myself, however, I expect an ethical theory to adequately and intelligibly account for evident human experiences like normative values and morals (ethics).
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"It certainly is quite a brazen claim," Peter chimed in. "What's you're evidence for it? Can you prove all other viewpoints to be unintelligible? How would one even know if a viewpoint is intelligible or not?"
First of all, I replied, it should be noted that "the argument" is not really one neat, singular argument but in fact a network of arguments which address various concerns (e.g. ontology, ethics, epistemology, etc) that as a unified whole argues for the same thing.
Second, the argument itself confronts head-on the epistemic assumptions which operate behind the common demand for 'proof' of one thing or another, putting the demand in its proper place. For example, the demand that all items of knowledge must satisfy empirical virtues, understood pejoratively as Scientism (q.v. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy), is an epistemology that, when consistently held, abrogates all abstract realities and therefore destroys itself; ultimately it is "a kind of logical fallacy involving improper usage of science or scientific claims," explains Gregory Peterson ("Demarcation and the Scientistic Fallacy." Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 38 [4], 751-761).
Third, one can know whether or not a viewpoint is intelligible by the very definition of the term itself; i.e. if a viewpoint is not capable of coherently and adequately articulating itself, it is unintelligible. For example, if I ask someone to account for why the law of non-contradiction is universal and they reply, "It just is," then that is an unintelligible answer.
"There have been many societies which had strong ethics and morals that weren't Christian," Peter replied, "societies which never heard of the Christian God."
Practically all human beings recognize a moral order and try to live morally. I do not think that's an issue anyone contests. As I pointed out to earlier, the positive (descriptive) analysis is categorically different from the normative (prescriptive) analysis; in other words, the fundamental issue here is properly and adequately accounting for this curious phenomenon of the human being. Most people will agree that mankind generally recognizes a moral order and tries to live morally; an intelligible theory of ethics needs to adequately account for this phenomenon. A godless theory of ethics is incapable of doing so, because it refuses to permit the tools required to traverse from the 'is' to the 'ought'.
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"Is it necessary to make the traverse from the 'is' to the 'ought' in order for an ethical system to function?" Eric asked. "In other words, do beings need the mythology of a Higher Power over their heads, waving the stick or carrot to enforce moral absolutes, in order to function? Or is there not a moral imperative inherent in their nature that, with their upbringing, will direct them to act in a certain way over an average?"
First, I would say that the traverse is only necessary for those with a concern for adequately and intelligibly accounting for normative statements. If one does not really care about accounting for the phenomenon, if one is content to believe that there is nothing within reality to which normative statements correspond, then no it's not necessary. But since there does exist a common human experience of objective morality (e.g. it is right for one society to charge members of another society with crimes against humanity), then certainly some people do have a concern for an adequate account of it; for such people, "there just is" is neither adequate nor intelligible.
Second, any theory of ethics which grounds moral order in some kind of carrot on a string falls prey to Euthyphro's dilemma and must answer to it.
Third, I agree that there is "a moral imperative inherent in [human] nature," so any adequate theory of ethics will need to account for this phenomenon. However, as many scholars far more able than myself have shown, trying to account for it by way of biological or sociological observations commits the naturalistic fallacy (e.g. George Moore, Principia Ethica). And theories which ignore fallacies fail the test of intelligibility. Furthermore, such naturalistic accounts fail to provide us with moral statements applicable to societies in themselves; i.e. circumstance 'X' might be considered 'good' under this theory because it promotes the health and survival of 'Society A' but it does not allow us to state whether 'Society A' is itself good or not (e.g. the Nazi regime). It also fails to provide a moral justification for 'Society B' involving itself in the affairs of 'Society A'. There are many undercutters such a theory must confront.
"With consideration given to religious behaviors across culture and distance," Eric added, "it seems that no one religion is likely to be more necessary or true than any other."
Behavior is descriptive, I answered, which is categorically different from normative or prescriptive. What a culture is or does is fundamentally different from what it ought to be or do.