Carl Sagan & Scientistic Nonsense

If we long to believe that the stars rise and set for us, that we are the reason there is a Universe, does science do us a disservice in deflating our conceits?

Thus wrote Carl Sagan, in the first chapter of The Demon-Haunted World: Science As a Candle in the Dark (Random House, 1996), one of his more popular books which sets out to "explain the scientific method to laymen, and to encourage people to learn critical or skeptical thinking." It is ironic, therefore, to find him here thrusting science into areas unrelated to it and making a fine display of very poor reasoning. Sagan, although he loved science, was certainly not a philosopher, yet both skepticism and critical thinking are philosophical subjects, not scientific ones. As much as I loved Sagan, he really ought to have avoided the folly Dawkins persists in, by keeping aware of his limitations: stick to what he knows, and avoid speaking on things which he clearly was not adequately versed.

It is categorically impossible for science to deflate our conceits (as he put it) when it comes to the issue of whether or not we are the reason there is a Universe. The scientific method empowers us to discover the structure and evolution of the Universe, on the whole as well as its parts, but it has nothing to say about teleology or the reason why the Universe exists. Science simply has nothing to say about the purpose or meaning of any thing; such comes from a different discipline: philosophy, that discipline which is the very foundation upon which science itself is based and from which it is enabled to operate in the first place. Affirming science consistently as the ultimate paradigm of rationality leads inexorably to rank self-stultification whose end is nihilism and the abdication of knowledge and reason altogether.

Science cannot "do us a disservice in deflating our conceits," sir, when it comes to the purpose of the Universe's existence, because science does not do business with purpose or meaning; it can examine certain properties of the Universe but it cannot tell you why the Universe exists, much less rule mankind out as the reason. One can discuss the purpose or meaning of the Universe but to do so is to engage metaphysics, not science.

"I Contend We Are Both Atheists" - Response to Comments

For a brief time I had a blog called Apologia over at WordPress.com, but since I was unhappy with the limited customization available to free accounts (and do not have the time to play with CSS), I eventually opened my blog here. Having said that, I had written a post there (23/Oct/06) on the now-famous quote originally authored by Stephen Roberts, a former acquaintance of mine from my days in #Atheism on the Dalnet IRC network. The quote is: "I contend we are both atheists; I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours" (The History of 'The Quote'). That article has generated a few comments from readers that happened upon it, but I am trying to divert traffic away from that inactive blog so I am going to start responding to comments here. The most recent comments are from two visitors, named "Kerin" and "DM."

Kerin writes:

How can you talk about rationality when… argh forget it, I’m over the whole debating about the existence of god, you don’t know, I don’t know there that settles it! happy?

It is a good thing she did not finish that first sentence, because in all likelihood she was about to make a complete fool of herself. And an unfinished sentence leaves nothing to respond to, so I am going to look at her agnostic assertion at the end. The fact of the matter is, the assertion that "you don't know, I don't know" is settled ONLY under an agnostic view. I am certainly not an agnostic, so she has no basis other than her own agnosticism to assert that I don't know—and I could really do without her shoving her beliefs down my throat. She is entitled to her agnosticism; she is not entitled to impose her views upon me. She can tell me about the things she doesn't know, but she cannot assert anything about what I know.

DM writes:

You describe Mr Roberts as "a good-natured fellow with a fantastic sense of humour who seemed to enjoy debate," then disregard that his comment is valid because it is clearly of a mocking nature. That you’ve read so deeply into it makes me believe that you’re terrified it is true. Then you (ironically) set yourself up against a religion (pantheism) that admits no god and accuse Mr Roberts of using a “straw man” tactic. Also, quoting Scripture as proof of your God is circular logic and you should be burned at the stake for such heresy (note: that’s humor…)

There are quite a few problems with DM's comments.

First, validity is not determined by the tone of a comment ("a mocking nature"); validity falls under the jurisdiction of logic. And as anyone can see (assuming they have a basic grasp of reading comprehension), my post critiqued the comment using logic, showing how it invalidated itself, under its own terms (with zero regard to tone). The comment utterly contradicts itself, intrinsically; it is a contradiction to "contend we are both atheists" in the context of a participant believing in "one fewer god" than another: (a) If Steve believes in one god while Mike believes in two or more, it is valid to say that Steve believes in "one fewer god" than Mike but contradictory to assert that either of them are atheists; (b) If Steve believes in no gods while Mike believes in at least one, it is valid to say that Steve believes in "one fewer god" than Mike but contradictory to assert that Mike is an atheist. The comment graphically impales itself on logic, regardless of its tone.

Second, I am not terrified of any truth. I love truth, passionately assert truth, constantly seek out truth. If you have something you contend as true, bring it forward; I would absolutely love to examine it. When one has a firm commitment to logic as I do, truth claims have no terrifying capacity (especially self-contradictory ones) because one is not operating emotionally but, rather, logically. Now, having invoked logic, I should like to identify your remark as an ad hominem fallacy, i.e. your comment regards the arguer (me), not the argument, and therefore fails the test of relevancy. Congratulations.

Third, to say that pantheism admits no god is false, displaying a lack of familiarity with pantheism. It does admit a god: the universe. Pantheists deify the cosmos (which atheists and myself deem a peculiar and impractical sentimentality).

Fourth, I argued that Roberts' comment is in danger of committing the Straw Man fallacy. How? Roberts said that "when you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours." One reason I dismiss the god of pantheism is because replacing "the term 'nature' with the term 'god' is superfluous and obfuscating outside the scope of sentimentality." If Roberts is consistent, he has to admit that he rejects the God of Christianity for the same reason. But it would be fallacious for Roberts to do so because Christianity is not a pantheistic religion.

And finally, I never use Scripture to prove the existence of God, so your criticism is irrelevant and vacuous.

Neale Donald Walsh and his New Revelations

The following excerpts are from The New Revelations by Neale Donald Walsch (published in the UK by Hodder Mobius), author of Conversations With God. The thesis behind these five statements, Walsh proposes, is that "there are five things you can choose now, if changing your world and the self-destructive direction in which it is moving is what you wish to achieve."

