Inconsistent Skeptics

Some skeptics do not adhere to critical thinking as consistently as they should. In my experience, atheistic skeptics exhibit this lack of consistency the most. Critical thinking is not a commendable heuristic if it gets abandoned whenever it inconveniences a pre-existing bias. Rather, critical thinking ought reshape one's bias, not be tossed out when it threatens one's bias.

For example, a skeptic who adheres to critical thinking consistently (Smith) would refuse to accept some proposition P if there is inadequate epistemic warrant for it. Now, one who does not adhere to critical thinking consistently (Jones) would likewise refuse to accept P at first. Where the inconsistency in critical thinking arises is when Jones takes it a step further and asserts that because P has not been proven true it is consequently false.

This is made more obvious where P stands for "gods exist." It is consistent with critical thinking for Jones to reject P if for him there has been inadequate epistemic warrant for it. However, Jones promptly abandons critical thinking if he asserts that P ("gods exist") is false because it has not been proven true; that is a logical fallacy, argumentum ad ignorantiam. And he further contradicts critical thinking if he also affirms that a lack of evidence for P is somehow itself evidence for ¬P ("gods do not exist"). An absence of evidence is an empty set; 'nothing' in support of P is still 'nothing' when used as an attempt to support ¬P.

Smith is the consistent skeptic when he refuses to affirm that P is true but also refuses to affirm that P is false. It may be false. Or it may be true. The lack of adequate warrant either way means he cannot affirm either; Smith remains agnostic on the question. Jones, in order to be consistent with critical thinking, must do the same. If what Jones wants to affirm is that P is false, critical thinking dictates that he must provide evidence that either (a) supports ¬P or (b) invalidates P.

"I Contend We Are Both Atheists" - Response to Comments 3

The following blog post is a direct response to some of the intriguing comments I have received regarding my criticism of Stephen Roberts' infamous Quote. I think the points being raised are too good to be buried in a Comments field which is inevitably lagging further and further behind in the flow of the blog, comments which certainly deserve their own light of day.

Anonymous said (his comment here):

"The Quote" does not imply that your reasons for dismissing other gods are the same as Stephen's reasons for dismissing yours. It merely states that when you UNDERSTAND your own reasons for dismissing those other gods, you will UNDERSTAND his reasons. I suspect that since you do not even UNDERSTAND the quote, you will not make the mental effort to UNDERSTAND either his reasons or your own.

First of all, I would encourage you to assume a name. Make one up if you have to, but please assume a name by which I can identify your arguments. Anyone can contribute as "Anonymous" and I would have no way of knowing if it was you or not.

Now, regarding your comment. I already know the Quote does not imply that our reasons are the same. The content and context of the Quote and Roberts' elaboration thereof both make that pretty obvious. My criticism argues from the understanding that the Quote implies our reasons are similar. That is the implication the Quote makes, and it is rather candid about it. So I will let the readers determine for themselves whether or not I understand the Quote, particularly by my responses here.

(Keep in mind that my criticism regarded the Quote and, by extension, Roberts' elaboration of it. My criticism did not, and cannot, regard your own views nor your perspective of the Quote. Any objection that indicates how my criticism fails to account for some perspective of yours only demonstrates a misunderstanding of my criticism itself. I am certainly able to offer a critique of your perspective on a given subject but that is not what I had done; yet it is my criticism of the Quote that you had responded to.)

What does the Quote itself say? I am going to direct our attention to the verifiable facts here, in an effort to keep this discussion relevant and intellectually honest. What does it actually say? It says that when you "understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods," then you will "understand why I dismiss yours" (emphasis supplied). And then Stephen Roberts himself stopped by this blog—which really made my day, quite frankly, since I had not heard from him in so long—to elaborate not only on the meaning of the Quote but also on what for him, as the originator of the Quote, is the real "meat" of it; specifically, that "if [theists] really understood why they don't believe in the other gods they might understand why their god is hard to believe in too" (emphasis supplied).

These facts are not really disputable. Anyone can independently verify them. Right? Especially when I openly provide the relevant links. The Quote was already fairly clear, and Roberts himself made it clearer still: the fundamental point is that if the Christian theist openly and honestly understands "why" he dismisses all the other possible gods then he will understand "why" the atheist dismisses God (or finds him hard to believe in, at best). In both the Quote and in Roberts' elaboration, the "why" test (reasoning) is the real meat or force of the Quote.

