Temporary Leave

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5 Oct 2007, 9:51 PM

Although I am moved into my new suite now, my broadband connection will not be set up until Tuesday of next week (Oct 9). My apologies for the lengthy delay.

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20 Sep 2007, 8:53 PM

New computer should be arriving within the first week of October, around the time that I take occupancy of my new suite. It is a fairly nice system, too. It's an AMD Athlon 64 X2 Dual Core 2.0GHz, 2GB RAM, 250GB HDD, etc, and comes with an LG 19-inch widescreen LCD monitor. Altogether, $620.


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13 Sep 2007, 8:17 PM

Sadly, my fiancée and I have split up. Until I situate myself with a new residence and a computer, the series I was working on and this blog itself will have to be suspended. I do not anticipate it taking more than a few weeks. My apologies to David Cramer and whatever readers I had.

P.S. Your prayers are appreciated.

Attributes of God: Omnipotence

David Cramer in one of his posts had a couple of brief comments about omnipotence with respect to logical contradictions:

The historic, orthodox definition of omnipotence can be stated as follows: "God can do anything that it is logically possible to do." Don’t get too wrapped up in the "logically possible" language. All that means is, if something can be done, God can do it. So, for example, God can’t both exist and not exist at the same time, because that is not "logically possible" to do. But, I don’t think this places any limitations on what he can do.

These comments of his recalled to my mind a question, related to this issue, that someone had asked me earlier this year. I want to share with both the readers and Cramer himself the answer I had replied to her with. Her question was posed to me in the following way (followed by my response):

Perhaps you can answer why God would not be able to create a state of affairs that violates the law of non-contradiction in some way?

Sure, but perhaps in a way that you might not expect.

Let nT stand for some self-contradiction.

It is not the case that God is unable to actualize nT. Rather, it is that nT is incapable of actualization. The former is a statement about God (and incompatible with omnipotence). The latter is a statement about nT (and says nothing about God). This is why Thomas Aquinas notes, "It is more exact to say that the intrinsically impossible is incapable of production, than to say that God cannot produce it."

The distinction that Aquinas underscores here is the fact that its impossibility is not due to some extrinsic feature (that which it has in relation to some thing outside itself); in other words, the idea that no agent can produce it is not what makes nT impossible. Rather, it is due to an intrinsic feature (that which it has in and of itself); in other words, the idea that it is incapable of production in and of itself, regardless of any agent, is what makes nT impossible.

Omnipotence is a concept which conveys the ability of God to perform all tasks subject to power, the accomplishment of which can never be frustrated by an obstacle. But a self-contradiction is an intrinsically impossible non-entity (i.e., it cannot be analytically conceived in itself without contradiction), which means that it is neither a task to be performed nor an obstacle against the accomplishment of one.

I shall borrow from an argument presented roughly ten years ago by Chuck Johnson (an atheist from the newsgroup talk.atheism) to underscore this distinction.

Let U stand for 'the universal set of tasks' and let T stand for 'some proposed task'.

1. Omnipotence is the ability to perform every member of U.
2. If T is logically possible, then T is a member of U.
3. If T is logically impossible, then T is not a member of U.
4. If T is not a member of U, then T is a non-task nT.
5. All nT form a null set Ø.

So it is immediately obvious that to ask if an omnipotent being can perform any members of a null set Ø is very absurd. It would be incorrect to say that he cannot; rather, it is that there is nothing there to perform. Aquinas again: "It is more exact to say that the intrinsically impossible is incapable of production, than to say that God cannot produce it."

Let me elaborate on this.

Intrinsic impossibilities do not limit omnipotence at all. Self-contradictions, by virtue of being two mutually exclusive properties, carry their impossibility within themselves; i.e., it is intrinsically impossible for them to have occupancy in the same universe at the same time—under all conditions and in all worlds and for all agents. "All agents" here includes God himself, Lewis notes in his book The Problem of Pain (HarperCollins, 2001), explaining further that God's omnipotence

means power to do all that is intrinsically possible, not to do the intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to him, but not nonsense. This is no limit to his power. If you choose to say 'God can give a creature free will and at the same time withhold free will from it,' you have not succeeded in saying anything about God: meaningless combinations of words do not suddenly acquire meaning simply because we prefix them [with] the two other words 'God can'. It remains true that all things are possible with God: the intrinsic impossibilities are not things but non-entities. It is no more possible for God than for the weakest of his creations to carry out both of two mutually exclusive alternatives; not because his power meets an obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we talk it about God (p.18).