1. You can choose to acknowledge that some of your old beliefs about God and about Life are no longer working.

First of all, the issue should be less about what "works" and more about what is "true"—with a focus on the former being shaped by the latter. Concern for what "works" is more emotional and subjective, and good luck achieving a functioning consensus on that. Concern for what is "true" is more rational and objective, and has very little to do with our emotional proclivities. Secondly, the 'age' of a belief has no relevance; a belief is not better just because it is 'new'. We should critically examine our beliefs and convictions about mankind and the world, and observe whether those beliefs correspond to the world in which we live; e.g. someone might believe that mankind is generally 'good' and will have reasons for this belief, but when we examine the real world, is that really what we find? If our beliefs do not correspond with the real world (what's true), they will be of little use (what works).

2. You can choose to acknowledge that there is something you do not understand about God and about Life, the understanding of which will change everything.

This is a call for an end to bigotry. If only this were achievable! But alas, you merely need to propose a worldview which invokes the name of God to observe prevalent bigotry from those committed to atheistic views, for example. I fear there is no end to bigotry. (But my worldview continues to produce beliefs which consistently correspond to the world in which we live.)

3. You can choose to be willing for a new understanding of God and Life to now be brought forth, an understanding that could produce a new way of life on your planet.

Same as above. Such an end to bigotry is a pipe dream; sad, but true. It is an unrealistic hope because it inherently fails to account for the real obstacle against its ultimate realization. That is, the realization of this hope is a road upon which sits a massive brick wall, and as long as we ram into that brick wall, ignoring its existence, we'll never travel that road. We can propose to travel it and desire to, but until our view acknowledges and accounts for that brick wall, it will never be anything more than a desired proposal. We need a worldview that will predict the building of such a brick wall, who builds it and why, and how to dismantle it. Unfortunately, mankind is not that bright.

(The source Walsh is channelling is not very careful with its language, providing us apophatic conclusions about its identity, i.e. inadvertently informs us who it's not, by referring to "your planet"—something God would not say.)

4. You can choose to be courageous enough to explore and examine this new understanding, and, if it aligns with your inner truth and knowing, to enlarge your belief system to include it.

Again, my "inner truth" is of no use to anyone, not even me, if it is not actually true. I want real solutions that account for the real world we live in. I don't need another channelled spirit blowing sunshine up my ass. Unless it is proposing a commitment to truth, it's just offering more impractical noise; I want something that corresponds to the world we live in, not something that appeals to my precious sensitivities.

(The source Walsh is channelling contradicts itself here, basically saying, "If the 'new' understanding fits your 'old' understanding, incorporate it." But if bigotry was the problem, then expanding and propagating that bigotry is not much of a solution. Why call for a 'new' understanding, if fitness with the 'old' understanding is the test it must pass? If our 'old' way of understanding is not working, why retain it and ensure 'new' ways of understanding are consistent with it? Walsh should try channelling intelligent spirits.)

5. You can choose to live your lives as demonstrations of your highest and grandest beliefs, rather than as denials of them.

Ah, but he avoids the salient point, which is: What's the criteria for "highest and grandest"?

Bauchman on Postmodern Theodicy

I transcribed the following from a brief video clip featuring the voice of Voddie Bauchman Jr, a sampler of his thoughts on the "Supremacy of Christ and Truth in a Postmodern World" (possibly from his Ever Loving Truth Bible studies) posted at the DesiringGod.org Facebook group Don't Waste Your Life. I don't know where the original video is located, and I got nowhere with YouTube.com, so I can't include the video here.

Student: I just wanted to ask you that, um, if you believe in a God that is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, then how do you reconcile the issue of theodicy?

Bauchman: Took a semester of philosophy, right?

Student: Well, yes. How did you know?

Bauchman: 'Cause if you hadn't, you would've just said, "Listen, God's so powerful and so good: how come bad stuff happens?" But I'm not going to answer the question until you ask it correctly.

Student: Worked on that all week. What do you mean, "ask it correctly"?

Bauchman: You're not asking the question properly.

Student: What do you mean, ask the question properly? It's my question! You can't tell me how to ask my question!

Bauchman: I will answer your question when you ask it properly.

Student: How do I ask it properly?

Bauchman: Here's how you ask that question properly: You look me in my eyes and you ask me this, "How on earth can a holy and righteous God know what I did and thought and said on yesterday and not kill me in my sleep last night?" You ask it that way and we can talk. But until you ask the question that way, you don't understand the issue. Until you ask the question that way, you believe the problem is 'out there'. Until you ask the question that way, you believe that there are somehow some individuals who, in and of themselves, deserve something other than the wrath of almighty God! Until you ask me the question that way, until you flip the script and ask the question this way and say, "Why is it that we are here today? Why has he not consumed and devoured each and every one of us? Why? Why, oh God, does your judgment and your wrath tarry?" When you ask it that way, you understand the issue. When you ask it the other way, you believe in the supremacy of man; how dare God not employ his power on behalf of almighty man. You flip the question around, you believe in the supremacy of Christ; how dare I steal his air."

QUOTES: John Piper

Could there be any holy motivation to believe in Christ where there is no taste for the beauty of Christ? To be sure we could be motivated by the desire to escape hell, or the desire to have material riches, or the desire to rejoin a departed loved one. But how does it honor the Light when the only reason we come to the Light is to find those things that we loved in the dark? Is this saving faith?

- John Piper, senior pastor of Bethlehem Baptist Church in Minneapolis, MN.

Shove This Down Your Throat

"What I can't stand is Christians who shove their beliefs down my throat."

Of all the ill-thought rhetoric coming from atheists, this oddly phrased tripe is one of those heard most often. (The verificationist mantra tops that list.) I am going to ignore how improbable that notion is, beyond anything other than hyperbolic rhetoric, and instead focus on another, far more revealing aspect of this issue: the fact that we Christians are routinely subjected to a militant campaign of atheistic beliefs.

After presenting a theistic argument for metaethics (values and morals), someone responded to me with, "Well, that's your opinion. And you're entitled to it." And that remark gave me pause. For maybe the first time ever, I actually stopped and gave that remark some thought. Well now, what does he mean by this statement? Quite simply, he means that what I presented is 'not fact'. More elaborately, he means that one cannot 'know' these things are so, these things I presented about God and metaethics; it is merely my personal perspective on something which is ultimately unprovable (i.e. there is nothing within reality to which the terms of my propositions correspond).

But do you realize what he has done? He doesn't realize it. By telling me that the sum of my argument is only so much 'opinion', he has shoved HIS beliefs down MY throat, because his statement is true only under his particular belief system! (In this case, some version of Scientistic Agnosticism. Some fundy atheists out there might object to the idea that they have a 'belief system', but it matters not because they do have one. No, it's not atheism; but it is atheistic.) The epistemic virtues that produce a statement like that certainly do not stem from my belief system. Such virtues are found somewhere else: in practically every case, the atheist's belief system. By insisting, in a matter-of-fact way, that my metaethics argument is only so much 'opinion', the atheist has shoved his beliefs down my throat—

—and is truly a hypocrite.