This fact becomes even clearer when one sees there are two questions which the Quote logically and naturally raises in our minds. The first question is, "Why does the atheist dismiss God?" And the second question is, "Why do I (the Christian theist) dismiss all other possible gods?" As I understand it, and Roberts likewise pointed out, the second question essentially acts as the springboard to the answer for the first question; i.e., answering the second question ought to enlighten and enable the Christian theist to discover the answer for the first question.

And my contention has been just this: "Is that actually the case?" Is there any real correlation between the answers to each question? Put it another way: Is it true that by honestly examining and understanding my own reasons for why I dismiss all other possible gods I will be enabled to understand why the atheist dismisses God? The force of my contention, of course, is borne upon the rather unequivocal answer, "No, there is no correlation." Because—

[and here is the essential thrust]

—if I honestly examine and understand my own reasons for why I dismiss all the other possible gods, I actually discover that they have no possible relationship with the atheist's reasons for dismissing God. None, zero. For example, my reasons (for dismissing all other gods) operate from the presupposition of God's existence. The epistemologies and heuristics on either side of the debate differ quite drastically, and at their most foundational levels. Not even the ground or nature of logic itself bears any similarity between us; for the Christian theist, logic is grounded in the very nature of God, and this cannot be said for the atheist—any atheist whatsoever. This is precisely why the theist's reasons (for dismissing all other possible gods) do not, in fact, offer any insight of understanding into the atheist's reasons (for dismissing God).

But notice something compelling here, equally relevant and interesting. The force of this argument can also be shown from the opposite side; i.e., flip the scenario around and it still bears this truth out. If I genuinely and honestly understand the atheist's reasons for why he dismisses God, based as they usually are upon an epistemology grounded in some form of empiricism, I discover that his reasons for dismissing God do not have any kind of relationship to my reasons for dismissing all other possible gods. Our epistemologies are grounded and structured quite differently. And that is the very point of my contention, originally and now expanded upon in this post: the theist's reasons and the atheist's reasons are not even similar, much less the same. This is why the second clause of the Quote is unintelligible. It is simply false (i.e., it bears no correspondence with reality). As I had said previously, the reasons why Roberts rejects God and the reasons why I reject "all other possible gods" are very different: "Being informed of Stephen's reasoning does not inform anyone of my reasoning, nor vice versa."

The first clause of the Quote is incoherent. And its second clause is false. I cannot understand why anyone would want to champion the Quote. (Well, actually I can, but that is the threshold beyond which my skepticism gives way to my cynicism. My skepticism I can defend; my cynicism is more rant-ish.)

jaydecay57 said (his comment here):

I believe the point of the quote is to illustrate the fact that any believer in a monotheistic religion can so readily dismiss all other gods as easily as any atheist, yet can cling so tightly to one slight variation from the others without providing an acceptable reasoning behind their choice.

I do not believe the Quote has anything to say about whether or not a theist has the intellectual honesty and integrity to provide "acceptable" reasoning behind his choice. (And I can level a significant and substantive criticism against atheists pontificating to others what "acceptable reasoning" is.) Let me explain what I mean. Whether the Christian provides his reasoning or not, the Quote is asking him to authentically examine and understand his reasons for dismissing all other gods, and that by doing so he will better understand the atheist's reasons for dismissing God. And my criticism shows how this fails the test, i.e., that it is simply not true, that it does not correspond to anything in reality.

Truthfully though the REAL point of the quote (I feel) is to make atheists smile and say "That's what I've been trying to say all along!"

Perhaps. But what those atheists "have been trying to say all along" is still incoherent and false, respectively, if it mirrors the first and second clause of the Quote. Like I said, if the Quote is really just humorous nonsense that atheists find entertaining, if it has nothing substantive or real to say about Christian theology, then I should not find any atheists arguing against me if I post about how nonsensical the Quote is. They felt the same way before I even posted, right? As I said before, "It is amusing but incoherent. Great. A smile, a nod, and now let's move along to authentic, intelligible dialogue." Why waste time over something everyone agrees is neither intelligible nor substantive?

