Quite a few months ago (prior to this blog's existence) I had received an email from someone who argues that compatibilism must be false because, according to his reasoning, it contradicts itself. The following is a copy of my response to his email.
Determinism and free will cannot both be true because, if determinism is true, then that choice is already determined for me. God knows at this moment if I will burn in hell or convert at some point and, if he knows, then there is nothing I can do to change it. There is a contradiction here.
Here the disputant claims that a contradiction was committed, but is this the case? It seems he is saying that if your choice is determined then it is not free. While this is quite a standard libertarian argument (and open to criticism), does it succeed in proving a contradiction?
As it stands? No. There is no immediate contradiction between determinism and free will. So then whether or not a contradiction occurs will depend on how one has defined 'free' because a contradiction occurs only when a proposition and its denial are both claimed to be true at the same time and in the same respect. In other words, if one defines 'free' in this context as "that which is not determined" then a contradiction would be present (but the question-begging fallacy is also committed). You see, for there to be a contradiction, it would have to be argued, "My will is both determined and, at the same time and in the same respect, not determined." But that is not the compatibilist argument at all.
That emphasized part is the clincher. I am claiming that in one respect my choices are determined, by internal forces, and in another respect my choices are not determined, by external forces. Because of this distinction the charge of contradiction vanishes.
My choices are causally necessitated from within—my desires, character, and beliefs determine the choices I make. But they are not causally necessitated from without—God knows my choices but he does not make them for me. Omniscience is an attribute of God, not an act of God. The omniscience of God is not the proximate cause of my choices. My desires, character, and beliefs are. My volitional activity is not passive (i.e., merely responding to the controls of external forces). The desires are mine. The beliefs are mine. The character is mine. The choices which they lead to are mine. From start to finish, the causal chain ran through my conative faculties. God does not make my choices for me; I make my own choices, which are causally necessitated by my own desires, beliefs, and character.
It is for this reason that in one respect free will is indeed an illusion. Let me explain. Properly speaking, our will is not free; it is determined by our desires, beliefs, and character. This is why I tend to indicate, in agreement with Locke and others, that "freedom is properly predicated of persons, not faculties." In other words, the agent is free, not his will. We ought to speak of free agency, not free will. The causal chain runs through the agent's conative faculties, not irrespective of them but concordantly with them; the volitional activity of our will actively shapes this causal chain. Nothing makes our choices for us; we make our own choices. We are not mindless puppets. Although our will is determined or causally necessitated, it is so only by our own internal forces.
In one respect my choices are determined (by internal forces). And in another respect my choices are not determined (by external forces). The charge of contradiction is refuted.
You said that "Smith chose C over V because at circumstance B his desires were constituted as X. He could have chosen V instead but this is a hypothetical condition only because his actual desires were X in that circumstance." But this cannot be; if determinism is true, as compatiblism claims, then B will always be the same for the instant and Smith will always choose C. He cannot choose V unless B were to change and since B is determined, B is determined as well.
Here I am convinced that the disputant misunderstood the argument, becoming confused about what the letters stood in the place of. So I reiterated the glossary:
- V = vanilla pudding
- C = chocolate pudding
- B = two bowls of pudding, V and C
- X = desire for chocolate instead of vanilla
- Y = desire for vanilla instead of chocolate
Using these definitions, I'll restate the argument and here directly address this rebuttal.
Smith chose C over V because at circumstance B his desires were constituted as X. Hypothetically his desires could have been Y, and therefore his choice of V, but this is hypothetical only because every time we encounter the real world we find that his desires at B were constituted as X, not Y, and therefore his absolute choice is C, not V.
So he is correct, that B is always the same, i.e., it is absolutely the case that there are two bowls of pudding which Smith must choose between. The point needing to be stressed is the difference between the real world and the hypothetical world.
In the real world his actual desire was for chocolate instead of vanilla so he chose the bowl of chocolate pudding. Yes, he could have chosen the vanilla, but this is hypothetical only; it is possible that he could have had a desire for vanilla instead of chocolate (Y) but it is not actual; his actual desire was for chocolate (X). Ergo, Y is hypothetical while X is real.
Now let's address the rest of the rebuttal, that if X is determined from without then his choice of C is determined from without as well. We know that his choice of chocolate (C) is determined by his own desire for chocolate (X), so it is determined—not from without but rather from within. And what is X determined by? We may reasonably assume that Smith has eaten both types of pudding at different times in the past and decided that he enjoyed the chocolate over the vanilla. This is what X, his desire for chocolate, was determined by. So in our scenario, at circumstance B (two bowls of pudding, V and C) Smith's eyes are drawn to the chocolate; his mouth begins to salivate as his mind recalls the past pleasurable experience of chocolate. Presto: desire leading to choice. This is causality running through Smith's conative faculties. Past experience forged the desire; the desire determined the choice. Here we observe determinism and free agency in action.
As you can see, there certainly is "more than one option that can occur." It is possible that Smith could have either a desire for chocolate (X) or a desire for vanilla (Y). It is hypothetically possible for either one to occur, but what is the real state of affairs? His desire for chocolate (X). And it is possible that Smith could have chosen either vanilla (V) or chosen chocolate (C). It is hypothetically possible for either choice to be made, but what is the real state of affairs? His choice of chocolate which was according to his desire for chocolate—X determining C.
"Remember," I said to him, "I do not need to convince you of the truth of compatibilism. You are free to reject it. All I need to do is inform you of this theory's existence, show its validity and coherence, and affirm that this theory is Scriptural. That alone firmly undercuts your already invalid argument against the existence of God (re: omniscience). To persist in your argument beyond this point without engaging the counter-arguments I made here, then, is to commit the 'straw man' fallacy."