A Question About Prayer

Kelly: Somewhere along my journey towards a more biblically consistent understanding of salvation I seem to have lost the confidence of knowing what to pray for with regard to God's dealings with someone—what I mean is, their salvation. I know these things are already known to God, and that His timing is impeccable and so forth. I understand that we can't know if a person will come to faith, so... well, what is appropriate to pray for, with respect to someone coming to know Christ? Is it inappropriate to pray for that at all, or what?

David: We pray that God's will is done, on earth as it is in heaven. That's the idea in a nutshell, but we are so accustomed to hearing that (cf. the Lord's Prayer) that its impact is scarcely felt. There is, as you should know, nothing at all wrong with talking to God on a personal level, talking to him about what your hopes and desires are, who you care for and would love to see in the Kingdom. But all such sentiment should be ultimately subservient to whatever God's will happens to be, with the fullest of confidence and trust that God is righteous and just.

Kelly: I see. And that's about what I thought you would tell me. I don't know what more I was hoping for. I just know someone who does seem to be searching but doesn't understand faith, and admits to wishing he had it. He doesn't, and can't, and we discuss freely all of the things involved with Christianity. Anyway, I do find myself praying for that sort of thing.

David: We both know that regeneration, the new birth, is a work of the Spirit, not a work of the Kelly. That sounds potentially condescending but it's not intended to be. I am trying to underscore a contrast. Fully trust in God, Kelly—and certainly do continue ministering to your friend, because you just never know, right? It's possible that these may be the initial flutterings of his wings of faith, as the Spirit regenerates his former heart of stone. Who but God can know?

Kelly: I water, God gives the increase. Yes, I understand that. This isn't really about me. I do minister, I do openly demonstrate my faith in my witness, I do relate things God has done and is doing in my life, to demonstrate that faith and those blessings. I agree with everything you've said, I do. I just have these buried impulses of habit to pray that their eyes would be opened, et cetera. But thank you for your answer.

David: By all means, you can still pray "that their eyes would be opened," Kelly. We are always encouraged to pray, engaging that communion we have with the Father through Christ Jesus. Like I said, there is nothing wrong whatsoever with sharing your feelings and desires with God.

Scott: That brings up a question for me: Why pray at all if you are only to pray for what God already has on His mind?

David: Because prayer is a form of worship. And it is one of several means whereby we may glorify God in our lives. And it serves to effectively focus our priorities. The list goes on. There are lots of reasons. But God is not a supermarket, and prayer is not a shopping cart.

The Unintelligibility of Godless Ethics

In a strong reaction against the Christian view of values and morals, Tina asserted, "Personally, I view religion as a security blanket with as much correspondence to reality as Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy." I commended her having the good sense to admit that it was a product of personal taste rather than scholarly evaluation; however, when it comes to the larger picture of reality as a whole, her personal tastes have little relevance. Christian theology is something far more substantial; it is "the only view which provides the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility of human experience." It is a very large and brazen argument that myself and others make, demonstrating clearly that Christian theology is far more than just some "security blanket."

"God has nothing to do with ethics or morals," Tina replied. I countered that this factually-phrased statement holds only if you assume that ethics can be adequately and intelligibly accounted for without reference to God. However, under a godless view, ethical norms are non-existent; all that remains are biographical or sociological descriptives. Some people are okay with that. Fine. Speaking for myself, however, I expect an ethical theory to adequately and intelligibly account for evident human experiences like normative values and morals (ethics).

- - -

"It certainly is quite a brazen claim," Peter chimed in. "What's you're evidence for it? Can you prove all other viewpoints to be unintelligible? How would one even know if a viewpoint is intelligible or not?"

First of all, I replied, it should be noted that "the argument" is not really one neat, singular argument but in fact a network of arguments which address various concerns (e.g. ontology, ethics, epistemology, etc) that as a unified whole argues for the same thing.

Second, the argument itself confronts head-on the epistemic assumptions which operate behind the common demand for 'proof' of one thing or another, putting the demand in its proper place. For example, the demand that all items of knowledge must satisfy empirical virtues, understood pejoratively as Scientism (q.v. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy), is an epistemology that, when consistently held, abrogates all abstract realities and therefore destroys itself; ultimately it is "a kind of logical fallacy involving improper usage of science or scientific claims," explains Gregory Peterson ("Demarcation and the Scientistic Fallacy." Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 38 [4], 751-761).

Third, one can know whether or not a viewpoint is intelligible by the very definition of the term itself; i.e. if a viewpoint is not capable of coherently and adequately articulating itself, it is unintelligible. For example, if I ask someone to account for why the law of non-contradiction is universal and they reply, "It just is," then that is an unintelligible answer.

"There have been many societies which had strong ethics and morals that weren't Christian," Peter replied, "societies which never heard of the Christian God."

Practically all human beings recognize a moral order and try to live morally. I do not think that's an issue anyone contests. As I pointed out to earlier, the positive (descriptive) analysis is categorically different from the normative (prescriptive) analysis; in other words, the fundamental issue here is properly and adequately accounting for this curious phenomenon of the human being. Most people will agree that mankind generally recognizes a moral order and tries to live morally; an intelligible theory of ethics needs to adequately account for this phenomenon. A godless theory of ethics is incapable of doing so, because it refuses to permit the tools required to traverse from the 'is' to the 'ought'.

- - -

"Is it necessary to make the traverse from the 'is' to the 'ought' in order for an ethical system to function?" Eric asked. "In other words, do beings need the mythology of a Higher Power over their heads, waving the stick or carrot to enforce moral absolutes, in order to function? Or is there not a moral imperative inherent in their nature that, with their upbringing, will direct them to act in a certain way over an average?"

First, I would say that the traverse is only necessary for those with a concern for adequately and intelligibly accounting for normative statements. If one does not really care about accounting for the phenomenon, if one is content to believe that there is nothing within reality to which normative statements correspond, then no it's not necessary. But since there does exist a common human experience of objective morality (e.g. it is right for one society to charge members of another society with crimes against humanity), then certainly some people do have a concern for an adequate account of it; for such people, "there just is" is neither adequate nor intelligible.

Second, any theory of ethics which grounds moral order in some kind of carrot on a string falls prey to Euthyphro's dilemma and must answer to it.