I will give you that believing in a god is logical. However all the logical reasons to believe in a god are inherently demeaning to the believer (Fear of the unknown, gullible, ignorant, and other admittedly mean sounding words) which may be why it is difficult for some to see that it is in fact rather silly to say no other god exists except the one you have arbitrarily chosen from the myriad of other choices.

Evidently you have not listed "all the logical reasons to believe" because I did not find in your list any of the reasons argued for in systematic theologies or philosophical texts, nor any of the reasons I happen to hold. That is a lot to have left out. I think maybe there are logical reasons you do not even know about (I do not want to assume there are some you know about and willfully omitted); critical reasoning would dictate that as an opportunity to exercise a tone of intellectual charity, admitting there could be logical reasons you have not informed yourself about, instead of rashly declaring that you have listed all the logical reasons to believe. I am assuming, of course, that you hold critical thinking skills in high regard when dealing with competing views. I hope it is a correct assumption.

How do you expect not to be ridiculed?

Because I champion reason, critical thinking, and skepticism. Perhaps fundies might ridicule me for that, but not fellow thinkers and skeptics. In my limited experience, they usually demonstrate appreciation for such things being championed, not ridicule. And no, "skeptic" is not a synonym for "atheist."

...you actively chose one God that fits you and ignoring all other possibilities, called it truth.

You assume I ignored all other possibilities. I am not sure you have a defensible basis for such an assumption.

But you are correct, I do not determine truth. I discover it—which can happen when one pursues it.

If one [god] is absurd, it inevitably means they all are.

It is not obvious how that follows logically. I would love to see the premises that render such a scandalous conclusion.

This is all rather mean sounding, I know, and I do apologies a little, but under the guise of the internet I am safe from your e-god's scorn...regardless, I can take it as easily as I can dish it out, so feel free to bash my grammar and liberal use of ellipsis. I also fully realize that I'm just as ignorant as you and we're all in this thing together...I'm just able to admit and embrace it.

I fully and genuinely appreciate your contributions. When people leave their bigotry outside and enter into an authentic conversation on ultimate issues, it can plant seeds that end up shaping the ideas and beliefs of the participants. That is what this blog is all about: the conversations and experiences that shape my itinerarium mentis.

Emotional Rhetoric, 1; Critical Thinking, 0

"The next time someone tries to tell me that being Christian is the embodiment of logic and reasoning, I don't know what I will do," a young woman on IRC commented. Well here is a really crazy notion for her to consider: engage the person in a critical analysis on that issue.

Her comment was in response to something I had said earlier in a conversation with someone else; namely, that an in-depth study of logic and critical thinking ironically led me from atheism to Christian theism: "The unexpected thing was the fact that a commitment to reason and critical thinking eventually landed me in the Christian camp," I had said.

But for all practical purposes it is impossible to engage her on that issue because she has a vitriolic aversion to anything that even resembles "religion talk." What I find very disappointing is the sheer ubiquity of this attitude among those who identify themselves as atheists. It is alarming, the number of atheists I encounter that exhibit it. They will take time out of their day to hurl such gratuitous invective, but to engage the issues critically is somehow not worth their time. It is very disheartening to observe such priority in their values, where they have time to invest in supercilious rhetoric but not critical analysis. Such intellectual irresponsibility was part of the reason I ended up rejecting atheism, and the atheists I interact with today continually demonstrate that my conclusive observation is still relevant and accurate.

In the words of English philosopher Herbert Spencer:

"There is a principle which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance. That principle is contempt prior to investigation."

Hate the Sin, Love the Sinner?

The following is an email I had received:

There's something I don't quite understand in the Bible. It says to "hate the sin" but to "love the sinner," and then in Psalm 5:5 it says about God, "You hate all who do wrong." I don't quite understand what that really means. How can God love us but hate us? And how can we do the same? Am I missing something here? Although I do realize that so many people have turned hate-the-sin-love-the-sinner into a cliché, so that it has lost all meaning, what's the true meaning?

You're right, it is a cliché. But as general principles go it is a fairly good one.

The deal with hatred comes down to the issue of intentions, or what lies at back of a specific act or emotional state (as does everything we are held morally culpable for). And not only for us but for God too, because in one sense he hates but in another sense it is impossible for him to hate, e.g., God is capable of hatred in the sense of "aversion" but not in the sense of "malice."