Herein lies the key concept: omnipotence regards power, but self-contradictions have nothing to do with power. Why? Because omnipotence has no reference to that which is not an object of power, e.g., that which is self-contradictory. Let this be our maxim: If the impossible could become possible or actual simply by applying power to it, then it was never impossible to begin with, but merely difficult. That which is impossible remains impossible regardless of any power applied. Think about what the paradox question implies. To suggest that nothing is impossible given sufficient power (omnipotence) is to deny that real contradictions exist; i.e., given sufficient power, the impossible is actually possible, albeit difficult. But to toss logic out the window is to toss out the baby with the bathwater! The non-believer who makes such an argument accidentally proves too much: if neither logic nor contradictions really exist, well then, the very objection he started out with vanishes.

Omnipotence regards the power of God to accomplish all things which are subject to power, and that power is never frustrated by an obstacle; self-contradictions, as non-entities, can be neither objects of power nor possible obstacles to it. (Refer to my argument at the beginning.)

What does omnipotence actually mean? "God can do all things the accomplishment of which is a manifestation of power," said twelfth-century philosopher and theologian Hugh de St. Victor. "Omnipotence is maximal power," cites the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Omnipotence regards the power of God to accomplish all things which are subject to power. In all dictionaries, encyclopedias, and systematic theologies I have encountered, omnipotence is defined as: having unlimited or universal power; all-powerful; the state or quality of being all-powerful; the state of having unlimited power. Omnipotence does not mean—and has never meant—the ability to bring about a self-contradiction.

Cramer & The Cause of Sin - Pt. 3(a)

My friend and faithful brother David Cramer has continued his discussion on John Frame's argument but he has done so in two independent posts (here and here). My analysis will distinguish the content of his objection into four individual categories—(1) Objective Evil, (2) The Sovereignty of God, (3) The Cause of Sin, and (4) Cause vs. Authorship—and I will publish on each category over the next four days, beginning with (1).

1. OBJECTIVE EVIL

According to Cramer's position, the Bible teaches us that "there are some things that are objectively morally evil" which, he goes on to argue, God surely hates. I wish for the readers to understand that I agree with Cramer on this point, but with some notable reservations.

First of all—and this is hopefully a minor point—I submit that "morally evil" is a redundant expression because "evil" is itself a normative moral term. Consequently, as the astute mind will detect, I reject the term "natural evil" (e.g. earthquakes) because that imports a humanistic definition of "evil" into what should be our stalwart commitment to Scriptures. You see, I hold that moral order is grounded in the very being of God. Ergo, for an earthquake to be considered a natural 'evil' it would have to occur against God's will; if a phenomenon in nature occurs according to God's will, surely it is not evil. So I prefer to reserve "evil" for moral contemplation while we should call things such as earthquakes "natural disasters," as we normally do. (As the reader might surmise, I also submit that "evil" and "sin" are synonymous, interchangeable terms; i.e. they both refer to the same thing. Furthermore, such an argument as I affirm here quite readily hands Euthyphro his hat and shows him to the door.)

Secondly (and I hope Cramer would concur), I affirm that if anything is evil, it is so objectively. In other words, biblically speaking there is actually no such thing as subjective evil. Why? Because moral order is not a human invention; moral order is grounded in the very being of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands. Consequently, if 'objective' means "independent of either a particular human mind or human minds altogether," then we may assert that all evil is so objectively.