Third, I agree that there is "a moral imperative inherent in [human] nature," so any adequate theory of ethics will need to account for this phenomenon. However, as many scholars far more able than myself have shown, trying to account for it by way of biological or sociological observations commits the naturalistic fallacy (e.g. George Moore, Principia Ethica). And theories which ignore fallacies fail the test of intelligibility. Furthermore, such naturalistic accounts fail to provide us with moral statements applicable to societies in themselves; i.e. circumstance 'X' might be considered 'good' under this theory because it promotes the health and survival of 'Society A' but it does not allow us to state whether 'Society A' is itself good or not (e.g. the Nazi regime). It also fails to provide a moral justification for 'Society B' involving itself in the affairs of 'Society A'. There are many undercutters such a theory must confront.

"With consideration given to religious behaviors across culture and distance," Eric added, "it seems that no one religion is likely to be more necessary or true than any other."

Behavior is descriptive, I answered, which is categorically different from normative or prescriptive. What a culture is or does is fundamentally different from what it ought to be or do.

Unequally Yoked

In a forum elsewhere, 'Sarah' asked any interested parties to weigh in on the following issue (my response to her follows):

I was having a discussion with a friend of mine a few months ago about spiritual and religious beliefs, and how they relate to your search for a life partner. He maintained that as we get older we get more set in our ways, and because our spiritual beliefs and values go to the core of who we are, these beliefs become more important with time. I argued that it should not be an issue, as long as your partner respects your beliefs. But since then, I am beginning to wonder if maybe he had it right. What is your take on this? Does it matter to you? Or is mutual respect for each other's beliefs sufficient?

For me the issue is 'somewhat important', but nearly pushes into the arena of 'very important'. There are theoretical considerations, but... for me, it was the practical lessons that drove the matter home. I had dated a Wiccan lady some years ago. As a person I thought she was quite delightful—obviously, since I decided to date her—but she eventually proved incapable of reconciling the differences between our convictions. I showed interest in her convictions by studying Wicca at length, its beliefs, rituals, and history, and asking her questions about her unique interpretation of Wicca (as a solitary practitioner). She showed precisely zero interest in my convictions, never bothering to understand me in light of them, its effect and influence on my life as a whole. I felt that was unfair but, in the grand scheme of things, acceptable. But ultimately it was more than just a disinterest on her part; she overtly disrespected my spiritual beliefs and completely failed to appreciate how integral it was to my very identity, which was demonstrated very clearly one fateful day. As we sat on the couch talking one afternoon, she noticed a black book sitting face down on the back of the couch. Curious about what it was, she picked it up and glanced at the cover, which said "Holy Bible." She made a face and a noise of disgust and dropped it back down, wiping her hand off. The relationship did not survive.

So obviously there needs to be a mutual respect between two parties with differing spiritual beliefs (or if one has no spiritual beliefs), but that only really works if the two people are merely dating. I think this is where the issue becomes more poignant and relevant, which might make sense of the realization Sarah is coming to. When the relationship goes beyond mere dating, when it transcends into a domestic covenant (whether marriage or common-law partnership), a mutual respect for each other's spiritual beliefs is no longer sufficient. When a relationship acquires substantial depth, one begins to desire more than just respect; one desires to be understood and to have harmony. And as another participant pointed out, raising a family brings the issue to a salient point, elevating the desire for understanding and harmony to a pronounced need—especially where values and morals are concerned. A pagan and an atheist might inherently agree already on values and morals, but the views of a pagan and a Christian are antithetical on that issue.

When it comes to dating, mutual respect is required. When it comes to a domestic covenant, something more substantial than mutual respect is desired. And when it comes to raising a family, that understanding and harmony goes from being desired to being needed.

Unbelievers and God's Mercy

In a forum discussion elsewhere, a fellow we shall call 'Brad' made the remark that "so many of the comedians these days do not find a God of mercy in the Old or New Testaments," that through irreverent satire they deride the God of Scripture as "vengeful and mean" and that it seemed to reflect a rather common attitude. "It saddens me that this trendy new religion of God-bashing has become a form of revenue and entertainment," he said. "The jokes are not challenged, which I fear might leave a perceptible force."

Despite his reference to "comedians" (George Carlin being a rather clear example), the various participants in that thread aptly demonstrated that it is a prevailing attitude of ALL unbelievers, an attitude which articulates a segment of their justification for unbelief. But my question is this: "Why should one be at all surprised?" Scripture predicts this condition.

Those participants who proceeded to exhibit a similar attitude as the one Brad was lamenting, a careful review of all their posts clearly demonstrates one consistent element: they have all presupposed a subjective system of morality that is in defiance of God, which they then hold God subject to. Why do they not find a God of mercy within the pages of Scripture? Because God's mercy is at odds with their system of morality! The mercy of God is defined by the gifts he bestows upon those who do not deserve it; but those comedians and these participants reject this idea of "do not deserve," insofar as they reject the biblical concept of sin and its inherent nature. They feel that there ARE things which all people deserve irrespective of their beliefs, race, commitments, geological location, etc. Since they view "sin" in strictly humanistic terms, there are numerous examples of God acting contrary to what they believe man deserves (and is therefore not merciful but, rather, inhumane and tyrannical). I do not think we would accomplish much by complaining about the derisions that unbelievers hurl at God (although it rightly upsets us). What we ought to do is call these people to the carpet for their completely unintelligible use of the term 'moral' and its relevant dimensions.

Why do I defend God? Because I love him. Why do they castigate God? Because they hate him (notwithstanding their varied qualifications about his existence).

The Unsaved and Morality

In a post to the CARM discussion group on Facebook, a young lady had asserted:

Anyone can live a morally good life but not be saved; i.e. people can 'do the right thing' and follow the comandments, etc. But without a personal relationship with our Savior, you will not have eternal life.

I have to disagree with this. I think we should always be careful of how much philosophical ground we are willing to concede to godless worldviews. (And for me, that amounts to 'zero'.) I will admit that unbelievers can live a 'good' life, but I would argue that it is colloquial and accidental only. They certainly do not live a morally good life, nor can they—if we accept that moral order is grounded in the immutable nature of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands (which we, as Christians, do accept). "The sinful mind is hostile to God. It does not submit to God's law, nor can it do so" (Rom. 8:7; verses 1 and 9 attest that "the sinful mind" belongs to whosoever is not in Christ). As Gordon Clark put the matter, "A man might will to be honest, to support his family, to discharge most of his obligations as a citizen. In colloquial language these things are called good. But they are not spiritual goods" (What Do Presbyterians Believe, pg. 109), because ethics—values and morals—is grounded in, and revealed by, the true and living God. Although an unbeliever might help a homeless person by giving him food or shelter, neither his behavior nor even his motivation is constituted by obedience to or love for God and his will (his conscience may be dictated by God-defying humanism, for example). Ergo, the 'good' he performed was colloquial and accidental—i.e. neither moral nor willfully so.