At back of God's hatred lies his supreme commitment to his own glory and righteousness. In other words, the reason why he hates all who do wrong is because they defy the supremacy and glory of God, and God simply cannot deny himself (2 Tim 2:13); as John Piper said, for God to deny the infinite worth of his own glory "would imply that there is something more valuable outside himself. He would commit idolatry." This is the reason for God's "intense aversion" (hatred) toward sin and sinners—and also the necessity of Christ and his atoning sacrifice. Without Christ our end is inescapable: utter destruction. It is because of Christ—and only because of Christ—that this world has not been destroyed and that anyone is saved at all. In ourselves we can offer God no worthy thing; the ground of the saints' justification is Christ, and only Christ.

The same thing may be said of the saints as well. Our hatred is justified when it takes the form of "aversion" but it is a sin when it takes the form of "malice." The saints never hate for hatred's sake; we hate for God's sake because, like David, we have a Spirit-fueled commitment to the supremacy and glory of our Lord God. As John Calvin said, "A dog barks when his master is attacked. I would be a coward if I saw that God's truth is attacked and yet would remain silent." The reason for our "intense aversion" (hatred) toward sin and sinners is because we have a commitment to the supremacy and glory of God that exceeds all else, completely. "If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother, his wife and children, his brothers and sisters—yes, even his own life—he cannot be my disciple" (Luke 14:26). For the saints, God comes first in all things and their commitment to him is intense.

We do not hate others because of their race or sexual orientation or because of what they have done to us; all these things are human-centred motives. Our motives are God-centred: "Do I not hate those who hate you, O LORD, and do I not loathe those who rise up against you" (Psa. 139:21). We are to live peaceably and to love others and forgive them, but never at the expense of God's glory; although we are to live peaceably here on earth, we are to avoid friendship with the world wherever it threatens the priority of God in our lives. "You adulterous people, don't you know that friendship with the world is hatred toward God? Anyone who chooses to be a friend of the world becomes an enemy of God" (James 4:4).

But it is very important to note that there is no Scriptural warrant for hating individual people. David said that he hates those who hate God and loathes those who rise against God, but notice: here he hates a certain class of people, not select persons, that class of people who hate God. But no individual is being specified. We can never be certain of who falls into that class, but we can certainly hate that class itself, like David, because of our passionate devotion to God.

When it comes to individual people, we have no idea who belongs to the elect of God and who does not. Smith might live in rebellion against God today but we should love him nonetheless, forgive him, and preach the Word to him, because next week he could turn his life over to God and become one of his most passionate followers. All along he was one of God's elect, but not until later did his life of faith begin. Walk down the street and notice the people around you: any one of them could be one of God's elect. We must not hate them as individuals because we do not know who belongs to God. But we must, like David, hate that class of people who defy God and rise against him because we cannot serve two masters. Where our loyalty is concerned, it must fall on the side of God, his supremacy and glory.

Is Compatibilism Self-Contradictory?

Quite a few months ago (prior to this blog's existence) I had received an email from someone who argues that compatibilism must be false because, according to his reasoning, it contradicts itself. The following is a copy of my response to his email.

Determinism and free will cannot both be true because, if determinism is true, then that choice is already determined for me. God knows at this moment if I will burn in hell or convert at some point and, if he knows, then there is nothing I can do to change it. There is a contradiction here.

Here the disputant claims that a contradiction was committed, but is this the case? It seems he is saying that if your choice is determined then it is not free. While this is quite a standard libertarian argument (and open to criticism), does it succeed in proving a contradiction?

As it stands? No. There is no immediate contradiction between determinism and free will. So then whether or not a contradiction occurs will depend on how one has defined 'free' because a contradiction occurs only when a proposition and its denial are both claimed to be true at the same time and in the same respect. In other words, if one defines 'free' in this context as "that which is not determined" then a contradiction would be present (but the question-begging fallacy is also committed). You see, for there to be a contradiction, it would have to be argued, "My will is both determined and, at the same time and in the same respect, not determined." But that is not the compatibilist argument at all.

That emphasized part is the clincher. I am claiming that in one respect my choices are determined, by internal forces, and in another respect my choices are not determined, by external forces. Because of this distinction the charge of contradiction vanishes.