Cramer states that "objective moral evils are those actions [which are] wrong for any being, at any time, anywhere, to do them." While this might work on the surface, a difficulty arises when we examine it more closely; i.e. literally "any being"? I hear Euthyphro knocking at the door again. I reject such a notion because there is no moral order to which God himself is subject. He is the sole Lawgiver, whose commands are forever consistent with his immutably holy nature and which express all moral parameters. In other words, "any being" cannot be literal; it must restricted to only those beings created by God which he ordained to hold culpable at his judgment (angels and humans). God, as a being, is not included in the moral culpability to which 'objective evil' refers; neither are horses, nor plankton, nor a host of other beings. Also, this is why the taking of human life is not evil per se (in itself); it is evil only where God has proscribed against it. Sometimes God has commanded the taking of human life (1 Sam. 15:3) and the refusal to do so is evil (v. 24; cf. v. 20). It is possible that all of this truly is what Cramer meant; such precision was my own desire.

Tomorrow I shall post my comments on (2) The Sovereignty of God.

Reformed Theology: Salvation & God's Drawing

In the official CARM Facebook group, Steve Wilson had asked the following question:

I believe the question that needs to be [confronted] by Arminians is: If God offers salvation for all, and if it is open to everyone to choose to accept or reject, [then] what about those that the Father does not draw? How does this square with the idea that it is open for everyone? Why can't a man with freewill come to Christ unless he is drawn? Would God really rob someone of their free will to choose salvation by not drawing him to Christ?

And finally, does this support Arminianism or Calvinism?

Here is perhaps a finer point on that question: "What does it mean for God to 'offer' salvation to all if he does not also 'draw' all?" In other words:

1. "In what way does God 'offer' to all, such that he does not also 'draw' all?"

Where is the disconnect between God's offering and his drawing? Someone might reply with the notion of 'evangelism', but that is man offering salvation, not God—it is our task to take the gospel message throughout the world without discrimination. One person plants the seed, another person waters the seed. But God's 'offer' must be something more distinctive and efficacious, because God's will decides whether the seed grows (1 Cor. 3:6-7).

Which raises a related and equally important question:

2. "Is God's drawing efficacious?"

That is, in the context of God setting out to draw someone, does God accomplish what he purposed to do (Isa. 55:10-11)? Perhaps someone might reply that God's drawing never "forces" someone, but notice something important: through their very use of the word force they have already admitted that God's drawing is not efficacious, and we shall thank them for their answer—because forced describes a conscious resistance, i.e. the word itself suggests that God lacks complete control over the one being drawn, such that there remains some measure of resistance against God.

With respect to his question about whether these things "support Arminianism or Calvinism," I would offer the following response:

1. If all those given to the Son were first drawn by God;
2. if God's drawing is efficacious, such that all those given to the Son unfailingly come to him;
   
3. if ultimately some do not come and are not saved;
   
4. then this contradicts Arminianism, but is consistent with Calvinism.

No Theist Is An Atheist

CARSON: But you're an atheist when it comes to Hinduism, Sarah.

DAVID: Um, an 'atheist' is someone who has no belief in ANY gods. Ergo, Sarah cannot be an atheist in any sense, for she believes in at least one God.

CARSON: But she does not believe in all gods.

DAVID: Right, which means she is not a polytheist. But she is not an atheist. To call her an atheist takes a brutally illogical step. Or it butchers the definition of "atheist." One of the two. Neither is very flattering.

CARSON: I meant she didn't believe in the gods of Hinduism. Yeah, it butchers the definition of 'atheist'. I can handle that.

DAVID: Such an irresponsible and illogical definition of 'atheist' would mean that everyone throughout the whole world are atheists, rendering the term meaningless.

CARSON: I qualified it: "when it comes to Hinduism." Not ALL people are atheists when it comes to Hinduism.

DAVID: She is not an atheist when it comes to Hinduism, sir. She is a theist who rejects the gods of Hinduism.

This conversation recalled to my attention something Stephen Roberts was once proud of asserting (or perhaps still is): "I contend we are both atheists, I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours." With all due respect to Roberts as a person—whom I regarded as a friend for some years—that is one of the most incoherent and untenable statements I have heard an atheist make, a statement which Carson here seems to echo. It would be really appreciated if atheists could exhibit a little more consistently the rationality they so triumphantly espouse.