UPDATE: About an hour later she replied, agreeing with me that the 'good' unbelievers perform is colloquial at best and certainly "not good in God's eyes, for they are done without the will to please God." She conceded that the 'good' which unbelievers perform is "defined by the world's view." Furthering this thought she writes:

They may vote, recycle, love their children, never divorce, donate money, etc, all of which would constitute them as 'model citizens' to the world; however, all of these things, although pleasing to society, will not please God if you are not one of His children . . . Society has its standards of good, but nothing outside of faith in Christ will please God.

And she has it spot on. My basic point is that if it's not according to the revealed will of God then it is not 'moral' (including its synonyms 'good' and 'right'). That term is specific and rich with content qualified by Scripture, and any equivocation of that term leads to unacceptable concessions to godless views. I feel, rather strongly, that we cannot and must not compromise the Word of God. Is that hardcore? Yes, but our commitment to God must be. I contest that we must, as ambassadors of Christ, insist that unbelievers are not good, that they are sinners in every context of their life and in need of the Savior. I contest that permitting unbelievers any foothold in the area of goodness immediately weakens the message of gospel and the necessity of Christ's atoning work.

Put briefly, the unsaved are not good—in any context. They are sinners, alienated from God and in mortal need of the Savior. Perhaps I advocate a minority position, but I simply cannot abide any weakening of the gospel. I was not trying to criticize this young lady's point specifically; I was merely advocating an uncompromising view on this issue.

Return to Blogosphere

I have now returned to the blogosphere. I am in my new place, I have my new computer, and my cable modem was installed today. My thanks to you, for your patience, understanding, and prayers.

Temporary Leave

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5 Oct 2007, 9:51 PM

Although I am moved into my new suite now, my broadband connection will not be set up until Tuesday of next week (Oct 9). My apologies for the lengthy delay.

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20 Sep 2007, 8:53 PM

New computer should be arriving within the first week of October, around the time that I take occupancy of my new suite. It is a fairly nice system, too. It's an AMD Athlon 64 X2 Dual Core 2.0GHz, 2GB RAM, 250GB HDD, etc, and comes with an LG 19-inch widescreen LCD monitor. Altogether, $620.


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13 Sep 2007, 8:17 PM

Sadly, my fiancée and I have split up. Until I situate myself with a new residence and a computer, the series I was working on and this blog itself will have to be suspended. I do not anticipate it taking more than a few weeks. My apologies to David Cramer and whatever readers I had.

P.S. Your prayers are appreciated.

Attributes of God: Omnipotence

David Cramer in one of his posts had a couple of brief comments about omnipotence with respect to logical contradictions:

The historic, orthodox definition of omnipotence can be stated as follows: "God can do anything that it is logically possible to do." Don’t get too wrapped up in the "logically possible" language. All that means is, if something can be done, God can do it. So, for example, God can’t both exist and not exist at the same time, because that is not "logically possible" to do. But, I don’t think this places any limitations on what he can do.

These comments of his recalled to my mind a question, related to this issue, that someone had asked me earlier this year. I want to share with both the readers and Cramer himself the answer I had replied to her with. Her question was posed to me in the following way (followed by my response):

Perhaps you can answer why God would not be able to create a state of affairs that violates the law of non-contradiction in some way?

Sure, but perhaps in a way that you might not expect.

Let nT stand for some self-contradiction.

It is not the case that God is unable to actualize nT. Rather, it is that nT is incapable of actualization. The former is a statement about God (and incompatible with omnipotence). The latter is a statement about nT (and says nothing about God). This is why Thomas Aquinas notes, "It is more exact to say that the intrinsically impossible is incapable of production, than to say that God cannot produce it."

The distinction that Aquinas underscores here is the fact that its impossibility is not due to some extrinsic feature (that which it has in relation to some thing outside itself); in other words, the idea that no agent can produce it is not what makes nT impossible. Rather, it is due to an intrinsic feature (that which it has in and of itself); in other words, the idea that it is incapable of production in and of itself, regardless of any agent, is what makes nT impossible.

Omnipotence is a concept which conveys the ability of God to perform all tasks subject to power, the accomplishment of which can never be frustrated by an obstacle. But a self-contradiction is an intrinsically impossible non-entity (i.e., it cannot be analytically conceived in itself without contradiction), which means that it is neither a task to be performed nor an obstacle against the accomplishment of one.

I shall borrow from an argument presented roughly ten years ago by Chuck Johnson (an atheist from the newsgroup talk.atheism) to underscore this distinction.

Let U stand for 'the universal set of tasks' and let T stand for 'some proposed task'.

1. Omnipotence is the ability to perform every member of U.
2. If T is logically possible, then T is a member of U.
3. If T is logically impossible, then T is not a member of U.
4. If T is not a member of U, then T is a non-task nT.
5. All nT form a null set Ø.

So it is immediately obvious that to ask if an omnipotent being can perform any members of a null set Ø is very absurd. It would be incorrect to say that he cannot; rather, it is that there is nothing there to perform. Aquinas again: "It is more exact to say that the intrinsically impossible is incapable of production, than to say that God cannot produce it."

Let me elaborate on this.

Intrinsic impossibilities do not limit omnipotence at all. Self-contradictions, by virtue of being two mutually exclusive properties, carry their impossibility within themselves; i.e., it is intrinsically impossible for them to have occupancy in the same universe at the same time—under all conditions and in all worlds and for all agents. "All agents" here includes God himself, Lewis notes in his book The Problem of Pain (HarperCollins, 2001), explaining further that God's omnipotence

means power to do all that is intrinsically possible, not to do the intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to him, but not nonsense. This is no limit to his power. If you choose to say 'God can give a creature free will and at the same time withhold free will from it,' you have not succeeded in saying anything about God: meaningless combinations of words do not suddenly acquire meaning simply because we prefix them [with] the two other words 'God can'. It remains true that all things are possible with God: the intrinsic impossibilities are not things but non-entities. It is no more possible for God than for the weakest of his creations to carry out both of two mutually exclusive alternatives; not because his power meets an obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we talk it about God (p.18).