My choices are causally necessitated from within—my desires, character, and beliefs determine the choices I make. But they are not causally necessitated from without—God knows my choices but he does not make them for me. Omniscience is an attribute of God, not an act of God. The omniscience of God is not the proximate cause of my choices. My desires, character, and beliefs are. My volitional activity is not passive (i.e., merely responding to the controls of external forces). The desires are mine. The beliefs are mine. The character is mine. The choices which they lead to are mine. From start to finish, the causal chain ran through my conative faculties. God does not make my choices for me; I make my own choices, which are causally necessitated by my own desires, beliefs, and character.

It is for this reason that in one respect free will is indeed an illusion. Let me explain. Properly speaking, our will is not free; it is determined by our desires, beliefs, and character. This is why I tend to indicate, in agreement with Locke and others, that "freedom is properly predicated of persons, not faculties." In other words, the agent is free, not his will. We ought to speak of free agency, not free will. The causal chain runs through the agent's conative faculties, not irrespective of them but concordantly with them; the volitional activity of our will actively shapes this causal chain. Nothing makes our choices for us; we make our own choices. We are not mindless puppets. Although our will is determined or causally necessitated, it is so only by our own internal forces.

In one respect my choices are determined (by internal forces). And in another respect my choices are not determined (by external forces). The charge of contradiction is refuted.

You said that "Smith chose C over V because at circumstance B his desires were constituted as X. He could have chosen V instead but this is a hypothetical condition only because his actual desires were X in that circumstance." But this cannot be; if determinism is true, as compatiblism claims, then B will always be the same for the instant and Smith will always choose C. He cannot choose V unless B were to change and since B is determined, B is determined as well.

Here I am convinced that the disputant misunderstood the argument, becoming confused about what the letters stood in the place of. So I reiterated the glossary:

• V = vanilla pudding
• C = chocolate pudding
• B = two bowls of pudding, V and C
• X = desire for chocolate instead of vanilla
• Y = desire for vanilla instead of chocolate

Using these definitions, I'll restate the argument and here directly address this rebuttal.

Smith chose C over V because at circumstance B his desires were constituted as X. Hypothetically his desires could have been Y, and therefore his choice of V, but this is hypothetical only because every time we encounter the real world we find that his desires at B were constituted as X, not Y, and therefore his absolute choice is C, not V.

So he is correct, that B is always the same, i.e., it is absolutely the case that there are two bowls of pudding which Smith must choose between. The point needing to be stressed is the difference between the real world and the hypothetical world.

In the real world his actual desire was for chocolate instead of vanilla so he chose the bowl of chocolate pudding. Yes, he could have chosen the vanilla, but this is hypothetical only; it is possible that he could have had a desire for vanilla instead of chocolate (Y) but it is not actual; his actual desire was for chocolate (X). Ergo, Y is hypothetical while X is real.

Now let's address the rest of the rebuttal, that if X is determined from without then his choice of C is determined from without as well. We know that his choice of chocolate (C) is determined by his own desire for chocolate (X), so it is determined—not from without but rather from within. And what is X determined by? We may reasonably assume that Smith has eaten both types of pudding at different times in the past and decided that he enjoyed the chocolate over the vanilla. This is what X, his desire for chocolate, was determined by. So in our scenario, at circumstance B (two bowls of pudding, V and C) Smith's eyes are drawn to the chocolate; his mouth begins to salivate as his mind recalls the past pleasurable experience of chocolate. Presto: desire leading to choice. This is causality running through Smith's conative faculties. Past experience forged the desire; the desire determined the choice. Here we observe determinism and free agency in action.

As you can see, there certainly is "more than one option that can occur." It is possible that Smith could have either a desire for chocolate (X) or a desire for vanilla (Y). It is hypothetically possible for either one to occur, but what is the real state of affairs? His desire for chocolate (X). And it is possible that Smith could have chosen either vanilla (V) or chosen chocolate (C). It is hypothetically possible for either choice to be made, but what is the real state of affairs? His choice of chocolate which was according to his desire for chocolate—X determining C.

"Remember," I said to him, "I do not need to convince you of the truth of compatibilism. You are free to reject it. All I need to do is inform you of this theory's existence, show its validity and coherence, and affirm that this theory is Scriptural. That alone firmly undercuts your already invalid argument against the existence of God (re: omniscience). To persist in your argument beyond this point without engaging the counter-arguments I made here, then, is to commit the 'straw man' fallacy."