There is simply nothing rational about calling a theist an 'atheist' in any sense—it is, in fact, a direct logical contradiction. Although a Christian theist might reject the gods of Hinduism, that does not make her an atheist "when it comes to Hinduism." She is a theist nevertheless, because she affirms a belief in the God of Christian theism. There are gods that she rejects, certainly, but that only means she is not a polytheist; to say that it means she is somehow an atheist in any way is patently absurd. Those atheists who wish to stack the deck in favour of atheism should find another tactic, because this one makes a fool of them.

Cramer & The Cause of Sin - Pt. 2

Although there is, at this point in the discussion, no significant material to respond to on Cramer's blog (he is undoubtedly still buried in class work), there are some items worth noting.

First of all, Cramer is now aware of my blog, which is why this can now be referred to as a 'discussion'. Although he mistakenly thinks I followed him here, the reality is that I have been with Blogger for over five years; this particular incarnation (Itinerarium Mentis) is somewhat new, but my former blog (Apologia) was around for a while and, at one point, had even garnered the attention of Jared Wilson and the boys at The Thinklings, and also Austin R. Cline, a Regional Director for the Council for Secular Humanism. I have been around for a while.

Secondly, I wish to make something clear to Cramer personally: Please do not feel obligated to respond to my blog posts. I certainly appreciate your thoughtful responses and the challenges they present, and I do admire your commitment to growth in the knowledge of Christ and your passion for the purity of the gospel, but I know you have a good deal on your plate as a student so I do not want you feeling as though you have yet one more thing to deal with. My blog is a place where I like to share my thoughts and experiences as I likewise grow and mature in my Christian walk; some of those encounters occur on IRC, some of them on message boards, and some through reading other people's blogs and critically examining their content. Your views on Frame's argument grabbed my attention. I look forward to engaging you in a discussion, I just do not wish for you to feel burdened.

And thirdly, back to the readers now, Cramer makes a couple of statements I wish to briefly respond to. He maintains, first of all, his rather unfavourable characterization of John Frame's argument—quite expectedly, I should think—here calling it "theologically abominable." What I wish the readers to note is this: It is not yet clear that he is properly understanding Frame's thesis in the first place, and it will not be clear until Cramer has some time available to write more fully on the matter. So for the time being, the reader is really encouraged to take Cramer's comments with a proportionately sized grain of salt. I am familiar with Frame's argument on this point and I know there is nothing "theologically abominable" about it, as surely does Frame himself.

Also, it certainly is not enough to call a spade a spade, but that has nothing to do with today's pluralistic society. It has to do with sound reason, critical thinking, and our moral duty toward our brothers in Christ; to "simply call a spade a spade" is only so much ipse dixit (i.e. "any unsupported rhetorical assertion that lacks a logical argument") and will not compel anyone. If he is going to assert that Frame has strayed from the truth of the gospel, then he should expect that his readers will want to know how and why this is so. (And so would Frame himself, should he have ever happened upon the post. An unlikely event, but a good principle to consider.) Cramer is entitled to call Frame a "spade" but his academic discipline should inform him that doing so shoulders the burden of exposing the argument that produces such a conclusion. If he did not have the time to provide even an outline thereof—and he admits to not having the time—perhaps he could have expressed his reaction with less censure for the time being. Or saved it as a draft until it did include the outline. My only point is that if one is going to make such a terrible accusation against someone who has established himself as a God-fearing apologist and critically acclaimed Christian philosopher, it should include one's reasoning. My passion is fueled by the conviction that we, as Christians, are bound by a higher moral rectitude toward the members of God's family.

Cramer also states he is not claiming that Frame has "rejected the gospel" or "does not affirm the gospel message." True, but he is claiming that Frame here strays from the truth of the gospel. That is a very, very serious charge, is it not?

For now Cramer rightly has his academic responsibilities to attend to. Both myself and his readers, I am sure, can wait with due patience until he has the requisite time to elaborate.