Herein lies the key concept: omnipotence regards power, but self-contradictions have nothing to do with power. Why? Because omnipotence has no reference to that which is not an object of power, e.g., that which is self-contradictory. Let this be our maxim: If the impossible could become possible or actual simply by applying power to it, then it was never impossible to begin with, but merely difficult. That which is impossible remains impossible regardless of any power applied. Think about what the paradox question implies. To suggest that nothing is impossible given sufficient power (omnipotence) is to deny that real contradictions exist; i.e., given sufficient power, the impossible is actually possible, albeit difficult. But to toss logic out the window is to toss out the baby with the bathwater! The non-believer who makes such an argument accidentally proves too much: if neither logic nor contradictions really exist, well then, the very objection he started out with vanishes.

Omnipotence regards the power of God to accomplish all things which are subject to power, and that power is never frustrated by an obstacle; self-contradictions, as non-entities, can be neither objects of power nor possible obstacles to it. (Refer to my argument at the beginning.)

What does omnipotence actually mean? "God can do all things the accomplishment of which is a manifestation of power," said twelfth-century philosopher and theologian Hugh de St. Victor. "Omnipotence is maximal power," cites the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Omnipotence regards the power of God to accomplish all things which are subject to power. In all dictionaries, encyclopedias, and systematic theologies I have encountered, omnipotence is defined as: having unlimited or universal power; all-powerful; the state or quality of being all-powerful; the state of having unlimited power. Omnipotence does not mean—and has never meant—the ability to bring about a self-contradiction.

Cramer & The Cause of Sin - Pt. 3(a)

My friend and faithful brother David Cramer has continued his discussion on John Frame's argument but he has done so in two independent posts (here and here). My analysis will distinguish the content of his objection into four individual categories—(1) Objective Evil, (2) The Sovereignty of God, (3) The Cause of Sin, and (4) Cause vs. Authorship—and I will publish on each category over the next four days, beginning with (1).

1. OBJECTIVE EVIL

According to Cramer's position, the Bible teaches us that "there are some things that are objectively morally evil" which, he goes on to argue, God surely hates. I wish for the readers to understand that I agree with Cramer on this point, but with some notable reservations.

First of all—and this is hopefully a minor point—I submit that "morally evil" is a redundant expression because "evil" is itself a normative moral term. Consequently, as the astute mind will detect, I reject the term "natural evil" (e.g. earthquakes) because that imports a humanistic definition of "evil" into what should be our stalwart commitment to Scriptures. You see, I hold that moral order is grounded in the very being of God. Ergo, for an earthquake to be considered a natural 'evil' it would have to occur against God's will; if a phenomenon in nature occurs according to God's will, surely it is not evil. So I prefer to reserve "evil" for moral contemplation while we should call things such as earthquakes "natural disasters," as we normally do. (As the reader might surmise, I also submit that "evil" and "sin" are synonymous, interchangeable terms; i.e. they both refer to the same thing. Furthermore, such an argument as I affirm here quite readily hands Euthyphro his hat and shows him to the door.)

Secondly (and I hope Cramer would concur), I affirm that if anything is evil, it is so objectively. In other words, biblically speaking there is actually no such thing as subjective evil. Why? Because moral order is not a human invention; moral order is grounded in the very being of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands. Consequently, if 'objective' means "independent of either a particular human mind or human minds altogether," then we may assert that all evil is so objectively.

Cramer states that "objective moral evils are those actions [which are] wrong for any being, at any time, anywhere, to do them." While this might work on the surface, a difficulty arises when we examine it more closely; i.e. literally "any being"? I hear Euthyphro knocking at the door again. I reject such a notion because there is no moral order to which God himself is subject. He is the sole Lawgiver, whose commands are forever consistent with his immutably holy nature and which express all moral parameters. In other words, "any being" cannot be literal; it must restricted to only those beings created by God which he ordained to hold culpable at his judgment (angels and humans). God, as a being, is not included in the moral culpability to which 'objective evil' refers; neither are horses, nor plankton, nor a host of other beings. Also, this is why the taking of human life is not evil per se (in itself); it is evil only where God has proscribed against it. Sometimes God has commanded the taking of human life (1 Sam. 15:3) and the refusal to do so is evil (v. 24; cf. v. 20). It is possible that all of this truly is what Cramer meant; such precision was my own desire.

Tomorrow I shall post my comments on (2) The Sovereignty of God.

Reformed Theology: Salvation & God's Drawing

In the official CARM Facebook group, Steve Wilson had asked the following question:

I believe the question that needs to be [confronted] by Arminians is: If God offers salvation for all, and if it is open to everyone to choose to accept or reject, [then] what about those that the Father does not draw? How does this square with the idea that it is open for everyone? Why can't a man with freewill come to Christ unless he is drawn? Would God really rob someone of their free will to choose salvation by not drawing him to Christ?

And finally, does this support Arminianism or Calvinism?

Here is perhaps a finer point on that question: "What does it mean for God to 'offer' salvation to all if he does not also 'draw' all?" In other words:

1. "In what way does God 'offer' to all, such that he does not also 'draw' all?"

Where is the disconnect between God's offering and his drawing? Someone might reply with the notion of 'evangelism', but that is man offering salvation, not God—it is our task to take the gospel message throughout the world without discrimination. One person plants the seed, another person waters the seed. But God's 'offer' must be something more distinctive and efficacious, because God's will decides whether the seed grows (1 Cor. 3:6-7).

Which raises a related and equally important question:

2. "Is God's drawing efficacious?"

That is, in the context of God setting out to draw someone, does God accomplish what he purposed to do (Isa. 55:10-11)? Perhaps someone might reply that God's drawing never "forces" someone, but notice something important: through their very use of the word force they have already admitted that God's drawing is not efficacious, and we shall thank them for their answer—because forced describes a conscious resistance, i.e. the word itself suggests that God lacks complete control over the one being drawn, such that there remains some measure of resistance against God.

With respect to his question about whether these things "support Arminianism or Calvinism," I would offer the following response:

1. If all those given to the Son were first drawn by God;
2. if God's drawing is efficacious, such that all those given to the Son unfailingly come to him;
   
3. if ultimately some do not come and are not saved;
   
4. then this contradicts Arminianism, but is consistent with Calvinism.

No Theist Is An Atheist

CARSON: But you're an atheist when it comes to Hinduism, Sarah.

DAVID: Um, an 'atheist' is someone who has no belief in ANY gods. Ergo, Sarah cannot be an atheist in any sense, for she believes in at least one God.

CARSON: But she does not believe in all gods.

DAVID: Right, which means she is not a polytheist. But she is not an atheist. To call her an atheist takes a brutally illogical step. Or it butchers the definition of "atheist." One of the two. Neither is very flattering.

CARSON: I meant she didn't believe in the gods of Hinduism. Yeah, it butchers the definition of 'atheist'. I can handle that.

DAVID: Such an irresponsible and illogical definition of 'atheist' would mean that everyone throughout the whole world are atheists, rendering the term meaningless.

CARSON: I qualified it: "when it comes to Hinduism." Not ALL people are atheists when it comes to Hinduism.

DAVID: She is not an atheist when it comes to Hinduism, sir. She is a theist who rejects the gods of Hinduism.

This conversation recalled to my attention something Stephen Roberts was once proud of asserting (or perhaps still is): "I contend we are both atheists, I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours." With all due respect to Roberts as a person—whom I regarded as a friend for some years—that is one of the most incoherent and untenable statements I have heard an atheist make, a statement which Carson here seems to echo. It would be really appreciated if atheists could exhibit a little more consistently the rationality they so triumphantly espouse.

There is simply nothing rational about calling a theist an 'atheist' in any sense—it is, in fact, a direct logical contradiction. Although a Christian theist might reject the gods of Hinduism, that does not make her an atheist "when it comes to Hinduism." She is a theist nevertheless, because she affirms a belief in the God of Christian theism. There are gods that she rejects, certainly, but that only means she is not a polytheist; to say that it means she is somehow an atheist in any way is patently absurd. Those atheists who wish to stack the deck in favour of atheism should find another tactic, because this one makes a fool of them.

Cramer & The Cause of Sin - Pt. 2

Although there is, at this point in the discussion, no significant material to respond to on Cramer's blog (he is undoubtedly still buried in class work), there are some items worth noting.

First of all, Cramer is now aware of my blog, which is why this can now be referred to as a 'discussion'. Although he mistakenly thinks I followed him here, the reality is that I have been with Blogger for over five years; this particular incarnation (Itinerarium Mentis) is somewhat new, but my former blog (Apologia) was around for a while and, at one point, had even garnered the attention of Jared Wilson and the boys at The Thinklings, and also Austin R. Cline, a Regional Director for the Council for Secular Humanism. I have been around for a while.

Secondly, I wish to make something clear to Cramer personally: Please do not feel obligated to respond to my blog posts. I certainly appreciate your thoughtful responses and the challenges they present, and I do admire your commitment to growth in the knowledge of Christ and your passion for the purity of the gospel, but I know you have a good deal on your plate as a student so I do not want you feeling as though you have yet one more thing to deal with. My blog is a place where I like to share my thoughts and experiences as I likewise grow and mature in my Christian walk; some of those encounters occur on IRC, some of them on message boards, and some through reading other people's blogs and critically examining their content. Your views on Frame's argument grabbed my attention. I look forward to engaging you in a discussion, I just do not wish for you to feel burdened.

And thirdly, back to the readers now, Cramer makes a couple of statements I wish to briefly respond to. He maintains, first of all, his rather unfavourable characterization of John Frame's argument—quite expectedly, I should think—here calling it "theologically abominable." What I wish the readers to note is this: It is not yet clear that he is properly understanding Frame's thesis in the first place, and it will not be clear until Cramer has some time available to write more fully on the matter. So for the time being, the reader is really encouraged to take Cramer's comments with a proportionately sized grain of salt. I am familiar with Frame's argument on this point and I know there is nothing "theologically abominable" about it, as surely does Frame himself.

Also, it certainly is not enough to call a spade a spade, but that has nothing to do with today's pluralistic society. It has to do with sound reason, critical thinking, and our moral duty toward our brothers in Christ; to "simply call a spade a spade" is only so much ipse dixit (i.e. "any unsupported rhetorical assertion that lacks a logical argument") and will not compel anyone. If he is going to assert that Frame has strayed from the truth of the gospel, then he should expect that his readers will want to know how and why this is so. (And so would Frame himself, should he have ever happened upon the post. An unlikely event, but a good principle to consider.) Cramer is entitled to call Frame a "spade" but his academic discipline should inform him that doing so shoulders the burden of exposing the argument that produces such a conclusion. If he did not have the time to provide even an outline thereof—and he admits to not having the time—perhaps he could have expressed his reaction with less censure for the time being. Or saved it as a draft until it did include the outline. My only point is that if one is going to make such a terrible accusation against someone who has established himself as a God-fearing apologist and critically acclaimed Christian philosopher, it should include one's reasoning. My passion is fueled by the conviction that we, as Christians, are bound by a higher moral rectitude toward the members of God's family.

Cramer also states he is not claiming that Frame has "rejected the gospel" or "does not affirm the gospel message." True, but he is claiming that Frame here strays from the truth of the gospel. That is a very, very serious charge, is it not?

For now Cramer rightly has his academic responsibilities to attend to. Both myself and his readers, I am sure, can wait with due patience until he has the requisite time to elaborate.

Cramer & The Cause of Sin - Pt. 1

David Cramer, a Facebook friend of mine from Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, wrote an interesting (albeit brief) piece on his blog this earlier afternoon. Cramer, it would seem, is quite shocked about something theologian John Frame had argued in his scholarly work The Doctrine of God; specifically, that Frame would dare to argue in favour of the idea that God is the cause of sin. Cramer said that this excerpt from Frame's book is "quite chilling" and that it shows "how far from the truths of the gospel we can stray while still maintaining strict adherence to biblical authority." That is a very serious charge for Cramer to level against Frame, so how does he support such a statement?

He doesn't.

Despite the deep respect for Cramer I have—or perhaps as a result of it—I am obligated to call him on such irresponsible negligence. He admits candidly enough that his current homework load does not permit him to write very extensively, but here is the crucial point: if he had the time to level such a critical charge against Frame then surely he had enough time to provide a brief outline showing why he thinks Frame has strayed from the truth of the gospel. Frame himself, in the excerpt Cramer linked to, made a reference to the book of Job (1:20-22); at a minimum there is a starting point Cramer could have commented on. But he did not. He provided his readers with his emotional reaction but nothing more.

What Frame discussed, and Cramer neglected to comment on, is the distinction between cause and authorship, insofar as God is the ultimate 'first cause' behind the existence of sin, "referring to God’s agency in bringing evil about," Frame notes. But God is never guilty of sin, he does not commit sin. Humans are responsible for sinning, but God is responsible for creating beings capable of sinning; Frame recognizes the difference between "God as the 'remote cause' and human agency as the 'proximate cause'." Does Cramer offer a scholarly response to any of these things? Does he tell his readers why things like this compel him to "reject the Calvinist framework as a whole"? No, he does not. It is very disappointing and irresponsible.

I titled this post "Pt. 1" because if Cramer should subsequently write more on this, perhaps shouldering his burden of proof and making his case, I will critically examine his arguments here.

Sin and Freedom

David: God is absolutely responsible for the behavior we choose to do. Why? Because he can stop it, and in select cases he has done so. That makes him responsible; when he can stop it—and has at times—but let's it continue. And he does not stop sin because he has a glorious purpose in it. It's why he created the world in this way in the first place.

Richard: So I can go ahead and sin, because if I can do it, it's God's fault anyway? Can't be sure I agree.

David: Just because God is causally responsible for the world he created, that does not absolve us of our responsibilities. You can sin, sure—and you will be held accountable when you do.

Richard: Okay.

David: The difference is this: We are responsible for sinning; God is responsible for sin.

Richard: Oh.

Garrett: I think you need to re-word that.

David: I doubt it, although I may need to clarify it.

Garrett: For God to give you freedom, He had to allow for the potential of sin.

David: Freedom? From what?

Garrett: Light and darkness.

David: We are free from light and darkness? What does that mean?

Garrett: Good and evil as potentials.

David: What is it we are free from?

Garrett: To choose. If you cannot sin, then you are not free.

David: So in heaven we will not be free? Or we can sin there?

Garrett: Discussion over. Enjoy.

David: Heheh. I bet it is, yeah.

You can lead a horse to water...

I probably would not be so hard on atheists if they did not make such a fuss about how 'rational' they are. Seriously, people: If you are going to proclaim how rational you are, then be rational!

Take my discussion on IRC the other night as one example. And this will be an abridged version of the discussion. There was an atheist whom I shall call Terry. He did not like the fact that his demand for evidence resulted in my calling his epistemology into question, essentially because he did not see the relevance. So I had explained to him, "Your demand for evidence is a product of your epistemology—which furthermore dictates what constitutes acceptable evidence."

"Okay, but why is this a problem?" he asked.

"Because I do not subscribe to your chosen epistemology, sir," I answered. "That is your worldview. Mine is very different. And here you are simply assuming that my argumentation must conform to your worldview, but there are two rather serious problems with this: (1) my argument does not work under your worldview, but more importantly (2) I emphatically reject your worldview because it is completely untenable in the first place."

"How come your argumentation does not work under my epistemology?" he asked. (Here is where I am skipping past a good deal of initial gratuitous invective he had offered up first.)

"Because our worldviews are antithetical at the most basic level," I replied. "My epistemology has a vastly different presuppositional starting point than yours does, one that your worldview would not accept." He then asked what my starting point was, and I answered, "It is that propositional revelation known as Scripture."

There is nothing wrong, rationally, with presupposing the truth of your own system of thought and tacitly insisting that your opponent work within the framework of that system. However, if it is permissible for the atheist to presuppose the truth of his system of thought and expect the Christian to work within the framework of that system, then it is also permissible for the inverse of that situation. Otherwise, the atheist would shoulder the epistemic responsibility for explaining why the only presuppositions permitted in the field of debate are his own.

"How do you know that Scripture is a valid starting point?" Terry asked me.

"Do you not see? That very question assumes that logic has priority rather than Scripture. Perhaps under your worldview logic is prior to everything else, but that is very different from mine. In other words, sir, your question is yet again expecting my argumentation to conform to your worldview. Under my worldview, God, not logic, is prior to everything else, and Scripture is that by which we know anything about God. In other words, the foundation of our epistemological infrastructure is Scripture, which propositionally reveals that which is prior to everything else, even logic—God."

"Nothing else can be prior to logic," he objected, "otherwise logical contradictions could prevail in that domain which is prior to logic."

"That statement is consistent with your worldview," I replied, "not mine. Under my worldview, that result would not occur. But this now raises a relevant and very interesting question: When another worldview is competing against yours, how do you evaluate them?"

"Whichever worldview demonstrates consistency, evidential support, predictive value, and simplicity."

"But those epistemological virtues are derived precisely from your worldview!" I replied. "To assume the truth of your worldview when evaluating a competing worldview against your own is to beg the question! One of the systems under question is assumed to be true before the evaluation process even began. That is a fallacious exercise."

"I have not assumed the truth of my worldview," he objected.

"Really? If you have not established in your mind whether your worldview is true or false, then why was it serving as the evaluative criteria?"

A slight pause. "I guess I did."

"And begging the question is not rational, under your view, Terry. What a dilemma."

It was an enjoyable discussion but it ended there because he had to leave for dinner. Terry usually makes a good deal of fuss about how rational he is, but there is nothing rational about fallacies and refusing to meet your burden of proof.

Introductory Post

As the profile widget says, this journal will follow my religious and intellectual pursuits as I delve ever deeper into my personal relationship with God, a course charted through confronting new challenges, gaining new insights, and discovering or developing my understanding of propositional revelation in or exegetical analysis of Scripture. I will also publish here my thoughts and perspectives on debate encounters—which are usually informal (e.g. an IRC or Facebook discussion)—or material I have read on other blogs.

(Note: When I publish material that originated from a discussion either in person or on IRC, I will use fictitious names. Since the content of the discussion is not accessible to the general public, they will be treated as private and no one will be personally identified. If the material originates from an online blog, article, or discussion group, the author's real name will be used, since it is available to the general public already.)

Atheists Say the Darndest Things!

An ongoing list of the retarded things I discover atheists saying.

Updated: 7/Nov/08

"Religion is illogical. Christianity is based on murder, promotes murder and condones murder. People that follow it, by choice, are illogical and evil." —'Daley', Atheist Nexus comments field (here).

Series Archive

This page functions as an archive of various series I have written on, for your convenience.

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Cramer & The Cause of Sin

• Part 1: Introduction
• Part 2: Some Notes
• Part 3(a): Objective Evil
• Part 3(b): The Sovereignty of God
• Part 3(c): The Cause of Sin
• Part 3(d): Cause vs. Authorship

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The Attributes of God

• Omnipotence